

# Situating Deleuze on Literature and Philosophy: Territories Distinct but Uncannily Analogous

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## Abstract

How does one situate the thought of Gilles Deleuze (his own thought, as well as his collaborative writings with Félix Guattari)? On the one hand, the reader of his works is struck by the breadth of the topics they survey (philosophy, literature, political theory, cultural critique, psychoanalysis, film) as well as by wide variations in tone (sober, declarative unpacking of difficult philosophical concepts, but elsewhere inventive flights of fancy which have been much admired and hotly contested). On the other hand, if, as Michel Foucault suggested, our century is “Deleuzian,” this is possibly the case because of the multifaceted usefulness and rhetorical persuasiveness of terms such as “assemblage (*agencement*),” “deterritorialization,” “line of flight,” “plane of immanence,” “rhizome,” etc.—terms which have served multiple ideological purposes and which have migrated far from their Parisian or European points of origin.

In my article, I attempt to situate the relationship between literature and philosophy in the writings of Deleuze and Guattari. My thesis is that the writers’ own explicit attempts to separate the domains into separate ter-

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ritories (developed with the greatest explicitness and rigor in *What Is Philosophy?*) mask the fact that, for Deleuze the acute reader of literary texts by Proust and Kafka, these two supposedly distinct fields stand in a relation of mutual resonance. Rather than being separate but equal, literature and philosophy are strangely analogous. Philosophy, the domain in which concepts are created, resembles uncannily, in the mode of Freudian *Unheimlichkeit*, the spider's web of literature.

**Keywords:** Literature, philosophy, uncanniness, Proust, Kafka, Freud

How does one situate the thought of Gilles Deleuze (his own thought, as well as his collaborative writings with Félix Guattari)? On the one hand, the reader of his works is struck by the breadth of the topics surveyed (philosophy, literature, political theory, cultural critique, psychoanalysis, film) as well as by wide variations in tone and style (sober, declarative unpacking of difficult philosophical concepts effected with concision and elegance (*Expressionism in Philosophy: Spinoza; Nietzsche and Philosophy; Bergsonism; The Critical Philosophy of Kant*; not to speak of what is perhaps his masterwork, *Difference and Repetition*), but elsewhere inventive flights of fancy which have been both admired and hotly contested: *The Logic of Sense; Anti-Oedipus; A Thousand Plateaus*.<sup>1</sup> On the other hand, if, as Michel Foucault suggested, “perhaps one day this century will be known as Deleuzian” (885), this is possibly the case because of the multifaceted usefulness and rhetorical persuasiveness of terms such as “assemblage” (*agencement*), “deterritorialization,” and “reterritorialization,” “line of flight,” “plane of immanence,” “body without organs,” “rhizome,” etc.—terms which have served multiple methodological and ideological purposes and which have migrated far from their Parisian or European points of origin (to mention just two examples, at geographical and cultural antipodes: Édouard Glissant’s theoretical writings [the Caribbean]<sup>2</sup> and the First Annual Deleuze Studies in Asia International Conference [Taipei, 31 May—2 June, 2013] at which an earlier version of the present paper was delivered).

Within the modern European (“continental”) philosophical context, Deleuze came along at a time of bracing renewal, writing contemporaneously with Foucault, Ricoeur, Derrida, Bourdieu, and Habermas, and beginning his career just at the time Heidegger was to end his. Of special interest to me in

<sup>1</sup> *Anti-Oedipus*, in particular, has become somewhat of a lightning-rod for criticism. In the entry “Gilles Deleuze” to *The Oxford Companion to Philosophy*, Christopher Norris describes the work as “a vast, chaotic rag-bag of a book” (183).

<sup>2</sup> Aside from being a reputed poet and novelist, the Martinican writer Edouard Glissant has written theoretically on the concepts of “*antillanité*” (*Le Discours antillais*), “*identité-relation*” (*Poétique de la relation* and *Philosophie de la relation*), and “*le tout-monde*” (*Traité du Tout-Monde*.) Glissant’s intellectual debt to Deleuze is perhaps most evident in the former’s theorizing of “*identité-relation*” on the basis of Deleuze’s “rhizome.” In an interview with Frédéric Joignot of *Le Monde*, Glissant makes a concise statement demonstrating this debt: “Fixed identities do harm to the sensibility of contemporary man engaged in a chaotic world and living in creolized societies. The identity-relation (*l’identité-relation*) or “rhizome-identity” (*l’identité rhizome*) as it was called by Gilles Deleuze, seems better adapted to the situation. This is difficult to admit, and fills us with the fear of calling into question the unity of our identity, the hard core of our person—an identity folded into itself, fearful of strangeness, associated with a language, a nation, a religion, sometimes an ethnicity, a race, a tribe, a clan, a well-defined entity with which we identify. But we must change our point of view on identities, as we must on our relation to the other. We must construct an unstable, fluctuating, creative, fragile personality, at the crossroads of the self and the other. An identity-relation (*identité-relation*)” (my translation).

the development that follows is one particular aspect of Deleuze's writings, and I shall dwell uniquely on that one aspect: namely, the relation between literature and philosophy in his work. This is a broad territory, and I shall make no attempt to survey it with anything resembling a systematic perspective. Rather, I should like to begin concisely, with an initial distinction between Deleuze and Heidegger and Derrida, and then move on, following Deleuze's own statements on the complex links between these two fields, in order to propose, neither a direct confirmation of what Deleuze states nor a refutation of his assertions, but rather a slight, but I think significant, *nuance* to the picture he paints of literature and philosophy as equally important but separate fields.

What distinguishes Deleuze from his immediate predecessor Martin Heidegger and his contemporary Jacques Derrida is that Deleuze continues to believe in a specifically philosophical project, a project that can only be carried out by philosophy *as* distinct territory. Whereas Heidegger, after the famous *Kehre*, had turned more and more away from philosophy understood as a specialized field with a specialized technical vocabulary which, in his view, had fallen away from its source, toward a kind of thinking that shared many of its attributes with poetry (thus *Denken und Dichten* replace *Philosophie* in Heidegger's later idiom),<sup>3</sup> and whereas, with and after *Glas* (1974), Derrida moves toward a mixing of linguistic forms of expression (in this case, an imaginative and disconcerting juxtaposition and engaged commentary of Hegel's philosophical reasoning and Jean Genet's autobiographical musings),<sup>4</sup> Deleuze thinks that philosophy, like literature, like science, *is a field*. When one reads Deleuze on philosophy, whether he is analyzing the continental or analytical tradition, one is, of course,

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<sup>3</sup> On the question of philosophy falling away from its source, see the concise development in Heidegger's "Letter on Humanism," notably the passage in which the German thinker responds to Jean Beaufret's question on the relation of ontology to ethics. In order to demonstrate that ontology must precede any possible ethics, Heidegger comments upon the Greek word *ethos*, meaning dwelling, or, in his view, "the open region in which man dwells" (233). In the same way that, with the passage of time and the fall of primordial thought outside itself into the narrow and purely technical domain of philosophy, there is, according to Heidegger, a loss of conceptual acuity and an intellectual decline; in the same way, in the evolution toward the creation of a sub-field within philosophy called "ethics," there is also considerable loss—loss of the initial meaning of the word *ethos*, whose resonance one finds in a rereading, or corrected reading, of one of Heraclitus's fragments, *ethos anthropoi daimon*. This fragment, traditionally translated as "A man's character is his daimon," becomes, in Heidegger's reinterpretation: "The (familiar) abode is for man the open region for the presencing of god (the unfamiliar one)" (234). In the Heideggerian reflection on Being, it is thus evident that the question "Who are we?" implies a second, no less important question: "Where are we?"—i.e., What is, and where is, our *dwelling*? In Deleuze's thought, the question of one's dwelling takes a different *turn*, with the development of new, decentered concepts of movement, regress, and egress: deterritorialization, reterritorialization, and lines of flight.

<sup>4</sup> For a reading of this juxtaposition and Derrida's problematic appropriation of Genet's writings within the textual web of *Glas*, see David R. Ellison, "À propos du 'style' de Genet."

aware of his broad knowledge, his erudition, his critical acumen, and his capacity not only to think conceptually, but, as he puts it in *What Is Philosophy?* to *create concepts*.<sup>5</sup> At the same time, however, and this is unusual, the professor of literature or literary critic is equally impressed (or should be, in my opinion) by Deleuze as a reader of literary texts. Whether one agrees wholeheartedly with everything he says about Proust or Kafka (and in the present essay I shall be focusing on both *Proust and Signs* and *Kafka: Toward a Minor Literature*), it seems to me that one is compelled to admire Deleuze's interpretations of these two modernist writers. But here is the question: is Deleuze simply but remarkably capable as a reader of fictional texts, making contributions to the separate fields of literature and philosophy; or is there some kind of overflow between these two forms of reading which is mutually fructifying? Can it be said that Deleuze's view of philosophy, his philosophy of philosophy, so to speak, borrows from, or perhaps better, *resonates with*, his readings of literary works? And if this should be true, what consequences would this have with respect to Deleuze's very anti-Heideggerian and anti-Derridian project of tracing for philosophy, and within philosophy as classically understood, its very own territory? It is to these questions that the next section will be devoted.

Before beginning my demonstration proper, I should add just one word of caution. I am aware that it would be possible (but I think not legitimate and not of the greatest intellectual interest) to see in the books on Proust and Kafka essentially practical applications of the theories enunciated in the *Anti-Oedipus*—i.e., the conceptual apparatus governing the readings of Proust and Kafka is similar to, or the same as, the apparatus Deleuze and Guattari develop for their anti-Oedipal magnum opus. I am not going to get into this bramble bush, but am willing to assert that the readings of Proust and of Kafka are not in any way dependent upon the *Anti-Oedipus*, but rather are parallel to it and enriching of it. I shall analyze the precise form of the mutual dependency of philosophy and literature in the final part of my essay.

I should like to begin with an overview of several salient features of *Kafka: Toward a Minor Literature* and *Proust and Signs* and some of the interpretive conclusions in those books before moving on to the late recapitulative text *What Is Philosophy?* and the ways in which this philosophical testimony echoes the literary readings in curious but, I think, significant ways.

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<sup>5</sup> From the early pages of *What Is Philosophy?*, see the thesis statement: "Philosophers have not been sufficiently concerned with the nature of the concept as philosophical reality. They have preferred to think of it as a given knowledge or representation that can be explained by the faculties able to form it (abstraction or generalization) or employ it (judgment). But the concept is not given, it is created; it is to be created. It is not formed but posits itself in itself" (11).

Let us begin with the principal theses of the studies of Kafka and Proust.

In the Kafka book, Deleuze and Guattari are simultaneously studying the various works of Franz Kafka (the letters, the short stories, the journal, and the unfinished novels) and also the mixed-language, mixed-cultural context in which he wrote: the Prague of the early 20<sup>th</sup> century, with Czech as the major language and German, the particular impoverished German elaborated by Kafka, as its minor counterpart. Picking up on points developed within the *Anti-Oedipus*, we have the following definitions of a “minor literature,” which the authors enlarge from its initial modest site, granting it a more general application to what one could call “revolutionary” literature:

The three characteristics of minor literature are the deterritorialization of language, the connection of the individual to a political immediacy, and the collective assemblage of enunciation. We might as well say that minor literature no longer designates specific literatures but the revolutionary conditions for every literature within the heart of what is called great (or established) literature. (18)

Minor literature, as practiced by Kafka, follows what Deleuze and Guattari call *lines of flight*, and is characterized, despite the appearance of depression and culpability exhibited by its fictional figures, by a certain “diabolical innocence” (33). According to this scheme, Kafka does not allow himself to be reterritorialized by Oedipus (unlike Freud, in the authors’ view), but navigates the rhizomes he and his animal protagonists create, and can be said to be reterritorialized not by guilt, but simply by “fatigue, by a lack of inventions, by the imprudence of what one has started” (*ibid.*). The reader might think here of the self-conscious rodent in the late story entitled “*Der Bau*” (“The Burrow”), who continually digs tunnels and erects fortifications against an unseen enemy, collapsing occasionally, but never for long, as he blindly follows his compulsive drive. The persuasiveness of this interpretation will depend upon the degree to which the reader of Deleuze and Guattari is willing to grant that guilt is always an appearance, a mere mask for Kafka, something not to be taken seriously. One can wonder, however, if this kind of reading does justice to the early story “*Das Urteil*” (“The Judgment”), in which the protagonist’s suicide by drowning would appear not to be the result of simple “fatigue,” but rather of a sense of guilt aggravated to the point of becoming a death wish.

Although Deleuze does not read Proust against the background of a specific cultural context, as is the case with Kafka and the “minor literature” of Prague, we readers are also asked, in the case of *À la recherche du temps perdu* (*In Search of Lost Time*), to grant only minimal importance to the apparently large theme of guilt that permeates Proust’s 3,000-page novel. Just as pertains to the suicidal drowning in “The Judgment,” we would need to read around or

read “over” the celebrated scene of the good-night kiss in *Combray*, in which the Narrator writes of his deep sense of guilt in forcing his mother to spend the night with him, away from the Law-giving father. In this case, one would need to not take seriously, or not read at all, phrases in that scene such as the concluding remarks in which the Narrator summarizes the effects, both on himself and on his mother, of the kiss he has obtained by coercion:

I ought to have been happy: I was not. It seemed to me that my mother had just made me a first concession which must be painful to her, that this was a first abdication on her part before the ideal she had conceived for me, and that for the first time she, who was so courageous, was confessing herself defeated. It seemed to me that, if I had just gained a victory, it was over her, that I had succeeded, as illness, affliction, or age might have done, in slackening her will, in causing her judgment to weaken and that this evening was the beginning of a new era, would remain as a sad date. (1: 41)

In the second section of *Proust and Signs*, on the Literary Machine as “Antilogos,” first published in French in 1970, two years before *L'Anti-Oedipe* and five years before *Kafka: Pour une littérature mineure* (at a time when Deleuze had not yet decided to foreclose completely a certain depressive culpability from Kafka’s imaginary universe), we have this statement on the law and culpability as they appear in Proust (in contradistinction, it would seem, to Kafka):

Modern consciousness of the law assumed a particularly acute form in Kafka: it is in *The Great Wall of China* that we find the fundamental link between the fragmentary character of the wall, the fragmentary mode of its construction, and the unknowable character of the law, its determination identical to a punishment of guilt. In Proust, however, the law presents another figure, because guilt is more like the appearance which conceals a more profound fragmentary reality, instead of being itself this more profound reality to which the detached fragments lead us. The depressive consciousness of the law as it appears in Kafka is countered in this sense by the schizoid consciousness of the law according to Proust. (132)

Later on in the same development, Deleuze writes, in lapidary form: “Now, in Proust the theme of guilt remains superficial, social rather than moral, projected upon others rather than internalized in the narrator” (142). This quite debatable evacuation of culpability per se from the Proustian imaginary allows Deleuze to present the Proustian Narrator not as the fictional representation of a person (subject to desires, drives, anxiety, and jealousy, whether deterritorialized or finally reterritorialized), but rather, in the final (quite remarkably brilliant) chapter of his study, as a spider, a “body without organs” sensitive to the vibrations and resonances of its environment, to which it responds with exquisite sensitivity and aggression:

But what is a body without organs? The spider too sees nothing, perceives nothing, remembers nothing. She receives only the slightest vibration at the edge of her web,

which propagates itself in her body as an intensive wave and sends her leaping to the necessary place. Without eyes, without nose, without mouth, she answers only to signs, the merest sign surging through her body and causing her to spring upon her prey. The Search is not constructed like a cathedral or like a gown, but like a web. The spider-Narrator, whose web is the Search being spun, being woven by each thread stirred by one sign or another: the web and the spider, the web and the body are one and the same machine. (181-82)

In this striking and highly problematic comparison (problematic because, by critical consensus, most readers of Proust see in the Narrator a human figure or the fictional representation of a human figure, not a “body without organs”), the interpreter of Deleuze’s writings will note an analytical gesture typical of the French philosopher—one that consists of making a categorical assertion, in the form of a *cut* (in French: *coupure*), through which competing figures or alternative interpretations to the one being proposed by Deleuze are quite simply eliminated from consideration. Here, Deleuze writes that Proust’s novel “is not constructed like a cathedral or like a gown, but like a web” (181). The assertion is interesting, and the figure of the spider is thought-provoking, but the problem is that the Proustian Narrator himself compares his novel both to a cathedral and to a gown (and not to a spider’s web).<sup>6</sup> In the same way, at the beginning of *Proust and Signs*, in the very process of presenting his thesis, Deleuze asserts: “What constitutes the unity of *In Search of Lost Time*? We know, at least, what does not. It is not recollection, memory, even involuntary memory. . . . Proust’s work is based not on the exposition of memory, but on the apprenticeship to signs” (3-4). Once again, very interesting, and to many readers, very persuasive (especially in the light of the semiotic interests Proust developed in his reading and translation of John Ruskin), but is it really possible to eliminate from consideration the theory of involuntary memory on which the entirety of Proust’s novel would appear to be structured, if one takes seriously the Narrator’s concluding remarks in the famous scene of the “petite madeleine”?<sup>7</sup>

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<sup>6</sup> Toward the conclusion of the final volume of *In Search of Lost Time* (*Le Temps retrouvé*, or *Finding Time Again*), the Narrator searches for analogies for the book he is about to write and the hard work involved in that writing: “How happy the writer of a book like that would be, I thought, what a labour awaited him! To give some idea of it, one would have to go to the most elevated and divergent arts for comparisons; for this writer . . . would have to prepare his book scrupulously, perpetually regrouping his forces as in an offensive, and putting up with the work like tiredness, accepting it like a rule, constructing it like a church, following it like a regime, overcoming it like an obstacle, winning it like a friendship, feeding it up like a child, creating it like a world.” But soon thereafter, in the same passage, he realizes that the act of writing also possesses a more modest, artisanal quality. He then compares his projected work to a dress being made by his housemaid, Françoise: “pinning a supplementary page in place here and there, I should construct my book, I don’t dare say, ambitiously, as if it were a cathedral, but simply as if it were a dress I was making” (6: 342-43).

<sup>7</sup> In what is doubtless the most celebrated passage of Proust’s novel, the Narrator, thanks to the



Now this kind of categorical assertion via the elimination of competing interpretations is precisely what one finds in the testimonial work of Deleuze and Guattari: *What Is Philosophy?* (this volume appeared in English translation in 1994, just one year before Deleuze's suicide). Indeed, on the back flap of the original French edition (1991), we read a statement which is developed extensively within the work: "Philosophy is neither contemplation, nor reflection, nor communication. It is the activity which creates concepts" (my translation). Throughout their treatise, Deleuze and Guattari cut off philosophy from science on the one hand, and literature and the fine arts on the other: they make a strategic cut in order to fence off philosophy and provide it with its own domain. But at the same time—and here, one must be fair to the complexity of Deleuzian thought—it is not as if the authors were *cutting off* the possibility of some sort of communication between and among these three domains (in French: *ils coupent, mais ne coupent pas court à la communication, à la relation*). But what I find particularly interesting is that, at the moment Deleuze and Guattari define the very foundation of philosophy, the concept, that building-block belonging, in their view, only to philosophy, their prose sounds remarkably like what Deleuze had written of the Proustian Narrator-spider, and includes both Proustian and Kafka elements:

Concepts are centers of vibrations, each in itself and every one in relation to all the others. This is why *they all resonate* rather than cohere or correspond to all the others. There is no reason why concepts should cohere. As fragmentary totalities, concepts are not even the pieces of a puzzle, for their irregular contours do not correspond to each other. They do form *a wall*, but it is a dry-stone wall, and *everything holds together only along diverging lines*. Even bridges from one concept to another are still junctions or detours, which do not describe any discursive whole. They are

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involuntary memory associations evoked by a pastry ("*petite madeleine*") dipped in tea, becomes able to bridge present and past, thereby uncovering the temporal dimension of his existence and setting in motion those people and places which will become the very material of his fictional work. At the conclusion of the passage, we read: "And as soon as I had recognized the taste of the piece of madeleine dipped in lime-blossom tea that my aunt used to give me . . . immediately the old grey house on the street, where her bedroom was, came like a stage-set to attach itself to the little wing opening on to the garden . . . and with the house, the town, from morning to night and in all weathers. . . . And as in that game in which the Japanese amuse themselves by filling a porcelain bowl with water and steeping in it little pieces of paper until then indistinct, which, the moment they are immersed in it, stretch and shape themselves, colour and differentiate, become flowers, houses, human figures, firm and recognizable, so now all the flowers in our garden and in M. Swann's park, and the water-lilies on the Vivonne, and the good people of the village and their little dwellings and the church and all of Combray and its surroundings, all of this which is assuming form and substance, emerged, town and gardens alike, from my cup of tea" (1: 50). Most readers of Proust will have difficulty agreeing with Deleuze that the *Recherche* is really or fundamentally about the apprenticeship to signs and not about involuntary memory. It would be closer to the truth (and to readerly common sense) to say that the novel is about *both* involuntary memory and the apprenticeship to signs.

movable bridges. From this point of view, philosophy can be seen as being in a perpetual state of digression or digressiveness. (23, italics by Deleuze and Guattari)

One wonders whether the either-or scheme proposed explicitly by Deleuze and Guattari—philosophy *or* science, philosophy *or* literature and the fine arts—a necessary scheme if one wishes to keep the domains separate—does not mask a both-and scheme: in the case that concerns us here, literature *alongside* philosophy. Philosophy, which is the domain in which concepts are created, resembles strangely, let us say, uncannily, in the mode of Freudian *Unheimlichkeit*,<sup>8</sup> the spider's web of literature, the web in which, according to Deleuze, the Proustian Narrator senses the vibrations of signs. And the wall mentioned in the passage I have just quoted resembles, also uncannily, the incomplete, haphazard structure in "The Great Wall of China," built not as a totalizing structure guaranteeing envelopment and protection, but rather as what Kafka's narrative voice calls a "piecemeal construction" (235)—a fragmentary design in which, to use the language of Deleuze and Guattari, "everything holds together only along diverging lines."

It is with this in mind that I would like to propose, not a refutation of Deleuze, not even a correction in the strict sense, but a slight inflection of his thought. The reader of Deleuze and Guattari will remember the ringing conclusion of *What Is Philosophy?*:

The three planes, along with their elements, are irreducible: *plane of immanence of philosophy, plane of composition of art, plane of reference or coordination of science; form of concept, force of sensation, function of knowledge; concepts and conceptual personae, sensations and aesthetic figures, figures and partial observers.* Analogous problems are posed for each plane. (216, italics by Deleuze and Guattari)

I would like to propose that we add this adjective "analogous" as a qualifier to the term "uncanny" as I conclude. According to the declarative statements of Deleuze and Guattari, literature and the fine arts on the one hand, and philosophy on the other, are not strict analogues, in the mode of Heidegger's *Denken und Dichten*, nor are they to be mixed, as is the case in many of Derrida's writings. Rather, providing we heed the intertextual echoes moving through and across Deleuze's writings, we can venture to say that literature (or art, broadly understood) relates to philosophy, not so much as something completely different,

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<sup>8</sup> For a concise exposition of the question of uncanniness, or *Unheimlichkeit*, see Sigmund Freud's essay "The Uncanny," recently included in a volume of the same title with other essays concerning the complex intersections between psychology and art (see Works Cited section). I endeavored to situate this essay within the progression of Romanticism to Modernism in my book *Ethics and Aesthetics in European Modernist Literature: From the Sublime to the Uncanny*.

occupying its own field and possessing its own language, but as something resembling it uncannily, vibrating with it, inhabiting the same kind of “piecemeal” unfinished structure. Literature and philosophy, therefore, mutually resonate as same-but-different territories, as *Doppelgänger* whose strangely analogous contributions to the human intellect and sensibility perennially engage our interpretive labor.

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## 遊牧於文學與哲學領域間的德勒茲： 絕對區分 / 詭秘擬似

### 摘要

要如何定位德勒茲的論述，不論是他個人的著作，或是他與瓜達希的合著？德勒茲的讀者常震懾於其作品涵蓋議題之廣泛（哲學、文學、政治理論、文化批評、精神分析、電影）以及其論述語氣之多變（時而嚴肅陳述費解的哲學概念，時而創新的想像力飛馳奔騰，後者往往在深受激賞之餘也引發激辯）；而傅柯所謂這是一個德勒茲的世紀，或因有感於德勒茲提出的概念如「裝配」、「解領域化」、「逃逸路線」、「內在平面」、「塊莖」等等，都可據以探討多種議題且深具說服力。這些概念不僅被多種意識型態挪用，甚且自其巴黎或歐洲的根源播遷至遠處。

本文試圖探討德勒茲與瓜達希論述中文學與哲學之間的關係。作者認為，德瓜二人將文學與哲學明確區分為兩個領域（在《何謂哲學？》中著力尤深）之舉，掩蓋了一個事實：對德勒茲這樣就普魯斯特與卡夫卡的作品提出精闢見解的讀者而言，理當有所區分的文學與哲學領域事實上彼此共振。與其說兩者雖分離但相等，不如說文學與哲學彼此詭秘擬似——此處的詭秘正是佛洛依德所謂不熟悉的事物中透露出的奇異的熟悉感。創造概念的哲學與文學編織的蛛網詭秘擬似。

**關鍵字：**文學，哲學，詭秘，普魯斯特，卡夫卡，佛洛依德