

Cultural Studies—A Reformist or Revolutionary Force for Social Change?

E. San Juan, Jr.

ABSTRACT

Born from the crisis of Eurocentric humanities and social-science disciplines, the “desire” called Cultural Studies (CS) in the metropolitan academies has now become institutionalized and reconfigured safely. With its canonical archive (Stuart Hall, de Certeau, Lyotard, etc.) and regimes of semiotic reading, deconstructive aesthetics, and eclectic inventory, Western CS has failed to question the hegemonic relations of power between metropole and periphery, between subordinate and dominant nation-states. It has failed, more precisely, to critique the globalized commodification of cultural products (now labelled “intellectual property”) and practices. More seriously, it has failed to challenge the persistent domination of peripheral, neocolonized countries by hegemonic, advanced industrial nation-states. In my paper, I attempt to diagnose the causes of these failures. In general, I argue that it inheres in the postmodernist relativism and nominalism of CS, its rejection of the imperative to integrate theory and practice, its ethos of rhetorical mastery. These inadequacies are worsened by its pragmatic refusal to grasp the political economy operating in the globalization or transnationalization of cultures around the world. Lacking a framework of rendering intelligible the effects of the transnational market on culture (ideas, practices, products exchanged via multimedia communications technology), CS has in general become complicitous with the profound dynamics of reification that has undermined the emancipatory project of modernity (already elaborated by various thinkers, among them Habermas, Jameson,

Said, and others). I propose a renewal of a historicist "cultural materialism" attuned to developments in Asia (particularly China), Latin America, and Africa that would recover the impulses of "national liberation struggles" in the last half of this century. This new framework would try to recover those oppositional and critical impulses embodied in the examples of Fanon, Amílcar Cabral, Sun Yat-sen, C.L.R. James, Che Guevarra, Lu Hsun, Aimé Césaire, and others. I am speculating on the possibility of a program of cultural studies keyed to the cultural practices of subaltern people of color that will articulate selected elements of the Western Enlightenment tradition with the needs and projects of hitherto silenced, marginalized, and invisible "Others."

KEY WORDS

Cultural Studies
hegemony
Marxism
globalization
power

articulation
political economy
capital
dialectics
multiculturalism



Since the intervention of Cultural Studies (CS) in the Western academy began with violating the conventional protocols, I start with a similar transgression by a preface of travel notes. Last March my wife and I attended a convention of the National Association of Ethnic Studies in Orlando, Florida, where we encountered the tourist holiday crowd in full force. Among the attractions disseminated by hundreds of brochures and media publicity is the Salvador Dali Museum located in St. Petersburg, Florida. The Museum's brochure describes the place in six languages (German, Spanish, French, Portuguese, and Dutch); the English version reads thus:

World-famous, the Salvador Dali Museum ranks as one of the top attractions in Florida receiving the highest rating by the Michelin Green Guide—the only such attraction on the west coast to be so honored. Daily tours of the museum's fascinating collection will educate, yet entertain you, about one of the 20th century's greatest artist—Salvador Dali. Bewildering double images and incredible paintings will surprise; sculptures, holograms and art glass will amaze; and early impressionist-style paintings and melting clocks will delight you. You are assured of finding something special. Be sure to include time for the Dali Museum in downtown St. Petersburg in your plans.

No doubt the Museum has been competing with such popular favorites as Epcot Disney, Universal Studios, Sea World, Wonderworks, and a thousand other diversions—from restaurants, specialized

shows, art galleries, curio shops, and diverse simulations and imitations of aspects of Disney World in numerous malls. We visited the Museum for verification. The reality was not far from the media hype. Shopping at the Museum, with surrealist-art mementoes and assorted merchandise guaranteed to educate, surprise, entertain, amaze and delight, is indeed the avowed rationale.

Later in March, I participated in an international conference organized by the Faculty of Letters and Social Sciences at Chiba University, Tokyo, Japan. The theme of the conference was "Searching for the Paradigm of Pluralism: Cultural and Social Pluralism and Co-existence in South and Southeast Asia." Scholars from Thailand, the Philippines, India, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka came; the plenary lecture was given by a leading Japanese scholar, Prof. Mitsuo Nakamura, who spoke about "Islam and Civil Society—Hope and Despair," while my topic was "The Paradox of Multiculturalism: Ethnicity, Race, and Identity in the Philippines." Mindful of the Japanese Empire's goal of building a "Great East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere" during World War II and the peculiar ethnic homogeneity in Japan, I remarked that the dialogue was a good start in exploring the meaning and implications of "multiculturalism" which, initiated in the West as a theme, genre, policy, and disciplinary orientation, can be recontextualized in the Asian setting and merged with the larger research and political projects of intellectuals, government officials, and other protagonists in the public sphere.

There is some distance, of course, between multiculturalism and CS. Disneyworld, Dali and Japan are coeval in the frame of my experience. How do we connect both the Dali Museum and the Japanese interest in pluralism, and my position as a Filipino scholar based in the U.S. as constituent elements in the field of CS? Given the fact that the discipline or practice called "cultural studies" has acquired a distinct temper at every case of "situational appropriation," one can call both the placing of the Salvador Dali Museum in the tourist-shopping cosmopolis and the multiculturalist conference in Chiba, Japan, as potential points of trajectory for reflection on the plight of CS. As a comparative literature scholar from the Philippines, and also a spe-

cialist in ethnic studies in the U.S. academy, I consider myself a conjunctural locus for the encounter between various disciplines in the social sciences and humanities, between “third” and “first” world cultures, and between popular/plebeian layers of culture and the mainly Eurocentric discourse of the academy. Obviously I may be an exceptional case, even though Taiwan has become also one site for the exchange between Western CS and its local practitioners. But in what way is this encounter productive of knowledge and pedagogical practice that can be used for undoing the Eurocentric, Western hegemony of global capitalism? Can the critical apparatus of concepts, idiom, rhetoric, and style be imported or transplanted from Birmingham and Chapel Hill, USA, to Asian, African, and Latin American milieus without reinforcing postcolonial and imperial hegemonies?

The inaugural collection *Cultural Studies* edited by Lawrence Grossberg, Cary Nelson and Paula Treichler has established certain doxa: CS as a superior form of bricolage, context dependent but both anti-/post-/multi-disciplinary, pragmatic, strategic and self-reflective, with a tradition and lexicon that defy codification, affording no guarantees of validity or authoritativeness, endless self-reflexive interrogation. It is a contentious field crisscrossed by diverse positions and trajectories, putatively open-ended. What does *bricolage* mean? It encompasses textual analysis, semiotics, deconstruction, ethnography, interviews, phonemic analysis, psychoanalysis, rhizomatics, content analysis, survey research, and so on. The British CS expert Richard Johnson describes the three models of CS in terms of “production-based,” “text-based,” and “studies of lived cultures” (107). While claiming that there is no single narrative or definition of CS, Grossberg and his colleagues cite the double articulation of CS: cultural practice and production as the ground on which analysis takes place simultaneously with political critique and intervention. Investigating the grounded practices, representations, languages and customs of specific historical formations, CS also studies “the contradictory forms of ‘common sense’ or commonplace understandings which presumably provide resources to fight the constraints of the social order. Grossberg and colleagues write: “It is nevertheless true that

from the outset cultural studies' efforts to recover working-class culture and history and to synthesize progressive traditions in Western intellectual history had had both overt and implicit political aims" (5). But what are the concrete consequences and implications of terms such as "political critique," "progressive," and "intervention"?

In an interview by *Radical Philosophy* in 1997, Stuart Hall reminded us of the core problematic of CS at its foundational moment: culture (meaning, symbolic forms, signifying practices, discourses) situated in the context of social relations and the organization of power. The analysis of semiotic and discursive practices—the linkages between language/literature and political economy/mode of production—includes with it the examination of the position of collective subjects in history, generating a critique of those practices and positions. Hall comments on a later development: "A formal deconstructionism which isn't asking questions about the insertion of symbolic processes into societal contexts and their imbrication with power is not interested in the cultural studies problematic" (390). CS then is distinguished by its examination of how cultural practices are enmeshed in networks of power. But is it enough to postulate as a desideratum of legitimacy for this new approach the linkage of discourse and society and power? What does "power" signify here? How is it related to political economy and the complex dynamics of social relations? Isn't this by itself a formula for a simple juxtaposition of empty formalistic concepts since there is no indication of purpose, agenda, or historical direction? Isn't this a rehashing of the rudimentary empiricist demand that ideas be framed in social and political contexts?

All commentators agree that a version of Marxist reductionism, otherwise known as economism, triggered the revolt against the left. What happened in the reaction to a caricatured "actually existing" Marxism? Despite claims that the rebels were reinstating agency and freedom to the subject, a swing to metaphysics and obscurantist reaction occurred. I believe the correction offered, namely, the over-emphasis on a formalist methodology conflated with organicist (Leavis) or nihilistic metaphysical assumptions (post-structuralism),

resulted into an unwitting cooptation of CS. It was never radical enough to destroy the logic of capital and the ideology of commodity exchange. Eventually CS has become an Establishment organon, or an academic “ideological state apparatus” preventing even the old style of *kulturkritik* to function.

One of the most astute diagnoses of this decay is by Francis Mulhern. In utilizing Gramsci’s complex notion of hegemony to ascribe more freedom to the subject, postmodernist CS overexaggerated the possibility of liberation over the established fact of domination. Both subordination and resistance are found in popular culture, the impulses of resistance embedded in relations of domination and imperatives of commodification. Rejecting totality, according to Mulhern, CS has ignored elite or high cultural forms and elevated popular culture as intrinsically subversive of the hegemonic mode of production, thus overlooking “the overwhelming historical realities of inequality and subordination” that condition both (34). In privileging commodified recreation or aestheticized performative activity found in marketed “life-styles,” Mulhern argues that the “spontaneous bent of cultural studies is actually *conformist*—at its worst, the theoretical self-consciousness of satellite television and shopping malls” (35). If the culture of everyday life is politicized and all difference regarded as immediately emancipatory, this dissolves the “possibility of culture as a field of political struggle.” Why? Because politics is a deliberative and injunctive practice that seeks to determine the character of social relations while culture, whose major function is to produce meanings, does not have for its chief purpose the determination of social relations by deliberation, injunction and coercion. The two realms should not be collapsed nor conflated. Political judgement and cultural judgement are distinct and do not coincide, as Gramsci taught us.

Mulhern concludes that orthodox CS treats all differences as absolute, whereas politics aims for solidarities, united fronts, in pursuit of specific ends. By eliding that distinction, dissolving politics into culture, CS abandons the search for political solidarities and freezes “the particularisms of cultural difference,” of differing cultural prac-

tices as political in themselves. Mulhern perceives CS accepting the inescapable bondage of the masses to consumer capitalism—the ironical end-result of their will to resist all determinisms: “There is no space, and in fact no need, for struggle if all popular culture, abstracted from ‘high’ culture and from the historical realities of inequality and domination, is already active and critical, if television and shopping are already teachers of subversion” (40). This has also been sharply formulated by Neil Larsen in his critique of the populist brand of CS advocated by John Fiske. Fiske simply reads off the popular as “immediacy,” as the “everyday” while the “aesthetic” is quarantined in idealized transcendence—“the antinomial ideology of modernism itself, but here with its normative polarities reversed” (Larsen 91).

Apart from the historical misfortunes of the radical Left in Britain (where the Birmingham experiment in CS was first launched), the post-structuralist “exorbitation” of language and semiotics contributed to what I would call a “metaphysical turn” in CS. Socioeconomic determinants shaped its immanent vicissitudes. The evolution from cultural empiricism to Althusserian structuralism ended in a peculiar reading of Gramsci. The concept of ideology was purged and hegemony replaced ideology-critique. Entirely overlooking the distinction between class-in-itself and class-for-itself already found in Marx’s *Eighteenth Brumaire* and other works, Laclau interpreted the Gramscian concept of hegemony hinging on working-class moral/intellectual leadership as equivalent to the “historic bloc.” This bloc constructs political subjects (working class, women, environmentalists, etc.) by the figure of equivalence—politics as “articulation.” While Laclau and Mouffe (in their joint work, *Hegemony and Socialist Strategy*) grant that the collective will of such a bloc is forged by organic intellectuals, a will expressed in the hegemonic politics uniting the bloc, they argue further that there is not just one hegemonic center in society but many. A field of “articulation” is posited in which society is no longer a totality sutured together, but an open field; “the openness of the social as the constitutive ground or ‘negative essence’ of the existing, and the diverse ‘social orders’ as precarious and ultimately failed attempts to domesticate the field of

differences" (95-96). Rejecting the Marxist notions of "mode of production," "social formation," "overdetermination," and the like, Laclau and Mouffe claim that all social and economic reality is constructed by articulatory practices that establish identities of elements through relation. Thus, "All identity is relational . . . There is no essence, no structure, which underlies the signifier, social identity is symbolic and relational, not fixed independently of any articulation," although temporary nodal points in the symbolic field for fixing meanings are conceded (113). But what rationale or purpose lies behind articulation? Unaffected by the elements it articulates, what is the direction of articulatory practice? The motivations and ends of this research programme remain indeterminate.

Translated into the grammar and syntax of CS, the theory of articulation becomes almost a methodological doctrine. Hall states: "An articulation is thus the form of the connection that *can* make a unity of two different elements, under certain conditions . . . The 'unity' which matters is a linkage between that articulated discourse [composed of elements without any necessary 'belongingness'] and the social forces with which it can, under certain historical conditions, but need not necessarily, be connected" (141). Hall stresses the *a priori* contingency and adhoc transitoriness distinguishing the practice of articulation. One suspects that whoever commands enough force can alter the contingent to the necessary. Beginning as a reaction against determinism, the reduction of ideology to political economy, this theory of articulation strikes me as a pragmatic epistemology of explaining social change as arbitrary, even gratuitous, open to the dictates of who exercises the most power. When Hall illustrates this articulation *modus operandi* by using the Rastafarian movement as an inflection of disparate ideological elements along certain historical tendencies, he gestures to the need to take into account "the grain of historical formations" but only to return to his primary thesis that religion, like any cultural or ideological complex, operates like a language or discursive enunciation open to a wide range of experimental play. So ideology (if that is still a viable notion), which interpellates individuals into political agents, is not given necessarily in socio-

economic structure or in objective reality; in short, “the popular force of an organic ideology” is “the result of an articulation” (145).

I rehearse part of the debate here in this question: Can all cultural practices then be reduced “upward” as discourse or language, and all subjectivities or subject positionalities be conceived as discursively constituted? Hall registers a limit to the theoretical reductionism of Laclau/Mouffe and psychoanalytic hermeneutics. He instructs us to locate cultural/discursive practices “within the determining lines of force of material relations, and the expropriation of nature . . . Material conditions are the necessary but not sufficient condition of all historical practice,” but such condition need to be thought of “in their determinate discursive form” (147).

Hall is cognizant of the abuses of a theoretical *bricolage* influence by *Realpolitik* pragmatism, as found in some applications of Foucault and the deconstructionist archive. Unfortunately, such abuses are fostered by the substantive inadequacy of articulation theory: it cannot comprehend the internal relation of parts within a dynamic whole since its level of abstraction refuses to grasp the internal impulses and potential within the elements being articulated, the unity and contradiction distinguishing them, as the force that shapes the way the whole nexus of forces is configured. While Hall acknowledges that Rastafarianism centers on the “determinations of economic life in Jamaican society,” its status as a product of discursive articulation, as a unified force with a non-unitary collective subject, originates somewhere else. Rastafarianism is conceived as the unifying ideology that subsumes economic determinations and constitutes its bloc of social/political forces in a non-holistic way, through negotiations, compromises, and other realignments. But exactly how that ideology materialized remains obscure.

The imperative of contingency and indeterminacy becomes almost fetishized in the work of Lawrence Grossberg, a disciple of Hall and editor of the chief institutional organ of CS. In surveying current theories of identity, Grossberg refuses what he calls the logics of modernity founded on difference, individuality, and temporality. He proposes an alternative logic of otherness, production and spatiality

for a theory of human agency and historical change. Agency, for Grossberg, is defined by “the articulations of subject positions and identities into specific places and spaces . . . on socially constructed territories” (102).

Mystifications multiply amidst triumphalist CS rhetoric. Grossberg upholds a notion of singularity underlying a community envisioned by the Italian philosopher Giorgio Agamben. It is somewhat of a puzzle that Grossberg endorses Agamben’s view that the 1989 Tiananmen Square demonstration in China instances the singularity of belonging without identity; ultimately, it’s the place, the exteriority or exposure, that constitutes the singular community. What is strikingly obvious is the emphasis on spontaneous and unplanned action that supposedly characterized the Chinese urban insurrection, a false premise based on ignorance of the facts of the case. Ignoring the actual circumstances, the tautology Grossberg indulges in to convey what he thinks is profound—“it was the fact of belonging that constituted their belonging together”—serves as proof that anomie, ephemeral experience, an anarchistic valorization of the accidental, happenstance, and contingent all acquire foundational import that becomes a warrant for novelty in CS.

Perhaps this style of adhoc extrapolation of the significance of a major historical event may not be as trivializing as the prodigious dissertations written on Madonna, *Star Wars*, parades, and beauty pageants which argue that such commercial icons and rituals are counterhegemonic ruses to overthrow the system. Or, more soberly, what harm can a treatise on Dali among the dolphins in Disneyland do? Nothing except that they legitimize the way things are: cash registers ring merrily while service workers in hotels, restaurants, and carnival grounds sweat it out for corporate capital and its instrumentalities to reproduce themselves and, with it, the unequal division of labor and distribution of social wealth around the world.

Now, surely, CS from the outset aspired to displace the centrality of victimization with the praxis of resistance, opposition, people’s democratic initiatives. From object to subject—this underlines the trajectory of the critique of determinism and the search for new forms

of subjectivity. But on the way to utopian pleasure and empowerment of the decentered subject, its own internal contradictions exploded. Relativism and nominalism undermined the goal of integrating theory and practice. The imperative of rhetorical mastery, compounded with the individualist ethos of “free-trade” theorizing for privileged academics, channelled any oppositional or critical impulses into the invention of apologies for neoliberal multiculturalism.

At this point, I want to call your attention to the more insidious irony at work in CS when poststructuralist ideas of resistance become a framework of describing ordinary practices of exploited people. Sheer heterogeneity reflecting the fragmentation of commodity culture infects the subject to the point where everything becomes relative. Nietzschean perspectivism prohibits the critic of Cartesian rationality from appealing to a normative framework for criticizing that rationality and its power. It is through the social conditions of fragmentation and dispersal that power, discursive and otherwise, prevails. Can a positivist description of epistemic structures be conjoined with “modalities of moral self-constitution” (Dews 234) to offset the preponderance of institutional power? In the contest of predatory globalization, can ethnographic particularism discover the “weak links” in the social structures that repress the human potential?

I want to anchor these philosophical reflections to a concrete situation. There are more than 100,000 Filipino domestics (also known as “Overseas Contract Workers”) in Hong Kong today, employed under terrible conditions. News reports of brutal and inhumane treatment, slavery, rape, suicide, and murder suffered by these workers abound. That thousands of college-educated women continue to travel to Hong Kong even as the coffins of their sisters greet them at the ports of embarkation, is not a mystery. Suffice it here to cite the context of this labor diaspora: the accelerated impoverishment of millions of Filipino citizens, the unequal and unjust system (the Philippines as a neocolonial dependency of the U.S. and transnational business) managed by compradors and bureaucrat-capitalists who foster emigration to relieve unemployment and defuse mass unrest, and the political adjustments in Hong Kong and other Newly Industri-

alizing Countries, and so on—all these comprise the parameters for this transnational phenomenon. The convergence of complex factors, including the internal conditions in the Philippines, has been carefully delineated by Saskia Sassen in her new book, *Globalization and Its Discontents*. She refers in particular to the devalorization of women's labor in global cities, the shrinking status of sovereignty for peripheral nation-states, and the new saliency of human rights in a feminist analytic of the "New World Order."

Notwithstanding this massive research into the structural and historical background of these "new heroes" (as President Corazon Aquino once called them), a recent ethnographic account of the lives of Filipina maids celebrates their new-found subjectivity within various disciplinary regimes. Deploying Foucault's notion of "localized power," Nicole Constable seeks "to situate Filipina domestic workers *within* the field of power, not as equal players but as participants" (11). Ambivalence characterizes the narratives of these women: they resist oppression at the same time as they "participate in their own subordination." And how is their agency manifested? How else but in their consuming power. Consider this spectacle: During their Sundays off, these maids gather in certain places like the food restaurants of the Central District and demand prompt service or complain to the managers if they are not attended to properly. They can also exercise agency at McDonald's if they ask for extra condiments or napkins. Apart from these anecdotal examples, the fact that these maids were able to negotiate their way through a bewildering array of institutions in order to secure their jobs is testimony to what Constable, a professor of anthropology, calls "the subtler and more complex forms of power, discipline and resistance in their everyday lives" (202). According to one reviewer, this scholarly attempt to ferret out signs of tension or conflict in the routine of the domestics' lives obfuscates the larger context that defines the subordination of these women and the instrumentalities that reproduce their subjugation. Functionalism has given way to neopositivism. Constable shares Foucault's dilemma of ascribing resistance to subjects while devaluing history as "meaningless kaleidoscopic changes of shape in discourse totalities" (Habermas

277).

Nor is Constable alone in this quite trendy vocation. Donna Haraway, among others, has earlier urged CS to abandon the politics of representation which allegedly objectifies and disempowers whatever it represents, and choose instead local struggles for strategic articulations that are always impermanent, vulnerable, and contingent. This view forbids the critique of ideology—how can one distinguish truth from falsehood since there are only “truth effects” contrived by power? This populist and even demagogic stance promotes “a radical skepticism” (Brantlinger 102; see also Ebert 105-15) that cannot discriminate truth-claims, nor establish a basis for sustained and organized political action.

The most flagrant erasure in Constable’s postmodernist inventory of episodes is the asymmetrical relation between the Philippines and a peripheral capitalist city like Hong Kong, a relation enabled by the continuing neocolonial domination of Filipinos by Western corporate interests led by the United States. But this microphysics of learning how to survive performed by Filipino maids cannot exonerate the ethnographer from complicity with this strategy of displacing causality (a technique of inversion also found in mainstream historians of the Philippines such as Glenn May and Stanley Karnow) and apologizing for the victims by oblique patronage. Anne Lacsamana pronounces a felicitous verdict on this specimen of CS: “To dismiss the broader history of Filipino OCWs in favor of more trivial pursuits (such as watching them eat at a fast food restaurant) reenacts a Western superiority that has already created (and is responsible for) many of the social, economic, and political woes that continue to plague the country” (42).

This verdict has already been expressed by others (see Katz; O’Connor). Implemented in a dispersed, empiricist and eclectic way, CS works to help capitalism manage the ongoing crisis of the old humanist subject by what Samir Amin calls “culturalist strategies” (66) impotent to challenge the havoc wrought by the universalizing effects of finance capital in its new forms. Because cultural practice is conceived as inherently indeterminate, contingent, infinitely plural,

and shifting, CS cannot theorize how new identities or subject positions can really transform social institutions. These identities begin and end with the testimony of experience taken as irreducible and meaningful in itself, unmediated by any normative critical framework. Defined as one-dimensional and atomized, the categories of race, class, and gender are mechanically repeated without any determinate content. Instead of being viewed as new forms of collective labor power that intensify the contradictions in globalized social relations of capital, CS regards class, race, and gender as abstract counters—so many incommensurable language games, articulations of the flux of some ubiquitous power which remains enigmatic and mystifying.

It is not just a matter of shifting the focus from the now disreputable metanarratives of modernity to the quotidian *habitus* of post-modern consumers. The collapse of CS's radical challenge to the reign of capital stems chiefly from the nominalist subjectivism and discursivism adopted from poststructuralist doctrines. Critique is abandoned for a rhetorical assertion that certain practices, which turn out to be simply survival techniques, are inherently emancipatory or liberating. The reduction of history to a series of conjunctural moments, of identity to temporary positionalities, and positionalities to symbolic chains of equivalence, has eliminated not just history or temporality but also the determinants of location and the geopolitics of place. While postmodernist simulacra, pastiche, and extra-territoriality have compelled us to pay more attention to surfaces and spatial dispositions, this has not translated into a serious engagement with the geopolitics of the "global assembly line," NAFTA and MASSTRICHT, the internationalization of migrant labor comprised primarily of women of color, and other mutations of the global marketplace.

One would have expected that a new sensorium of spatiality would compensate for the damage wrought by temporal distancing of colonized indigenous peoples. Johannes Fabian has demonstrated how the denial of coevalness and the scientific cartography of progress legitimized Europe's civilizing mission over the barbaric natives. The ideal of progress served to apologize for the genocide of "peoples

without history,” justifying by extension the globalizing evangelism of CS itself and its postcolonial hubris. One example of this is James Clifford’s oft-cited essay “Traveling Cultures.” Clifford is engaged in exploring and purportedly displacing “exoticist anthropological forms” inhabiting the domain of comparative cultural studies: the diverse, interconnected histories of travel and displacement, exile, diaspora, etc. While preoccupied with the theme of intercultural interpretation, “how cultural analysis constitutes its objects—societies, traditions, communities, identities—in spatial terms and through specific spatial practices of research,” (97) Clifford is really intent on rehabilitating traditional anthropology or ethnography.

The strategy for salvaging colonialist anthropology pivots around the effort to redefine “fieldwork” as less a concrete place of research than a methodological ideal, a communicative competence. The issue of representation is, for Clifford, concerned with “the portrayal and understanding of local/global historical encounters, co-productions, dominations, and resistances, [consequently] one needs to focus on hybrid, cosmopolitan experiences as much as on rooted native ones.” Clifford expands on this topic:

In tipping the balance toward traveling as I am doing here, the “chronotope” of culture (a setting or scene organizing time and space in representable whole form) comes to resemble as much a site of travel encounters as of residence, less a tent in a village or a controlled laboratory or a site of initiation and inhabitation, and more like a hotel lobby, ship, or bus. If we rethink culture and its science, anthropology, in terms of travel, then the organic, naturalizing bias of the term culture—seen as a rooted body that grows, lives, dies, etc.—is questioned. Constructed and disputed *historicities*, sites of displacement, interference, and interaction, come more sharply into view. (101)

Not a believer in nomadology or ostensibly a relativist/nominalist, Clifford seems earnest in proving that he can discriminate between

the privileged and the disadvantaged, between the colonizing West and the subjugated natives, between the oppressor and the oppressed. He disavows linear history and its telos of progress. But he is passionately driven to do comparisons and analogies. He states that while there is no ground of equivalence between Alexander von Humboldt travelling through South America as a scientist and the Asian indentured laborer in California, "there is at least a basis for comparison and (problematic) translation" (107). He believes that a comparative cultural studies would be interested in knowledge of the Asian laborer's view of "The New World" as a potential complement or critique of Von Humboldt's. But what is the basis for such comparisons?

Clifford favors itineraries, returns and detours, "a history of locations and a location of histories." He is obsessed with migration, exile, transitions, diasporas, movements here and there. Borderlands fascinate him, cities where artists pass through. But the cities he concentrates on are European ones, Paris in particular, "a site of cultural creation," where Alejo Carpentier, Aimé Césaire, and a host of African and Latin American intellectuals sojourned and learned a "post-colonial habitus," a "discrepant cosmopolitanism." Symptomatic of an aesthetic-driven agenda, Clifford does not mention Ho Chi Minh, Aimé Césaire, or Frantz Fanon who travelled through Paris, literally and metaphorically: Ho and Césaire witnessed and rejected the Eurocentric chauvinism of the French communists while Fanon experienced the spectrum of racism in his encounter with European psychoanalysis and existentialism. Unbeknownst to Clifford, the problematic of travel thus contains the positive in the negative, opposites uniting and separating in stratified motion. Contrast Clifford's exhibitionist travelogue with a historical-materialist mapping of places. Adopting the framework of "militant particularism," the geographer David Harvey points out that the "dialectics of space and place" implies a process of remembering activities of "place creation and dissolution" (29) rooted in class consciousness and political action—"structures of feeling" (Raymond Williams' term) without which encyclopedic travel, albeit sophisticated and anti-ethnocentric, is nothing but blind and empty motion of atoms in space.

Clifford's broad agenda is "to rethink cultures as sites of dwelling *and* travel" (105). In a time when transnational capital, with its new modalities of "flexible accumulation" and niche marketing, is uprooting millions of "third world" peoples and converting them into "transnational" workers, Clifford has the leisure to craft a strategy of aestheticizing this planned mobility for a refurbished ethnography of cultural mapping. An obvious symptom of this aestheticizing of migration is his agreement with CS practitioners who believe in the extinction of the nation-state. For example, he agrees with the sociologist Orlando Patterson's idea of a postnational environment in the United States, a country now possessing "borderland culture areas, populated by strong, diasporic ethnicities unevenly assimilated" into the dominant culture. No mention here of the role of "buffer races," labor-market segmentation, pauperization of gendered labor, and so on. Instead, Clifford emphasizes that "travel," encompassing the historical resonance of other terms like migration, pilgrimage, displacement, tourism, and so on, is a translation term to be used "for comparison in a strategic and contingent way" (110). Dense with connotations of gender, class, and race, "travel" harbors a "certain literariness" which allows semiotic free-play. But of course, the play of representations, images, texts inventoried by the ethnographer is always constructed and fixed by the power of authorities who also command material, political, and economic resources/properties.

Postmodernist CS scholars make the familiar idealist move of projecting into the object of inquiry a particular "way of understanding" (Eagleton 219) which, contrary to their original motivation, becomes spontaneous dogma. While Clifford urges self-critical awareness that we are using "compromised, historically encumbered tools," he himself (like his fellow anthropologist Constable) does not reflect deeply enough on his own spatial politics. As a result, his survey levels contradictions of class, nationality, race, and gender into a blanket phenomenon whose utility as ethnographic material for knowledge is its most indispensable virtue. Significantly he treats tourism as something marginal, when in fact tourism, a form of travel, reveals the function of travel as an allegory or ethnography of modernity, not

as a set of socioeconomic institutions but as a form of experience or consciousness.

It is not irrelevant to remark that Clifford's "travel" as a pedagogical technique of cultural studies requires the acquisition and deployment of cultural capital. Travel becomes a means of exchanging knowledge, ostensibly for enriching knowledge of one's self, but ultimately for reaffirming mastery of the few privileged Westerners able to engage in leisurely self-reflection. Travel seeks to domesticate Otherness (personified here by migrants, exotic cultures, diasporic artists and intellectuals). In this connection, John Frow points out the dangers entailed by the ideology of travel when he comments on the touristic role of the Other:

The commodification of reciprocal bonds, of the environment, and of culture are moments of that logic of contemporary capital which extends private appropriation and ownership from material to immaterial resources, and whose paradigm case is the commodification of information. . . . The logic of tourism [as of travel considered as a form of aestheticized knowledge] is that of a relentless extension of commodity relations and the consequent inequalities of power between centre and periphery, First and Third Worlds, developed and underdeveloped regions, metropolis and countryside. Promising an explosion of modernity, it brings about structural underdevelopment. (100-101)

The seeming equalization of societies imposed by Clifford's spatial politics of translation may impress those who are already die-hard crusaders of liberal pluralism. But I think it is one-sided and misleading in trying to remedy the chaotic fragmentation of life in late capitalism by detaching culture from its contradiction-filled matrix. Its project of breaking down national boundaries, like the aim of technocratic modernization theory still sponsored by the World Bank/International Monetary Fund, is premised on that same reality

of unequal development that reproduces center and periphery under the aegis of universalized capital accumulation. Postmodernist travel reaffirms such inequality and asymmetry of the status quo world-system.

The difficulties of salvaging the old humanistic disciplines like anthropology have been acknowledged by mainstream CS scholars and attributed to the postmodernist dogma on the “celebration of a radically relativized Difference,” the “effectivity of surfaces” predicated on “unity in difference.” Such formalist concepts replicate the anarchy of the market, anomie and alienation. To remedy this predicament, Slack and Whitt have proposed an “ecocultural alternative” that tries to mediate between holistic ecosystem and the integrity of constituent individuals which are supposed to overdetermine the whole. But this alternative still clings to a dualistic metaphysics, assuming that “life is conducted in discursive conditions not of our own making” (585). The CS program centering on biotic interdependence, with an eclectic *bricolage* of various pragmatic strategies for survival, is charged with abundant moral messages. But unfortunately it lacks a history in which subject and object dialectically interact. Silent on the contradictions destabilizing the welfare-state consensus in advanced capitalist societies, ecoculturalism colludes in reproducing social inequality. Echoing Frankfurt Critical Theory’s attack on instrumentalism, it downplays or dismisses the complicity of the systemic accumulation of capital by a moralistic attack on fascism. Its communal utopianism renders the whole program a panacea for the neoliberal’s guilt-stricken conscience.

Before concluding, I would like to allude briefly here to one rather obscure counter-example to Constable and Clifford’s style of doing CS that is fully conscious of the internal contradictions that define any historical moment. This example takes into account the political economy of cultural practice and production, apprehending culture as an ensemble of agencies that produce and reproduce the totality of social relations with its specific hegemonic articulation. What Fredric Jameson suggested as a cognitive mapping based on the imperative “simultaneously to grasp culture in and for itself, but also

in relationship to its outside, its content, its context, and its space of intervention and of effectivity" (47), has been pursued with lucid and impassioned eloquence by Jan Myrdal and Gun Kessle in their now classic travel account, *Angkor: An Essay on Art and Imperialism*.

Myrdal and Kessle, committed Swedish intellectuals, travelled through Vietnam and Cambodia in the days of heavy U.S. bombing of the region in the late sixties. They preface their historical and topographical survey of the architectural ruins at Angkor, Cambodia, by transvaluing their experience into social awareness and critique:

You stand face to face with the stone faces of Angkor. Beyond a border there is a war. But when you yourself face this stone then the "beauty" becomes a concrete reality. These faces of stone were hewn by sweating men in a bloody time of repression and revolt.

To write about Jayavarman VII and get beaten up by the cops; to stand in the midst of the dirt and violence writing fiction; to collect money for the striking mine-workers and lecture on Strindberg; to publish the secret Swedish army regulations on the use of gas against "rioting" strikers and to demand back all of history and all the millennia—that is to take part in the razing of the load-bearing walls of imperialism.

To write on Angkor is a necessary part of the struggle for liberation. (4-5)

For Myrdal and Kessle, culture as a mode of production is articulated in the way that Japan during the conference I mentioned at the outset articulated itself for me as a place of collision and confrontation, not a place one simply travels through. Unlike Clifford and Constable, our joint authors do comparative cultural studies by juxtaposing testimonies and ethnographic accounts of Western travellers and the sites surrounding Angkor. They discuss not only climate, local history, topography, tribal customs and rituals, but also carry out a subtle analogizing of distant events: 12th century Angkor Wat inter-

faced with the Italian Renaissance, Hellenism, Count Gobineau, Livingstone, and of course French colonialism. Andre Malraux (famous author of *Les conquerants* and *La voie royale* set in Indochina) is inserted here as someone who plundered the temple of Banteay Srei in December, 1923, but was later acquitted because the monuments were not considered “protected” by the colonial government. This militant ethnography is guided by a consistent historicizing of social forms and cultural practices, thus materializing the coevalness of cultures, times, and places for judgment. Alterity is not fetishized but rendered concrete and practical.

What distinguishes Myrdal and Kessle’s travel through history and a concrete geopolitical space is not its erudition, nor its meticulous scrutiny of how culture and power are imbricated. Rather, it lies in the dialectical intelligibility of its discourse. This depends on its inquiry into both “the causally generated presentation of social objects and their explanatory critique—in terms of their conditions of being, both those which are historically specific and praxis-dependent and those which genuinely are not” (Bhaskar 128). While respecting the relative autonomy of art, Myrdal and Kessle situate Angkor in a constellation of political, economic, and ideological forces that determined its history. It is a mode of CS that proceeds from the materiality of signification to the political constitution of subjectivities, sublating rhetoric and textuality into a field of conflicting forces where control/access to knowledge and resources are at stake both for past and present protagonists. Mindful of the war of national liberation against the West, these European observers implicate themselves in what they are studying: they question the ideal of detachment and neutrality. They are partisans of the popular forces that built Angkor in the past and those fighting imperialist bombs at the time of their writing.

Employing a dialectical method of analyzing the unity of opposites, Myrdal and Kessle are grappling with symptoms of reification in the discourse of bourgeois aesthetics and history. They succeed in penetrating the surface of empirical data, of personal experience, to register the movement of conflicting tendencies. What caused Ang-

kor's decline? Not wars or shifts in religion, as the official textbooks say, but the internal contradictions immanent in society:

Angkor perished. But Cambodia survived. The rulers vanished. But not the people. The whole history of Angkor was a history of incessant revolts, of unending social struggle. . . . Angkor grew up as a centralized state, in which, by exploiting new techniques, oligarchy has been able, at the people's expense, to create for itself immeasurable wealth. This state existed in a chronic state of war. Just as the temples were not just religion or mere ostentatious waste, but the very mechanism by which the oligarchy could absorb the people's labor, so these wars were an inevitable form in which the state's organization could exist.

The most comprehensive building period in Angkor's history coincided with—and was an expression of—the inner crisis which shook the state. . . . With Angkor as with the Roman Empire, the internal contradictions tore the state asunder. . . . This social collapse [of the nobles and wealthy merchants]—the collapse of intensive irrigational agriculture (thus of the centralized state)—was a liberation. (158, 164)

In bold strokes, Myrdal and Kessle thus delineate the pattern of dialectical exchange between milieu and art, between objective constraints and subjective capacities, ideas and material culture, in order to mobilize an audience for anti-imperialist intervention.

Grossberg and other mainstream CS experts have repeatedly stressed the uniqueness of CS in bridging theory and material culture, contextualizing intellectual work with real social and political problems, with cultural and political power and struggle. At present, the question of AIDS, for example, is an urgent testing ground or terrain for struggle and contestation: "What cultural studies must do, and has the capacity to do, is to articulate insights about the constitutive and

political nature of representation itself, about its complexities, about the effects of language, about textuality as a site of life and death" (7). This certainly responds to local needs. But is that all the strategic intervention CS can do? Conjunctural analysis and the theory of articulation are privileged because it is "embedded, descriptive, and historically and contextually specific" (8). Myrdal and Kessle transcend the conjunctural by transposing the lessons of the past of Angkor into the war-torn landscape of Vietnam in the sixties. They emphasize the need to grasp the historical relations of political forces in order to act intelligently and effectively. They understand Lenin's insight that national liberation struggles (such as those of the Vietnamese and Cambodian peoples) are forms of revolutionary subjectivity generated by capital's uneven and combined development (Anderson). From this perspective, the stone temples of Angkor should not be read simply as symbols of gods or abstract ideas; rather they embodied power: "All aesthetic problems connected with Angkor are wrongly put," Myrdal and Kessle argue, "unless connected with the hierarchy of social classes":

Prayers and ceremonies. Sacred texts and learned men. All were merely the form in which the rice crop was collected from the peasants and distributed among the rulers. . . . The construction of these immense temples was conditional upon the majority of the people being called brute beasts.

In the night, when Gun slept and the fan squealed, I thought of Manhattan. Of Paris. And London. Walk down these streets a thousand years from now. How much will remain? (167)

Myrdal and Kessle's book, *Angkor*, I think, exemplifies a form of cultural studies that intervenes across the boundaries of popular and elite cultures. While dealing with the fabled ruins of an Asian kingdom studied by art historians and anthropologists, Myrdal and Kessle succeeded in making its history intelligible for lay persons

without any prerequisite of technical knowledge. What is required is a knowledge of how culture is tied with human labor and the organization of social energies, the entire "field of cultural production." Canonical CS today avoids talk of exploitation of labor, property relations, and the whole political economy of both elite and popular culture.

Problematizing CS, I submit, entails a reinscription of such dichotomies as elite/popular in the dialectical coupling of mode of production/social formation. Notwithstanding all the talk about intervention, CS reveals its own compromised situation when Grossberg and colleagues pontificate: "Cultural studies does not require us to repudiate elite cultural forms—or simply to acknowledge, with Bourdieu (1984), that distinctions between elite and popular cultural forms are themselves the products of relations of power. Rather, cultural studies requires us to identify the operation of specific practices, of how they continuously reinscribe the line between legitimate and popular culture, and of what they accomplish in specific contexts" (13). Apropos of this formalism, Antony Easthope remarks that "it would be a form of logocentrism, the old vision of speculative rationalism, to believe that an intellectual procedure necessarily leads to a particular politics" (178). Evidently CS cannot operate as an autonomous institutional force separate from the demands of the ideological-political field. Just as "reason develops and transforms itself in the practical field," CS acquires value-filled import in engagement with crucial public issues affecting entire peoples and societies. The contexts are decisive, as Ioan Davies has shown in the case of Canada and in the person of Kenyan novelist Ngũgĩ wa Thiong'o; and Kuan-Hsing Chen, Jon Stratton and Ien Ang for the rest of the world (for samples of British inflection, see Inglis; Easthope).

Proposals for renewing CS usually invoke a pastiche of topics such as sameness-in-difference, multidimensionality, return to the "cultural-in-the-economic" (Morley 49), syncretizing racialized ethnicities, "deracinated subaltern subjects, heterodox traditions," (Leitch 182), postnationalist ethics of hybridity, transcultural cosmopolitanism, and the like. Space constraints prevent me from elaborating here my view that a historicist "cultural materialism" first out-

lined by Raymond Williams can be renewed by recovering the principles of “national liberation struggles” and “third world” revolutions espoused by Frantz Fanon, C.L.R. James, Lu Hsun, Amilcar Cabral, Che Guevarra, Aimé Césaire, and others. CS practised by those activist intellectuals (and exemplified here by Myrdal and Kessle’s book) can be a way out of the current impasse.

Mindful of Williams’ advice to think through the history of conflicted ideological formations, Hall recently urged the concentration of CS on problems of “racism today in its complex structures and dynamics” arising from “the terrifying, internal fear of living with *difference*” (“Race” 17). Obviously the resurgence of racism in the UK and elsewhere in the last two decades precipitated this call to arms. There is no cause for premature alarm—unless apocalyptic investments persist in attributing a messianic mission to CS in the hope of revitalizing a civic humanism beloved by Rorty and fellow neo-pragmatists. Jameson in fact celebrates the utopianism of CS as a “project to constitute a historic bloc” (“Cultural Studies” 251) of populist academics. Because of its current fixation on articulation, contingency, indeterminacy, and local power resistance, CS will continue to perform at best a polite and loyal-opposition role, reinforcing that affirmative culture which Marcuse described as the realm of freedom and happiness—“universally obligatory, eternally better and more valuable world that must be unconditionally affirmed: a world essentially different from the factual world of the daily struggle for existence, yet realisable by every individual for himself ‘from within,’ without any transformation of the state of fact” (95). Far from the cacophonous din of Disneyland surrounding Dali’s enigmatic masterpieces in St. Petersburg, Florida, this veritable utopia is the not-so-clandestine object of desire for the contemporary high priests of Cultural Studies whose complicity with hegemonic capital, no doubt unpremeditated and even resisted, will surely be the object of “enormous condescension by posterity.”

WORKS CITED

- Amin, Samir. *Spectres of Capitalism*. New York: Monthly Review P, 1998.
- Anderson, Kevin. *Lenin, Hegel and Western Marxism*. Urbana: U of Illinois P, 1995.
- Bhaskar, Roy. "Dialectic." *A Dictionary of Marxist Thought*. Ed. Tom Bottomore. Cambridge, Mass: Harvard UP, 1983. 122-28.
- Bocock, Robert. *Hegemony*. London: Tavistock, 1986.
- Bourdieu, Pierre. *The Field of Cultural Production*. New York: Columbia UP, 1993.
- Brantlinger, Patrick. *Crusoe's Footprints*. New York: Routledge, 1990.
- Chen, Kuan-Hsing. "Cultural Studies and the Politics of Internationalization: An Interview with Stuart Hall." *Stuart Hall: Critical Dialogues in Cultural Studies*. New York: Routledge, 1996. 392-410.
- Clifford, James. "Traveling Cultures." *Cultural Studies*. Ed. Lawrence Grossberg, Cary Nelson and Paul Treichler. Urbana, Ill: U of Illinois P, 1992. 96-111.
- Constable, Nicole. *Maid to Order in Hong Kong*. Ithaca: Cornell UP, 1997.
- Davies, Ioan. *Cultural Studies and Beyond: Fragments of Empire*. London: Routledge, 1995.
- Dews, Peter. *Logics of Disintegration*. London: Verso, 1987.
- Dunn, Robert G. *Identity Crises: A Social Critique of Postmodernity*. Minneapolis: U of Minnesota P, 1998
- Eagleton, Terry. *Ideology: An Introduction*. London: Verso, 1991.
- Easthope, Antony. *Literary into Cultural Studies*. New York: Routledge, 1991.
- Ebert, Teresa. *Ludic Feminism and After*. Ann Arbor: U of Michigan P, 1996.
- Fabian, Johannes. *Time and the Other*. New York: Columbia UP, 1983.

- Frow, John. *Time and Commodity Culture*. Oxford: Clarendon, 1997.
- Godelier, Maurice. *Perspectives in Marxist Anthropology*. London: Cambridge UP, 1977.
- Grossberg, Lawrence. "Identity and Cultural Studies: Is That All There Is?" *Questions of Cultural Identity*. Ed. Stuart Hall and Paul du Gay. London: Sage, 1996.
- , Cary Nelson, and Paula Treichler, eds. "Cultural Studies: An Introduction." *Cultural Studies*. New York: Routledge, 1992. 1-22.
- Habermas, Jürgen. *The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity*. Cambridge, Mass: MIT, 1988.
- Hall, Stuart. "On Postmodernism and Articulation: An Interview with Lawrence Grossberg." *Critical Dialogues in Cultural Studies*. Ed. David Morley and Kuan-hsing Chen. New York: Routledge, 1996.
- . "Race, Culture, and Communications: Looking Backward and Forward at Cultural Studies." *Rethinking Marxism* 5.1 (1992): 10-18.
- Haraway, Donna. "The Promises of Monsters: A Regenerative Politics for Inappropriate/d Others." *Cultural Studies*. New York: Routledge, 1992. 295-337.
- Inglis, Fred. *Cultural Studies*. Oxford: Blackwell, 1993.
- Jameson, Fredric. *The Cultural Turn: Selected Writings on the Postmodern, 1983-1998*. London: Verso, 1998.
- . "On Cultural Studies." *The Identity in Question*. Ed. John Rajchman. New York: Routledge, 1995.
- Johnson, Richard. "What Is Cultural Studies Anyway?" *What Is Cultural Studies?* Ed. John Storey. London: Arnold, 1996.
- Katz, Adam. "Postmodern Cultural Studies: A Critique." *The Alternative Orange* 5.1 (1998): 40-52.
- Laclau, Ernesto and Chantal Mouffe. *Hegemony and Socialist Strategy*. London: Verso, 1985.
- Lacsamana, Anne. "Academic Imperialism and the Limits of Postmodernist Discourse: An Examination of Nicole Constable's *Maid to Order in Hong Kong: Stories of Filipina Workers*." *Amerasia Journal* 24.3 (1998): 37-42.

- Larrain, Jorge. "Identity, the Other, and Postmodernism." *Post-Ality: Marxism and Postmodernism*. Ed. Mas'ud Zavarzaedh, Teresa Ebert, and Donald Morton. Washington DC: Maisonneuve P, 1995. 271-89.
- Larsen, Neil. "Negativities of the Popular: C.L.R. James and the Limits of 'Cultural Studies.'" *Rethinking C.L.R. James*. Ed. Grant Farred. Cambridge, Mass.: Blackwell, 1996. 85-102.
- Leitch, Vincent. "Cultural Studies." *The Johns Hopkins Guide to Literary Theory and Criticism*. Eds. Michael Groden and Martin Kreiswirth. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins UP, 1994.
- Marcuse, Herbert. *Negations*. Boston: Beacon P, 1968.
- Mulhern, Francis. "The Politics of Cultural Studies." *Monthly Review* (1995): 31-40.
- Morley, David. "So-Called Cultural Studies: Dead Ends and Re-invented Wheels." *Cultural Studies* 12.4 (1998): 476-97.
- Myrdal, Jan and Gun Kessle. *Angkor: An Essay on Art and Imperialism*. Trans. Paul Britten Austin. New York: Vintage, 1970.
- O'Connor, Alan. "The Problem of American Cultural Studies." *What Is Cultural Studies?* Ed. John Storey. London: Arnold, 1996. 187-96.
- Osborne, Peter and Lynne Segal. "Interview with Stuart Hall: Culture and Power." *Race, Identity and Citizenship*. Ed. Rodolfo Torres, Louis Miron, and Jonathan Inda. Oxford: Blackwell, 1999.
- Sassen, Saskia. *Globalization and Its Discontents*. New York: The New Press, 1998.
- Slack, Jennifer Daryl and Laurie Anne Whitt. "Ethics and Cultural Studies." *Cultural Studies*. Ed. Lawrence Grossberg, Cary Nelson, and Paula Treichler. New York: Routledge, 1992. 571-92.
- Stratton, Jon and Ien Ang. "On the Impossibility of a Global Cultural Studies: 'British' Cultural Studies in an 'International' Frame." *Stuart Hall: Critical Dialogues in Cultural Studies*. New York: Routledge, 1996. 361-91.
- Van Erven, Eugene. *The Playful Revolution: Theatre and Liberation in Asia*. Bloomington: Indiana UP, 1992.
- Williams, Raymond. *The Politics of Modernism*. London: Verso, 1989.

