

# The Road Not Taken: The Convergence/ Divergence of Logic and Rhetoric in the Mohist “Xiaoqu”

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## ABSTRACT

Modern scholarship on *Mozi* has established an interpretative tradition of equating *Mobian* with logic. The present study takes issue with this tradition, criticizing its failure to locate the tension between logic and rhetoric in the Mohist art of disputation. Indeed, when modern scholars draw a parallel between the Mohist practice of debate and Western logic, they generally do not take into account the tension between logic and rhetoric, either in the West or in *Mobian*. Overlooking this tension, Hu Shi thus reads the “Xiaoqu” chapter in *Mozi* as a treatise on logic. Drawing upon the history of logic and rhetoric’s development in the West, the present paper attempts to reveal Hu’s bias in emphasizing the elements of logic in his explication of “Xiaoqu.” To counterbalance Hu’s reading of “Xiaoqu” in logical terms, this paper further highlights the rhetorical function of *pi*, *mou*, *yuan*, *tui*, four strategies of argument discussed in “Xiaoqu.” *Pi*, *mou*, *yuan*, *tui* are actually four methods of analogy that take advantage of superficial resemblance to influence one’s judgment of the argument’s logical validity. Exploring the convergence and divergence of logic and rhetoric in the Mohist “Xiaoqu,” it is hoped that we can arrive at a better understanding of *Mobian*.

## KEY WORDS

*Mobian*  
“Xiaoqu”

logic  
*pi*

Hu Shi  
Graham, A. C.  
rhetoric

*mou*

*yuan*

*tui*



Influenced by Hu Shi 胡適, modern scholarship on *Mozi* 墨子 has generally approached *Mobian* 墨辯, translated as the Mohist art of disputation by A. C. Graham (1978), with the paradigm of modern Western logic.<sup>1</sup> Although this approach has achieved fruitful results, the question remains whether it is justifiable to understand the Mohist practice of disputation as logic proper.<sup>2</sup> For one thing, this kind of approach seems partial in that it fails to locate the tension between logic and rhetoric in the Mohist art of argument. This partiality is especially conspicuous in the discussion of “Xiaoqu” 小取, taken to be a general treatise on “logic” by many modern scholars. At the same time as the Mohist methods of argument are translated into Western logical methods, some scholars have pointed out that the Mohist “logic” leaves much to be desired compared with modern Western logic. While these scholars are able to identify the difference between modern Western logic and the Mohist practice of disputation, they attribute this difference to the rudimentariness of the Mohist “logic.” It does not seem to occur to them that the Mohist art of debate, instead of being “logic” pure and simple, may be a combination of logic and rhetoric. Granting that the Mohist “logic” is a type of rudimentary logic, these scholars simply forget to explore the convergence and divergence between logic and rhetoric in the two arts’ rudimentary stage of development. When we draw a parallel between the Mohist art of disputation and Western logic, should we not also take into account the tension between logic and rhetoric in the West? The purpose of my paper is to introduce this tension into the interpretation of “Xiaoqu.” In fact, some scholars working on the history of Chinese rhetoric have identified the rhetorical elements in *Mozi*. For instance, Yi Pu 易蒲

and Li Jinling 李金苓, in their *Hanyu xiucixue shigang* 漢語修辭學史綱 [A Concise History of Chinese Rhetoric], point out that “Xiaoqu” is of importance to the study of both logic and rhetoric (43-44, 67-68). Zhou Zhenfu 周振甫 also takes note of the rhetorical elements in “Xiaoqu” (25-26). However, they do not explore in detail the tension between logic and rhetoric in “Xiaoqu”; nor do they draw upon the historical development of both arts in the West to make a comparison. The tension between logic and rhetoric in the West has existed from the very beginning of the two arts’ development and has extended well into the Middle Ages when logic, rhetoric, and grammar constitute the so-called “trivium” of the Medieval educational system. As “trivium” literally means a place where three roads meet, it will be more desirable to put the Mohist practice of disputation in the three perspectives of grammar, rhetoric, and logic. A. C. Graham has touched in some detail upon the relationship of logic and grammar in *Mozi* (1964: 39-56; 1978: 111-65). My paper will thus take up the road not taken by most scholars: rhetoric. However, due to the limitation of my ability, I cannot venture very far along this road at present. My paper will be only a cursory excursion into the territories where rhetoric and logic converge and diverge.

Although “Xiaoqu” is only one of the six chapters which make up the Mohist art of disputation, it is unique “in being a consecutive treatise relatively free from textual corruption” (Graham 1964: 1-2). The other five chapters are fragmentary in structure and have suffered from textual corruption in many places to make their interpretation much more difficult. Therefore, “Xiaoqu” has been regarded as the key to the understanding of the Mohist disputation. For those who wish to prove that the Mohists have developed a systematic study of logic, “Xiaoqu” is of crucial importance. Without “Xiaoqu,” the Mohist “logic” reconstructed from the other five chapters is at best a patchwork devoid of a consistent theoretical framework. Nevertheless, despite the brilliant intelligence many scholars have put into the elaboration of “the Mohist logic,” it still seems that the Mohist art of disputation has not received fair treatment in these scholars’ hands, for they have managed to give the false impression that the Mohist art

of debate is nothing but logic.

This false impression is the most evident in Hu Shi's *The Development of the Logical Method in Ancient China*, which is written in English. In this book, Hu embarks upon the task of recovering the logical theories and methods of ancient Chinese philosophers from Confucius to Han Fei. He tells us that "Neo-Mohism" is "the only school of Chinese thought which has developed a scientific logic with both inductive and deductive methods" (1968: 61). Here is his reading of "Xiaoqu":

It is a complete treatise on logic, consisting of nine sections. Section 1 sets forth the general nature and function of logic. Section 2 defines the five methods of inference which are: deduction, comparison, parallel, analogy, and induction. Section 3 discusses the dangers and fallacies of the last four methods. Section 4 names the five difficulties of formal logic, most of which difficulties are due to the peculiar character of the Chinese language which has neither signs for plural number nor distinctions of generic and partitive usages of names. The remaining five sections take up these five difficulties separately and in great detail. (1968: 86)

Although the reader can get a rough picture of the content and structure of "Xiaoqu" from the passage quoted above, (s)he is advised to ignore those terminologies of logic strewn here and there by Hu. Hu's passage illustrates one of the writing strategies we can use to smuggle meanings, especially when doing comparative studies across two languages. Without any detailed gloss on the Chinese term *bian* 辯, he takes it for granted that *bian* is logic and accordingly treats "Xiaoqu" as a treatise dealing with logical reasoning. Actually, *bian* is more commonly known as meaning "disputation" or "argument." Its original meaning is disputation between two parties in the courtroom (Yao Zhenli 姚振黎 68). According to Sun Zhongyuan's 孫中原 *Zhongguo luojixue* 中國邏輯學 [Chinese Logic] (13, 208), it also means to

distinguish 辨. A. C. Graham observes: "For the Mohists . . . *pien* [*bian*] is the regular term for rational discourse, for disputation with the purpose of distinguishing between right and wrong alternatives" (1978: 319). Therefore, even if the Mohist *bian* can be demonstrated to involve elements of logical thinking, it cannot be directly equated with logic. In Hu's *Zhongguo gudai zhexue shi* 中國古代哲學史 [A History of Ancient Chinese Philosophy], written in Chinese, he glosses the Mohist *bian* as the method to distinguish the right from the wrong and truth from falsehood, and touches upon *bian*'s denotation as argument (177-78). It seems that some distance is allowed to exist between *bian* and logic in Hu's Chinese account of the Mohist *bian*. However, this distance does not pose any problem to Hu as if to argue is always to argue logically in the case of the Mohist *bian*.

The same attitude in treating the relationship between logic and the Mohist *bian* characterizes many other scholars, such as Liang Qichao 梁啟超, Yao Zhenli, Wang Dianji 汪奠基, Sun Zhongyuan, and Chen Menglin 陳孟麟. They all treat the Mohist art of disputation as argument based on logic. Some even equate *bian* with logic. Liang Qichao, for example, declares that what is called logic in the West is called *bian* by the Mohists (41). This view is shared by Sun (40), Wang Dianji (116), and Wang Zanyuan 王讚源 (142). Such reductive declaration which treats *bian* and logic as synonyms only serves to obscure the difference between Western logic and the Mohist way of reasoning, not to mention its distortion of *bian*'s definition. What is more, when earlier scholars, like Hu and Liang, equate the Mohist art of disputation with Western logic, they never concern themselves with the historical development of Western logic. They simply take the modern Western logic as they find it and translate the ancient Chinese concepts in the Mohist *bian* into modern terminology of logic. Their synchronic approach, which brackets the time lag of roughly two thousand and five hundred years, is motivated by a desire to find in the ancient Chinese text the elements they consider to be the great achievements of the modern Western civilization. As long as something which appears to be like "concept," "judgment," "inference," "deduction," and "induction" can be found in "Xiaoqu," Hu and Liang are

satisfied to declare that the Mohist *bian* is logic proper. Later scholars, such as Sun Zhongyuan and Chen Menglin, have developed more elaborate and systematic ways of reading the Mohist *bian* in terms of Western logic. Nevertheless, in the desire to prove that the Chinese people know how to think logically, they all fail to explore the tension between logic and rhetoric in the Mohist practice of argument.

I want to emphasize that I have no intention to devalue what these scholars have accomplished in their efforts to reconstruct the Chinese logic. Nor do I deny that there are elements of logic in the Mohist art of disputation. But to announce categorically that *Mobian* is logic seems to mix categories. Sun is not unaware of this problem when he states in his *Guibian yu luoji mingpian shangxi* 詭辯與邏輯名篇賞析 [Analytic Appreciation of Classics in Sophistry and Logic] that there is almost no pure logical reasoning in ancient China—not even in “Xiaoqu” (48). Therefore, it is premature to treat *bian* and logic as synonymous. To read ancient Chinese texts in terms of modern Western logic is to adopt a synchronic approach that aims at building a coherent system of theory. Because the purpose is to set up a theory of the Chinese logic, scholars from Hu to Sun have focused exclusively on those elements in Chinese texts which can be compared with modern Western logic. Their blindness to the non-logical elements goes together with their insight into the logical elements in *Mozi*. This is not merely an issue of whether we are to adopt a synchronic approach or a diachronic approach in the comparative study of logic and the Mohist art of disputation. The question is that in adopting a synchronic approach, Hu, Sun, and others have not taken into consideration the element of rhetoric in the synchronic system of the Mohist *bian*. They have, so to speak, performed an act of synecdochal substitution by making the element of logic in the Mohist disputation become the whole of the Mohist art of argument. In spite of the fact that in attempting to include the element of rhetoric in my reading of “Xiaoqu,” I resort to a diachronic description of the development of Western logic to show that logic and rhetoric are mutually entangled, I think I am also engaged in a synchronic study of the two systems of the Mohist *bian* and the Western logic/rhetoric. It is sim-

lenistic Age, the Stoics interpret logic broadly as the verbal arts, dividing it into dialectic, grammar, and rhetoric (Wagner 10-11). Different ages have witnessed different scholars' formulations of the relationship between rhetoric and dialectic. Sometimes dialectic is subsumed under rhetoric. At other times rhetoric is considered as a branch of dialectic (Camargo 101-02). The distinction between the two arts has never been clear-cut in the Middle Ages, as evidenced in Martianus Capella's *The Marriage of Philology and Mercury*. For example, Dialectic claims that "whatever the other Arts propound is entirely under [her] authority," including Rhetoric (110). On the other hand, Rhetoric also includes the study of Dialectic in her art (179-84).

Bearing in mind this brief and much simplified history of the tension between logic and rhetoric, we can observe the same tension between logic and rhetoric in the Mohist "Xiaoqu" as soon as we do not approach the Mohist art of disputation as logic proper. Historically, the Mohist art of disputation grows partly out of the Mohists' debates with contemporary sophists' sophisms such as "A white horse is not a horse" or "A white dog is black." While the Mohist art of disputation has involved some principles of logical reasoning, its ultimate aim is to persuade the opponent in a debate. As rhetoric in the West has traditionally been defined as the pragmatic art of persuasion, the Mohist art of disputation can be said to combine both rationalist and oratorical elements, much like Aristotle's general theory of argument. As I have pointed out, the Mohist *bian* cannot be translated as logic in English. A. C. Graham has translated it as "Dialectics" in 1964. However, in his 1978 book *Later Mohist Logic, Ethics and Science*, Graham changes his translation of *bian* to "disputation." Graham seems to realize that the Mohist *bian* is more an art of persuasion in disputations than a study of dialectical reasoning. I will hence proceed to read "Xiaoqu" with this perspective, quoting Hu's and Graham's translations of "Xiaoqu" to make my point.

The first section of "Xiaoqu" tells us the purpose and function of *bian*:

夫辯者將以明是非之分審治亂之紀明同異之處察名實



之理處利害決嫌疑焉摹略萬物之然論求群言之比以名舉實以辭抒意以說出故以類取以類予 (Mozi ch. 45)

The following translation is taken from Hu Shi's *The Development of the Logical Method in Ancient China*:

In order to distinguish between right and wrong, to inquire into the causes of good government and misrule, to know the points of agreement and difference between things, to examine the relations between names (predicables) and substances (subjects), to be able to determine the good and the evil, and to be able to meet difficult and doubtful situations,—in order to accomplish all this, the reasoner notes and observes the happenings (literally, the becoming-so) of all things and seeks the order of relation between the various judgments, he defines the subject with the predicate, expresses his meaning in a proposition, and gives the reason (or the ‘because’) in a premise, he selects instances on the principle of similarity and affirms on the principle of similarity. (Hu 1968: 93)

Hu Shi takes this section to be a description of logic. However, other scholars have interpreted this passage as referring simply to disputation (Chen Guimiao 陳癸淼 258; Cai Renhou 蔡仁厚 168-69). To draw upon Charles S. Peirce's theory of semiotic, if we take “Xiaoqu” as a system of sign, its meaning would seem to be conditioned by the “interpretant” the reader brings to it. As Peirce states, “A sign, or *representamen*, is something which stands to somebody for something in some respect or capacity. It addresses somebody, that is, creates in the mind of that person an equivalent sign, or perhaps a more developed sign. That sign which it creates I call the *interpretant* of the first sign” (5). Because Hu approaches the Mohist art of disputation in terms of logic, his understanding and translation of “Xiaoqu” is accordingly conditioned by the interpretant of logic. This can be further observed in his translation of the section dealing with the four

methods of argument: *pi*, *mou*, *yuan*, *tui*, which he understands to be logical methods, but which can be demonstrated to be rhetorical strategies in practical debates once we take rhetoric as the interpretant of “Xiaoqu.”

*Pi* is simply the use of metaphors, similes, and comparisons: 辟也者舉也物而以明之也 (*Mozi* ch. 45). “The method of comparison (the *pi*, 辟) consists in illustrating one thing by means of another” (Hu 1968: 99). As such, Hu admits it “does not purport to discover new truths, but merely to explain one thing by means of something else which bears some resemblance to it” (1968: 99). Zhong Youlian 鐘友聯 also points out that simile is actually a literary figure, lacking in logical significance unless it is used to illustrate, to explain, or to demonstrate (70-71). Nevertheless, when simile is used to illustrate, to explain, and to demonstrate, the purpose is always to persuade, and hence it serves the pragmatic function of rhetoric. The practice of *mou* is to develop one’s reasoning basing on two sentences’ parallel syntactic structures: 侔也者比辭而俱行也 (*Mozi* ch. 45). Again, there is no guarantee that this kind of practice will help people think logically. On the other hand, parallelism has long been a characteristic literary style in Chinese writings. *Yuan*, according to the Chinese text, is to cite the opponent’s argument to support one’s own argument: 援也者曰子然我奚獨不可以然也 (*Mozi* ch. 45). Hu interprets it as analogy: “The method of analogy (the *yuen*, 援) says: ‘You are so, why should I not be so?’” (1968: 99). As for *tui*, Hu considers it to be induction: “The method of induction (the *tuei*, 推) consists in making a general affirmation on the ground that the unexamined instances are similar to those already examined” (1968: 99). And yet, according to Graham, *tui* is “using what is the same in that which he [the opponent] refuses to accept and that which he does accept in order to propose the former” (1978: 483). Graham’s translation is more faithful to the original Chinese text: 推也者以其所不取之同於其所取者予之也 (*Mozi* ch. 45). In comparison, it seems that in order to equate *tui* with induction, Hu has stretched the meaning of the original text in his translation. It is important to note that in both *yuan* and *tui*, one will base one’s own argument on the premise of the opponent.

Therefore, the two methods are strategies to be applied in actual debates. In the context of “Xiaoqu,” the two methods are formulated more as rhetorical weapons, than as logic proper. What is more, the four methods all make use of analogy. It is interesting to note that while Zhong Youlian admits that the first three methods belong to the category of analogy, he, along with Hu Shi, insists that the last method, *tui*, is induction. Zhong has remarked that in the use of analogy, the function of literary embellishment is stronger than logical reasoning (86). It seems that Zhong is aware of the problem involved if *tui* is also to be considered as belonging to the use of analogy, because it will then be much more difficult to assert that “Xiaoqu” is a treatise on logic. Perhaps Roman Jakobson’s theorization of “the poetic function” will help us better understand the rhetorical force of *pi*, *mou*, *yuan*, *tui*. According to Jakobson, the poetic function “projects the principle of equivalence from the axis of selection into the axis of combination” (155). Using the four methods of *pi*, *mou*, *yuan*, *tui*, we make up sentences that develop along the horizontal axis in accordance with the principle of resemblance. Thus the poetic function in the use of analogy will influence one’s judgment of the argument’s logical validity during debates. However, as analogy only resorts to superficial resemblance, it can easily lead to fallacies.

In the next section of “Xiaoqu,” we are warned of the fallacies produced through practicing the four methods of analogy:

夫物有以同而不率遂同辭之侔也有所至而正其然也有所以然也同其所以然不必同其取之也有以取之其取之也同其所以取之不必同是故辟侔援推之辭行而異轉而危遠而失流而離本則不可不審也不可常用也故言多方殊類異故則不可偏觀也 (*Mozi* ch. 45)

As Hu has not given us a complete translation of this section, I am quoting from Graham’s translation:

Of things in general, if there are respects in which they are the same, it does not follow that they are altogether the

same. The parallelism of propositions is valid only as far as it reaches. If something is so of them there are reasons why it is so; but though its being so of them is the same, the reasons why it is so are not necessarily the same. If we accept a claim we have reasons for accepting it; but though we are the same in accepting it, the reasons why we accept it are not necessarily the same. Therefore propositions which illustrate, parallelise, adduce and infer become different as they ‘proceed’, become dangerous when they change direction, fail when carried too far, become detached from their base when we let them drift, so that we must on no account be careless with them, and must not use them too rigidly. Hence saying has many methods, separate kinds, different reasons, which must not be looked at only from one side. (1978: 483-84)

This section is perhaps the most important one in “Xiaoqu.” It can be elaborated in terms of modern semiology as demonstrating the instability of the language system. Nevertheless, for the purpose of this paper, I only want to state that the section is a precaution for the debaters who use the rhetorical weapons of *pi*, *mou*, *yuan*, *tui* in their discourse. What is involved in the use of the four methods is the dialectical relationship of resemblance and difference. It is interesting to note that although one of the functions of *bian* is to “distinguish between points of agreement and difference between things” as stated in the first section of “Xiaoqu,” *pi*, *mou*, *yuan*, *tui* will develop one’s argument with the purpose to *equate*, rather than to *distinguish*. The four methods of *bian* take advantage of superficial resemblance to annul difference of opinions. Hence the Mohist *bian* seems to be a self-deconstructing practice in that whereas it claims to *distinguish*, the practice of *bian* actually results in *non-differentiation*. That is why it has to warn the disputant against the practice of *pi*, *mou*, *yuan*, *tui* it teaches itself.

The remaining sections of “Xiaoqu” are engaged with the self-deconstruction it creates for itself with five groups of examples which

contradict each other's truth-claims. Therefore, it is apparent that the purpose of "Xiaoqu" is not to develop a systematic theory of logic, but to explore rhetorical strategies in disputations, which may lead to contradictory conclusions. As Graham has pointed out, in the progression of arguments presented in these sections, "there are not even logical connectives, simply parallel propositions laid side by side" (1978: 489). However, there is still a rhetorical principle of organization in arranging the parallel propositions. The first group of examples is arranged so as to advocate the Mohist doctrine of universal love: 白馬馬也乘白馬乘馬也驪馬馬也乘驪馬乘馬也獲人也愛獲愛人也 (*Mozi* ch. 45). "A white horse is a horse. To ride a white horse is to ride horses. A black horse is a horse. To ride a black horse is to ride horses. Jack [a servant] is a person. To love Jack is to love people" (Graham 1978: 485). The second group of parallel propositions is designed to prove that "killing robbers is not killing people." However, the formula of "Jack is a person; to love Jack is to love people" contradicts with the formula of the second group of parallel propositions:

盜人人也多盜非多人也無盜非無人也……惡多盜非惡多人也欲無盜非欲無人也……盜人人也愛盜非愛人也不愛盜非不愛人也殺盜非殺人也 (*Mozi* ch. 45)

Robbers are people, but abounding in robbers is not abounding in people, being without robbers is not being without people. . . . Disliking the abundance of robbers is not disliking the abundance of people, desiring to be without robbers is not desiring to be without people. . . . [A]lthough robbers are people, loving robbers is not loving people, not loving robbers is not not loving people, killing robbers is not killing people. (Graham 1978: 487)

For Graham, the contradiction in formula between the two groups of examples "is a matter of semantics rather than of logic" (1978: 489). Accordingly, it is not enough to approach this contradiction with the

perspective of logic. We have to understand the Mohist practice of disputation in terms of rhetorical strategies. As *pi, mou, yuan, tui* are only rhetorical strategies, the use of them aims only to win in disputations. We are warned of the logical consequence of producing fallacies in the application of the four methods, but “Xiaoqu” does not offer us any guidelines based on logic to avoid the possible fallacies. Thus it seems arguable whether “Xiaoqu” can qualify as a treatise on logic.

In *Anatomy of Criticism*, Northrop Frye makes the following observation: “Anything which makes a functional use of words will always be involved in all the technical problems of words, including rhetorical problems. The only road from grammar to logic, then, runs through the intermediate territory of rhetoric” (331). Therefore, it is unavoidable that we should find ourselves treading the territory of rhetoric once we start to analyze a text. Nevertheless, modern scholars explicating the Mohist art of disputation have seemed to ignore the part and the function of *Mobian*’s rhetoric in their analyses of the six chapters which make up *Mobian*. For example, there is the question whether the fragmentary structure of the other five chapters is designed for the convenience of memorization of the many items of definitions in these chapters in order to be drawn upon during debates. If such is the case, even if modern scholars have pieced these fragments together to form a consistent theory of logic, we can argue that the text of *Mobian* was originally constructed for rhetorical purpose. We can even set out to explore the elements of rhetoric involved in modern Chinese scholars’ efforts to translate the Mohist art of disputation into modern Western logic. Their discourse is often marked by the exclamation that the Chinese mind is not inferior to the mind of the West since they are basically “the same.” Thus, we can observe that they are making use of the Mohist analogy to prove that they are arguing logically. In the meantime, we can also ask if these scholars are being somehow misled to a certain degree in their pursuit of resemblance between the East and the West.

In their approach to the Mohist art of disputation via the road of logic, modern Chinese scholars seem to be addressing at the same time the issue of what road the modern Chinese should take in order

to catch up with the West. As Graham puts it, “their problems became inseparable from the general problem of Westernisation . . .” (1978: 72). It seems that the contemporary crisis of finding a new direction for the Chinese culture is being shifted to the ancient cultural crisis of the debates between the Mohists and the sophists. Modern scholars lament the fact that the road of the Mohists, the road of “logic,” had not been taken. On the contrary, the Chinese culture has taken the road of the sophists, the road of rhetoric. Hu Shi thinks that the rhetoric of Zhuangzi’s 莊子 sophisms, in particular, had to take the responsibility for the Chinese mind’s loss of interest in logic (1991: 339-40). Nevertheless, as I hope I have demonstrated, it is not completely correct to equate the Mohist art of disputation with logic. Furthermore, as Hu Shi also seems to fall into the trap of depending too much on the method of analogy in his argument that the Mohist *bian* is logic, he does not seem to be logical enough. Actually, it appears that Hu has overlooked the warning presented in “Xiaoqu” that “[o]f things in general, if there are respects in which they are the same, it does not follow that they are altogether the same” (Graham 1978: 483). Once Hu and other scholars fail to *distinguish* clearly the difference between the Mohist art of disputation and modern Western logic and instead emphasize on their resemblance, to quote from the Robert Frost poem I refer to in the title of this paper, “that has made all the difference” in modern understanding of *Mobian*. And despite the remarkable achievement of modern scholars in reconstructing a system of Chinese logic, the difference between the West and the East has always already been there, and their achievement can be regarded as the difference the Western influence has made upon the direction of Chinese culture’s interpretation. As such, it can be studied under the “pure rhetoric” of Peirce, which deals with “the laws by which . . . one sign gives birth to another, and especially one thought brings forth another” (6).

## NOTES

<sup>1</sup> The most recent examples include Chen Menglin 陳孟麟, Sun

Zhongyuan 孫中原, and Wang Zanyuan 王讚源 141-45.

<sup>2</sup> For objection to treating the Mohist art of disputation as logic proper, see Liu Fuzeng 劉福增 271-74 and the important essay by Tang Junyi 唐君毅.

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