

The Rhetorical and the Grammatical in Early Chinese Logic

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ABSTRACT

Early Chinese logic often seems puzzling because it is deeply rooted in an interplay of rhetoric and grammar. As logic in ancient China was more of persuading kings and dukes than of reasoning in epistemological terms, catching rhetoric seemed to be a short cut to instant fame.

The elliptical Chinese syntax and semantic shift in word play often found in the logical texts underlie the perplexity. One of the logicians' strategies is to employ a mutual interference of, in Jakobsonian terms, the metaphorical and metonymical axes, stopping the operation of each other to create bizarre statements. Another strategy is what Paul de Man would call the rhetoricization of grammar and the grammatization of rhetoric, which leaves the reader dangling between a literal and figural reading of the logical texts.

New lights should be shed on early Chinese logic if one tries to look at it not in strictly logical, but in rhetorical and grammatical, terms.

KEY WORDS

early Chinese logic
grammar
rhetoric
Paul de Man
Roman Jakobson

semiotics
Gongsun Longzi
Mozi
Zhuangzi



Rhetoric, grammar and logic, the three basic branches of learning collectively called the trivium in medieval Europe, remained distinct subjects despite their intertwining relations. Conscious and meticulous efforts were taken in medieval times to define and delimit their scopes of studies, which can be shown in Martianus Capella's allegorical work about the seven liberal arts. In ancient China, the three basic branches of learning—if they could be distinguished from one another at all—formed an even more intricate and confusing web of discourses: logic was embedded in and muddled by an interplay of rhetoric and grammar. Logic was known in ancient China as the study of *ming* 名 and *shi* 實, which, translated into modern semiotic terms, can be called the study of the relations between the sign and object. The socio-political implications of these discourses must not be overlooked, for they could help kings, dukes and even philosophers who professed these discourses to achieve power. Therefore, the main purpose of these discourses were actually to persuade by way of rhetorical strategies rather than find the truth by way of logical reasoning. That is to say, rhetoric took priority over logic. That explains why early Chinese discourses are so perplexing, for the philosophers' purposes were to defeat their opponents in debates, even if that meant they had to recourse to bizarre rhetoric. The power play behind these discourses also explains why in early Han Dynasty (207 B.C. to 220 A.D.), when China was emerging into a big empire, and was beginning to feel the need to consolidate its power, the Confucian doctrine was adopted as the supreme doctrine, and all other schools of thoughts were banished. For Confucius's *zhengming* 正名, which advocates a logocentric one to one relation between the name and the

object, obviously served to stabilize the ruler's power: as the ruler, only he or she could be called so. The present study attempts to uncover the forces at work behind the perplexity of these logical discourses: namely how an interplay between the rhetorical and the grammatical muddles logic. I take as the subjects of study three philosophers, Gongsun Longzi 公孫龍子, Zhuangzi 莊子, and Mozi 墨子. Gongsun Longzi's discourse, described in *Hanshu* "yiwenzhi" 漢書藝文志 as "chaotic analysis" 亂析 (1,737), is chosen because of his notoriety as one of the most perplexing sophists at the time. The reason for choosing Zhuangzi is even more obvious: he is called by a twentieth century commentator as even more bewildering than Gongsun Longzi (Sun, 128). As for Mozi, although he seems to attempt at a systematic study of logic, his discourse is no less perplexing.

An explanation for the terminology used in the present study must be given. Paul de Man, in his "Semiology and Rhetoric," which has inspired the present study, questions the privilege given to grammar by semioticians. Drawing examples from popular literature and from works by Yeats and Proust, de Man then puts forth two related new concepts—the rhetoricization of grammar and the gammatization of rhetoric—to show how grammar and rhetoric stand in an interlocking relation. Actually my study draws on the Jakobsonian model of the metaphorical and the metonymical axes as its theoretical framework, but reworks it in a de Manian manner. To underscore the importance of rhetoric and grammar in Chinese logic, I use de Man's terminology—the rhetorical and the grammatical—in the title of this paper; but in the text, de Man's and Jakobson's terminologies are often interchangeable.

Gongsun Longzi's idiosyncracies are so puzzling that not only his contemporaries expressed contempt and disbelief, modern critics may still avoid him in discussions of Chinese logic. John Makenam, in his book on *ming shi* in early Chinese thought, almost neglects Gongsun Longzi because, he argues, Gongsun Longzi's extreme nominalist view could not give new insights to the issue (xv). Sun Zhongyuan 孫中原, in his book on Chinese logic, calls the argumentation process whereby Gongsun Longzi reaches the famous con-

clusion that “a white horse is not a horse” 白馬非馬 sophistical rather than logical, although Sun admits that this sophist’s view is also based on the logical concept about class and particular (159-171). Trying to make sense out of Gongsun Longzi, another critic, Chen Guimiao 陳癸淼, also tries to read his logic against the concept about class and particular.

The absurdity, or perhaps the force, of Gongsun’s discursive strategies lies in a breach of grammar. When provoked to explain why “a white horse is not a horse,” Gongsun Longzi replies:

馬者，所以命形也。白者，所以命色也。命色者，非命形也，故曰白馬非馬。

Horse: it’s for naming the body. White: it’s for naming the color. Naming the color is not naming the body. Therefore I say a white horse is not a horse. (“*Baima lun*” 白馬論 18)

The argument can be followed smoothly and clearly until the final conclusion, the irrationality of which must stun the reader. The conclusion as a sentence is ungrammatical, in the sense that it breaches everyday logic based on experiences. That is to say, the assertion itself is as ungrammatical as the sentence “The ball kicks John,” for the usual grammatical sentence would call for “A white horse is a horse.”

The commonly accepted sentence, “A white horse is a horse,” set inside Jakobson’s model, would operate smoothly along both the metaphorical and metonymical axes, where the “white horse” could be replaced by “a horse” to become “A horse is a horse,” which, though tautological, is grammatical. However, in Gongsun Longzi’s argument, the metaphorical axis stops to operate “normally.” The interchange between “a horse” and “a white horse” is forbidden by the “not” in the sentence, for “A horse is not a horse” would be even more perplexing than “A white horse is not a horse.” Thus the manipulation of the grammatical also constitutes a breakup of the rhetorical.

A break in the metonymical can also be seen when Gongsun Longzi argues that the body and the color are separately named. The phrase “white horse” is constituted by two signs metonymically linked. “Horse” seemingly refers to an object, but for Gongsun Longzi it can be no more than a concept, a name or a sign; and only with the combination of two signs can a material object be really referred to. His discussion about the color of the horse can illustrate this point. An inquirer points out that every horse has colors, and nowhere can one find a colorless horse. Therefore, the inquirer rebukes that if a white horse is not a horse then there is no horse at all.

Gongsun Longzi’s reply reiterates the difference between “white” and “horse”:

馬固有色，故有白馬。使馬無色，有馬如已耳，安取白馬？故白者非馬也。白馬者，馬與白也；馬與白馬也，故曰：白馬非馬也。

Horses of course have colors; therefore there is the white horse. If there were colorless horses, then a horse itself would be enough, and why should we have a white horse? Therefore the white is not the horse. “White horse” is “white” and “horse”; as for a white horse and a horse, therefore I say a white horse is not a horse. (“*Baima lun*” 23)

For Gongsun Longzi, “horse” (without color) can exist no more than a pure concept, or a sign without any referent; but a white horse can be a particular object. So the signs “white” and “horse” put together can refer to a material object. Yet Gongsun Longzi reminds the inquirer that “white” and “horse” are separate, remaining two distinct signs.

Gongsun Longzi’s logic about “white horse” seems to be restricted on the sign level without actually making references to the material world, and hence his name as a nominalist. In “*Zhiwu lun*” 指物論—his somewhat elaborate discussion about the relations between sign and object—we can see how Gongsun Longzi’s discourse operates on the sign level only:

物莫非指，而指非指

Every object is signified, but the signifier is not the signified. (50)

In the original, the Chinese word *zhi* takes on a semantic shift, but its meaning never goes beyond the three elements of the Saussurean model: sign, signifier, and signified. Gongsun Longzi's discourse seems to privilege the sign, for the object cannot be known without the sign:

天下無指，物無可以謂物

If there was no sign in the world, the object could not be signified. (52)

However, that does not necessarily mean that Gongsun completely denies the existence of the object, or the material world. Rather, by claiming the non-existence of the signified, he wants to caution us against the fallacy of equating the sign with the object:

指也者，天下之所無也。物也者，天下之所有也。以天下之所有，為天下之所無，未可。

The signified cannot be found in the world. The object can be found in the world. Equating what the world has with what the world has not, that's wrong. (54)

This quotation and the preceding one have to translate the same word *zhi* separately into sign and signified; otherwise Gongsun Longzi may seem to be contradicting himself, because in the first statement, he claims that objects cannot be signified without *zhi*, which exists in the world, while in the second statement, he claims that *zhi* does not exist in the world.

The difficulty in understanding Gongsun Longzi's arguments, therefore, often lies in his elliptical syntax and the ambiguity of the words. The ambiguity comes from a play on the rhetorical axis: he refuses to replace the word *zhi* with any other in different contexts.

His elliptical syntax further adds to the perplexity. The phrase, or clause, *zhi fei zhi* 指非指 seems to be often reduced to *fei zhi* 非指 in subsequent discussions in “*Zhiwu lun*”; but the reader can never be sure whether this is really an abbreviation of *zhi fei zhi* (meaning that signified is not signifier), or *fei zhi* could mean “non-sign,” “non-signified” or “non-signifier.” Thus Zhuangzi follows the line of the rhetorical usage, and proposes that Gongsun Longzi had better use *fei zhi* (non-signs) or *fei ma* (non-horse) in his discourse (I will return to this later).

Again, when Gongsun Longzi warns us against mixing up the object with the sign, he seems to be also warning against mixing up the signs themselves. The metaphorical axis cannot operate without a substitution of signs, but as signs are distinct from each other, the axis ceases to function. Hence, a literal translation of his perplexing assertion *Wu mo fei zhi, er zhi fei zhi* 物莫非指，而指非指 would become “Objects are signs, and signs are not signs.” “Signs are not signs” has to be taken to mean that one sign is distinct from another. In “*Baima lun*,” then, “horse” (for Gongsun, it has no referent), is a sign in itself, distinct from “white horse,” another (set of) sign(s) that can refer to a particular object. He further breaks “white” and “horse” into two distinct signs. By so doing, Gongsun Longzi places a bar in between the signs on the metaphorical axis, and on the metonymical axis as well.

The bar is also put between bodily experiences. In “*Jian bai lun*” 堅白論 Gongsun Longzi separates the visual and the tactile experiences in human relations with the stone. Hardness and whiteness, for him, have to be considered separately in relations with stone. He explains:

視不得其所堅，而得其所白者，無堅也。拊不得其所白，而得其所堅。得其堅也，無白。

By looking at the stone, you cannot feel its hardness but only sees its whiteness: there's no hardness. By touching it you cannot see its whiteness, and can only feel its hardness. You have its hardness, and there's no whiteness. (114)

The argument constitutes a radical break between the visual and tactile experiences, both of which usually can exist in our ordinary language in a grammatical/metonymical relation. The ordinary people should find no difficulty in understanding the phrase “a white hard stone” as a stone which is hard and white at the same time. The philosophy behind this separation of the bodily experiences is not the focus of the present discussion. Yet by separating them, Gongsun Longzi again breaks up the grammatical phrase “a white hard stone,” collapsing its metonymical relations.

The collapse of “a white hard stone” necessarily gives us two other (sets of) signs: “a white stone,” and “a hard stone.” The two (sets of) signs apparently cannot stand in relation in the rhetorical/metaphorical axis. Ordinarily, the stone can be replaced by a white stone or a hard stone or a white hard stone, as a matter of choice. But now any substitution between “hard” and “white,” for Gongsun Longzi, is not just a matter of choice, because it calls for a leap into the other realms of experiences, a leap that also blurs the difference between the signs. Similar to the horse, which is only a concept/sign without a referent, a stone cannot exist as a material object without any qualities. In the case of the horse, it is the whiteness that matters; in the case of the stone, there are two qualities at work. Although the two qualities (if they have essences of their own) can actually co-exist in a stone, it is not the concern for Gongsun Longzi. His model operates in twoness: two signs—one referring to an object and the other referring to a quality—combined together to form another sign that has a referent, like a “white horse,” a “white stone,” or a “hard stone.” Gongsun Longzi calls our attention to the fact that the qualities belonging to different realms of experiences cannot be combined to form a single sign, simply because touching cannot produce visual perception, and vice versa. We can now see that Gongsun Longzi does not really completely deny experiences. What he does instead is introduce a radical remodelling of our daily experiences through a linguistic twist.

Let's return to “*Baima lun*.” The linguistic twist in Gongsun Longzi really gives us a problem in determining whether his assertions can be

taken at face value. Derrida suggests that perhaps all philosophical discourses are metaphorical in nature (qtd. in Zhang 41). Therefore, in the face of such bizarre assertions as “A white horse is not a horse,” critics tend to make sense out of it by reading it metaphorically, namely the white horse is a metaphor for particulars, and the horse for classes, or concepts. What if we read it literally? In his discussion of Yeats’s “Among School Children,” Paul de Man asks whether the final line of the poem—“How can we know the dancer from the dance?”—should be read figurally or literally. He concludes that “the figural reading, which assumes the question to be rhetorical, is perhaps naïve, whereas the literal reading leads to greater complication of theme and statement” (11). What he means is the literal reading gives rise to a philosophical discourse about being, a reading which comes directly in conflict with a figural reading, which actually confirms the difference between the dancer and the dance.

In the case of “*Baima lun*,” it is a figural reading, which uncovers the rhetoricity of the assertion, that rationalizes the absurdity of a literal reading by pointing out that a white horse is actually a horse. On the other hand, a literal reading may prompt one to ask whether a white horse is really not a horse, a problem which is not just some kind of rhetorical or semantic trick. For is it not because critics take the assertion at its face value—its literal meaning—that so many philosophical discourses about it have been generated? The critics read it literally, and then look for the answer rhetorically.

Unlike Gongsun Longzi, Zhuangzi completely denies the use of language, which, for him, is the source of confusion. He asks:

言者有言，其所言者特未定也。果有言邪？其未嘗有言邪？……亦有辯乎，其無辯乎？

The speaker speaks. What he speaks is indeterminate. Has he really spoken? Or has he not spoken? . . . Is there a debate? Or is there not a debate? (“*Qiwu lun*” 齊物論 63)

Sun Zhongyuan rightly points out that it was impossible for Zhuangzi not to participate in debates with his contemporary rivals,

although he despised such rhetorical activities. For keeping one's mouth shut was tantamount to self-destruction in terms of one's social and political status (140). Therefore, being aware of the dilemma, Zhuangzi maintains that his own discourses "are spoken, but I don't know whether what I say is really said, or is not really said?" 今我則已有謂矣，而未知吾所謂之其果有謂乎，其果無謂乎 ("Qiwu lun" 79). He maintains that Dao 道 cannot be signified or debated:

夫大道不稱

The Dao cannot be spoken of. ("Qiwu lun" 83)

Therefore he advocates the so-called "wordless debate." He criticizes his contemporaries for their debate, because "debate cannot lead us to truth" 辯之不必慧 ("Zhi beiyou" 知北遊 743).

When Huizi 惠子 challenges Zhuangzi why he still uses the useless language, Zhuangzi answers: "But you must first know they are useless before you can talk about their use" 知无用而始可與言用矣。 ("Wai wu" 外物 936). Zhang Longxi points out that Zhuangzi "seems to argue that once you know that the use of words is provisional, you are freed, as it were, from the infatuation with words and are thus capable of using words as expedient 'non-words'" (40). The idea about "non-words" here seems to mean that one has to take words as "non-words," and only by so doing can one really talk of something. "By speaking non-words all through the life," Zhuangzi says, "one has really said something" 言無言，終身言，未嘗不言 ("Yu yen" 寓言 949).

Zhuangzi's response to Gongsun Longzi's "*Baima lun*" falls in line with his idea about "non-words"; but here it is referred to as "non-signs":

以指喻指之非指，不若以非指喻指之非指也；以馬喻馬之非馬，不若以非馬喻馬之非馬也。天地一指也，萬物一馬也。

Using *zhi* [sign] to signify *fei zhi* [non-sign] is inferior to using *fei zhi* to signify *fei zhi*; using horse to signify non-

horse is inferior to using non-horse to signify non-horse. The world is a single sign, and all objects are a single horse. (“*Qiwu lun*” 66)

What he tries to do is to break down the meaningless dichotomies of right/wrong, positive/negative. So words and non-words, signs and non-signs are all the same. Yet if he is to be asked to make a choice for his rhetorical strategies, he would choose non-words and non-signs.

It remains doubtful how Gongsun Longzi’s model can be rebuilt with Zhuangzi’s suggestions. Zhuangzi actually resorts to perplexing rhetorical strategies to underscore his point without really caring about whether his words make sense or not. This matches his belief that language cannot lead to truth.

It is easy to see that he is also trapped in the prison house of language, for he cannot avoid speaking of his views through the use of language due to the social and political reasons mentioned above. Conscious of the dilemma, Zhuangzi adopts a rhetorical strategy that exposes as much as he can the absurdity of language. Sun describes Zhuangzi’s rhetoric as “weird words and strange talks” which are even stranger than Gongsun Longzi’s (128).

When Dongguozi 東郭子 asks him where Dao can be found, Zhuangzi replies that it is everywhere. When he is further asked to specify its location, he says it is located in ants and even excretions (“*Zhi beiyou*” 749-50). The rhetoric is repelling. Zhuangzi actually makes use of a double-edged strategy: on the one hand, language becomes a mere instrument, which can be discarded at any time; on the other hand, Zhuangzi can excuse himself from using language in any bizarre way he wants (Zhang 40-41).

His manipulation of the rhetoric, which is a case of what Paul de Man would call the grammatization of rhetoric, can also be found in his famous debate with Huizi about the possibility of knowing whether a fish is happy. When Zhuangzi claims that the fish is swimming happily, Huizi asks him: “You are not the fish. How do you now that the fish is happy?” 子非魚，安知魚之樂。 After some exchanges

between them about the possibility of knowing the other's feelings, Zhuangzi concludes triumphantly:

請循其本。子曰「汝安知魚樂」云者，既已知吾知之而問我。

Please return to the beginning. You asked, 'How do you know that the fish is happy?' You then already knew that I knew when you asked. ("*Qiushui*" 秋水 606-607)

This is a demonstration of Zhuangzi's idea about the indeterminacy of language. Huizi's question is commonly taken to be a rhetorical question that denies the possibility of Zhuangzi knowing the feeling of the fish. It is not meant to ask Zhuangzi to reveal the way of how he comes to know about the other's feelings. But Zhuangzi manipulates Huizi's rhetorical question, and takes it at its face value, concluding that it is already Huizi's confirmation that he does know about the fish's feelings. That is what Paul de Man calls the grammaticalization of rhetoric, where a rhetorical question is taken literally. Although Zhuangzi's manipulation of the rhetorical question gives him victory in the debate, the meanings of the question are still indeterminate. And there cannot possibly be a conclusion as to whether Zhuangzi really knows the fish's feelings.

Another famous fable about Zhuangzi and the butterfly further demonstrates how language, although condemned by Zhuangzi as useless, actually confirms his own being. Once when Zhuangzi is asleep, according to the story told at the end of "*Qiwu lun*," he dreams that he is a butterfly. When he wakes up, he cannot determine whether he is Zhuangzi dreaming about the butterfly, or the butterfly dreaming about Zhuangzi. Lacan points out that the two situations here are only deceptively parallel, because only Zhuangzi, living in the symbolic order, or a world of language, can ask such a question, while the butterfly, presumably lacking the ability to use language, cannot possibly ask whether it is dreaming about being Zhuangzi (Lacan 75-77). Zhuangzi therefore has to conclude that he and the butterfly are different. His recognition of the difference, through the force of lan-

guage, undermines his claims that language is useless. Zhuangzi's philosophy, founded on his rhetorical strategies, seems to undermine his own claims: if language is unreliable and cannot lead to truth, his discourse will be necessarily deceptive also. Zhuangzi, obviously conscious of the trap he sets for himself, therefore pushes his language to an extreme to show the absurdity of language. The paradox is, if we believe him, then we should shun his discourse; but if we do not believe him, then we might still try to take some efforts to make sense out of his discourse.

The Mohist view about language on the other hand is more pragmatic. For Mozi, language imitates reality: "The name imitates reality" 以名舉實 ("Xiaoqu" 小取 642), and "Discourse comes from imitation of reality" 舉，擬實也 ("Jingshang" 經上 471). Language is used to "inspect the truth behind all things, and to compare different discourse. The name imitates reality. The words express the opinions, and discourse explains the rationale" 摹略萬物之然，論求群言之比，以名舉實，以辭抒意，以說出故 ("Xiaoqu" 642).

At first sight, the Mohist views seem to privilege language, but his discourse never calls into question the existence of the material world. Instead his elaborate logical scheme is designed to warn against the traps of language. His text is often called *Mobian* 墨辯 and the Mohist logic *bian xue* 辯學, or the study of debating (Sun 40). In "Xiaoqu," Mozi at the very beginning explains the function and necessity of debating:

夫辯者，將以明是非之分，審治亂之紀，明同異之處，
察名實之理

Debating is meant to distinguish the right from the wrong,
to judge order from chaos, to point out sameness and dif-
ference, to inspect the relations between name and actual-
ity. (642)

Bian 辯 here has two meanings, one of which is to debate, and the other to distinguish. When it is taken to mean "distinguish," it is interchangeable with another Chinese character, 辨, with the same

phonetic value (Sun 41). So the Mohist logic is meant not only to be rhetorical techniques for debating, but also a necessary tool for distinguishing.

Does the Mohist logic really help us make distinctions? There seems to be no doubt about it. However, his rhetoric is so heavily dependent on the compactness of the Chinese syntax that sometimes it is no less perplexing than Gongsun Longzi's sophism. In "*Xiaoqu*," when Mozi illustrates his logical arguments, a great number of substitutions occur on the rhetorical axis over the same or very similar grammatical structures. Consider the following two sets of assertions concerning a certain person named Ho:

(1) 獲，人也。愛獲，愛人也。

Ho, human being. To love Ho is to love human being.

(643)

(2) 獲之親，人也。獲事其親，非事人也。

Ho's relatives are human beings. Whom he serves are his relatives, not human beings. (643)

On the rhetorical mode, Ho and human being are interchangeable in the first assertion. However, in the second assertion, such a substitution is forbidden. This apparently hinges on a semantic difference between the words "human beings" and "Ho" in the two assertions.

The semantic difference, however, is generated by the difference of the verbs used in the two assertions. The verbs do not only differentiate the actions, but also imply different social situations and values, which constitute the semantic shift. For to love someone, it is a common act that could apply to anyone, regardless of their social positions, or the symbolic value invested on their relations by a sign system. Therefore Ho can remain a human being, regardless of by what name he is called. On the other hand, to serve someone necessarily involves a hierarchy, or a relation determined by society or language. So what Ho serves is a position taken by someone, whose existence as a human being can be neglected. Mozi's logic is thus

context bound, embedded in a code that governs the interplay of the metaphorical and metonymical.

Early Chinese logic, if it can be called so, is confused by an interplay between rhetoric and grammar, and that explains why it looks perplexing. Many efforts have been invested in tackling the problems in strictly logical terms. Yet perhaps the power of ancient Chinese logic, whose main purpose was to persuade, lies in its rhetoric. A study of rhetoric then may shed new lights on Chinese logic.

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