

**First, Second, and Third: An Epistemological
Reflection on Comparative Methodology
through Reviewing Tim-hung Ku 古添洪,
Jihao Shixue 記號詩學 [Semiotics of Poetry]
and Kar^l H. Kao 高辛勇,
Xingmingxue yu xushi lilun 形名學與敘事理論
[Semiotics and Narratology]**

Hong-Chung Lee

ABSTRACT

The aim of this review article is to reflect on the methodology of comparative literature through Charles Sanders Peirce's semiotic theory. The crucial and polemic point in both Ku's and Kao's books amounts to the relationships between Chinese literature and semiotic theories. Without speculating and defining their relations, the application of theories to the texts evades methodological or even epistemological aporia especially when theories and texts are conspicuously heterologous; both are what Peirce has called the First or monad which exists independently of others. In that sense, the violence of theories is manifest to a great extent.

The problem is: what is to be saved, the text or object of analysis, or the analytical structure? Structuralism and semiotics seem to run into the dead end when the concept of "structure" or "system" becomes the target of criticism. But, the object can only be saved, not in itself, but in the other/Other, in the immanent negativity of the theoretical Other: salvation never exists outside though it is impossible without the outside. Peirce's philosophy leads to a way to "inscribe" this possibility of dyadic salvation through Secondness or indexical copulation or articu-

lation.

Comparison, articulation or copulation is what Peirce has termed by "Thirdness" which, however, cannot be achieved except by establishing the "Firstness." In the case of comparative literature, the separateness of the object from theories represents the condition of "Secondness." To explicate the transformation of the First by the Second in order to achieve the Third is what I endeavour to accomplish here.

KEY WORDS

First/Firstness	Peirce
Second/Secondness	Kao
Third/Thirdness	Ku
Metaphor	Icon
Monism/monistic	Mimesis



We are both a part and a likeness of a vast intellectual mechanism. . . . [W]hether we are studying the structure of the literary text, the functional asymmetry of the hemispheres of the brain, the problems of oral speech or of deaf and dumb language, the advertisements of our modern age or the religious ideas of archaic cultures—we find the different mechanisms of the single intellectual life of humanity. We are within it, but it—all of it—is within us. We are . . . the likeness of everything, and ‘the other’ both for other people and for ourselves; we are both a planet in the intellectual galaxy, and the image of its universum. (Lotman 1990: 273)

A part of both Tim-hung Ku’s 古添洪 (Tianhong Gu) and Karl H. Kao’s 高辛勇 (Xinyong Gao) books deal with the introduction of various semiotic theories. To review “introductions” does not make much sense nor provide readers with additional information. But both also deal with the relationships between western semiotic theories and Chinese texts or culture. That part highlights the issue of translation or communication between two cultures and thus between two different kinds of structures. The first problem that comes to mind is that of applicability which, however, presupposes the issues of adequacy and adaequation: are the two structures or systems compatible or homologous to the extent which permits their copulation or comparison?

The application of Western theories to Chinese literature can be generally divided into two directions: either direct

appropriation of theoretical models, or initiation by and transfer of methodologies. . . . The most important question involved in the direct appropriation of models is obviously the “universality” of the model or its cultural “specificity.” . . . But the application of models with “specificity” often leads to the effect of “cutting the foot to fit the shoe.”

(Kao 5, translation mine)

But that leads us astray because the question of comparability cannot be approached by any other means than the comparative one: we have to compare two things in order to determine their copulability; that means, we run into a dead end. The problem of copulation, in terms of what Peirce called the “Thirdness” (see 1991: 189-90, 262), cannot be answered without prior tackling the problem of structure: its nature and condition. The definitive claim of structuralism and semiotics is to start from within, to approach problems from within the structure. Consequently, the condition of translation or articulation between two different systems will be the main task of this review article. But the other question is where to begin. We have two subjects, two structures. To formulate the nature or constitution of both Chinese texts and semiotics is beyond the scope and reach of a review article. Since both Ku’s and Kao’s books are semiotically oriented, a meta-semiotic approach is the only legitimate choice; that is, the Hjelmslevian “substance of expression,” the semiotic theory in our case, will be the object of study. In other words, echoing Eco’s claim for the self-critique of semiotic theory (28-9), this article is meant to be an epistemological reflection on the level of methodology.

Firstness and Secondness of Semiotic Methodology

There are two distinctive methodologies of semiotics: one is to construct a self-sufficient, self-contained, or monistic sign system or structure; the other tends to veer away from the monistic tendency and to concentrate on the structural imbalance so that intersystem or articulation between systems is made possible. Saussurean linguistics

or structuralism basically pertains to the former. This kind of research (pre)supposes the existence of one and only one system or structure, stretches the structure to subsume various sign systems, and configure tautological semiotic systems, but not one semiotic, intersystemic universe. Thus the problem of linguistics cannot be solved by “expansion of its object of study,” or “the expansion of its scope of study” (Ku 180, translation mine). The early Barthes’s inversion of Saussure’s declaration that “linguistics is only a part of the general science of semiology” (Saussure 16) brings to the foreground the underlying methodological premise:

linguistics is not a part of the general science of signs, even a privileged part, it is semiology which is a part of linguistics: to be precise, it is that part covering the great signifying unities of discourse. (Barthes 11)

It may not be inappropriate to term this first kind of study as formalistic in the sense that these “formalists” superimpose one formal structure upon the object or matter of research. This formalistic tendency can be easily detected in Ku’s *Jihao Shixue* 記號詩學 [Semiotics of Poetry] when he applies Jakobson’s, Lotman’s, and Barthes’s theories to Chinese literary texts. In this case, what Ku has formulated is not one and only one system nor tautological systems, but three semiotic narrative structures in three different texts. But, each narrative system remains isolated and independent from others. That is, what characterizes this formalistic approach is not “the expression-substance,” to borrow a phrase from Hjelmslev, or the specific theory the critic adopts. Rather, it is the “expression-form,” the methodological attitude in our case, which distinguishes the two kinds of approaches: the formalistic one tends to construct static, self-contained structures among which no intersystem, in the strong sense of the term, is conceivable. Hjelmslev’s pushing Saussure’s linguistics to a more formal level amounts to constructing a structure beyond space and time (130-31). But it is this self-sufficient, internal structure which guarantees its immanence. It is fascinating to see that each

system formulated by this formalistic approach is “equivalent” to one another in that the structural immanence is the quality or character that pertains to all structures. We can even say that it is the Peircean iconic similarity, a character that connects similar objects (Peirce 1955: 102), which subsumes these formalistic approaches into one methodological category which I call structural monism or monadism in the sense of Peirce’s concept of the monad and the icon as the “Firstness” (1931: 149; 1955: 104). Peirce’s concept of the icon or Firstness perfectly illustrates the nature of this monistic approach: the monad is a pure “suchness *sui generis*” (1931: 149), a pure may-be as the object of the iconic sign with no regard to the existence of this pure quality (150). It is the pure idea, just as the monistic structure is a pure idea in itself; that means, it does not exist.

Both Kao’s emphasis on the immanent “self-plenitude” (122-3) and Ku’s on the formalistic “zero-structure” (179) reveal the tendency of this monistic approach. But, on the other hand, Kao’s emphasis on Barthes’s concept of the non-existence of “writing degree zero” (the writing without ideologies) (197), and Ku’s on the openness of the structure to include the heterogeneous elements, e.g. the diachronic factor, also pertain to the second methodological category which can be termed as the intersystemic structuralism or semiotics. But, it does not mean that those theorists of this category all formulate the relationships between different sign systems, they merely tend to. One specific sign system can be inherently intersystemic. What characterizes this kind of approach is the breaching of the autonomous, monistic structure of the first approach. In other words, structural contradictions or lacks are instituted into the monistic system so that it opens both inside and outside to other sign systems. Internal contradictions make possible and thus lead to external disclosure. Benveniste’s declaration can be regarded as the manifesto of this approach if we take his “sign” as the monistic structure:

In reality the world of the sign is closed. . . . The semiology of language has been obstructed, paradoxically, by the same instrument which created it, the sign. We cannot

brush aside the idea of the linguistic sign without omitting the most important characteristic of language; nor can we extend it to discourse as a whole without contradicting it as a minimal unit. (1981: 20-1)

We have to bear in mind that Benveniste is explicating the relationships between language and other sign systems: language *articulates* all other sign systems to form the general social scheme (18). To achieve such an intersystemic articulation, an “intralinguistic analysis” is required (21). In other words, the murder of the system is the way to intersystem: the intersystemic possibility hinges on the impossibility of the internal, structural completeness. Of course, the monistic approach can also work out an intersystemic theory, but it turns out to be monistic as well, not intersystemic *per se*. In that sense, Even-Zohar’s polysystem theory which regards the struggle between different systems as the structural dynamics (14) misses the point. We cannot hope to solve the question by displacing it elsewhere: the defects of static (synchronic) structure cannot be eliminated by expanding the same structure to a broader field of study. If we take seriously our rendition of the relationships between structures achieved by monistic approach as a Peircean iconic structure, the way to formulate their intersystemic relations is not to be sought in their external, dual communication, but paradoxically in the self-regarding, self-reflexive, and self-negating immanence. To change one side of the iconic sign relation triggers consequent changes in the dual relations of the two sides. The point is that the relations of the structure to its outside dwell within the structure, in its immanent negativity. In the Peircean sense, this kind of self-negating approach amounts to the “Secondness” which negates the existence of the Firstness but still maintains the existence of an immanent suchness pertaining to the dyadic relations of the sign and its object (1931: 163-4). That is, this dyadic approach maintains the crucial concept of “structure” in semiotics. The most important is that the Secondness or index represents the causal relationships between the sign and its object (1931: 164; 1955: 108). That is, this Secondness requires the existence of the ob-

ject without which the indexical sign cannot exist (1991: 239). The “existential relation” (1955: 108) or causality of the Secondness which makes existent the object outside the sign also makes existent the intersystemic relations because the “object,” another sign system as external to the structure in question, is as well *realized*. What is causality if not that each side in itself is insufficient because the other is always presupposed and, though it does not exist within the former, leaves negative traces there. That confirms our hypothesis that an immanent negativity predicates the existence of the external and thus the intersystemic possibility. As for polysystem or external relationships between systems, it is the Thirdness, the interpretant, which constructs the relationships between two systems, between the two sides of the Secondness or between a First and a Second.

From Secondness to Thirdness

First of all, before we directly undertake the intricate issue of comparability, the Thirdness, the problem between the general and the particular has to be solved. Paul Ricoeur has had a fabulous discussion with Greimas about the concept of deep structure. According to Ricoeur, discursive or surface level generates dynamic force for the structure which is always retroactively constructed through the surface level; and thus it is the underlying deep structure which “reflects” the surface discursive level, instead of the other way around (Greimas and Ricoeur 552-4). His post-structuralist view is meant to subvert the orthodox or vulgar Marxist complete determination of superstructure by the base or deep structure. But, Greimas provides an answer to explain the necessity of the semiotic or structuralist claim for the deep structure. According to him, the surface level, in our case the cultural particularity, is always anthropomorphic in that a definitive subject is connected with a definitive object (554). Our claim to cultural specificity amounts to anthropomorphism which declares the autonomy of each distinct cultural group. That means, particularity obstructs inter-cultural translation or transmission. The condition of cultural or intersystemic translation hinges on the existence of a deep

structure. But, the transfer from the surface to the deep level results into a decrease of signification or semantic tensivity because the deep level is an abstracted, non-figurative structure (555). Greimas does not solve the impasse in that article.

Comparability presupposes an underlying structure of generality. But, the pure existence or presupposition of this abstract structure cannot enhance translation on the semantic level of particularity. The conflicts between generality and particularity express the fact that direct translation of semantic contents is impossible. As we have said, the Secondness is the place where the intersystemic relations are made possible. That is, the comparability based on the Thirdness can only be effectuated by Secondness or reciprocal commutation on the semantic plane of each system by immanent mutation within each Firstness. The pivotal concept here is that each mutation within one First in any dyadic relations must “cause” a corresponding transmutation on the other First. In this process, a Thirdness is constituted. Peirce has an exquisite formulation for this curious process:

A philosophy which emphasises the idea of One, is generally a dualistic philosophy in which the conception of Second receives exaggerated attention, for this One (though of course involving the idea of First) is always the other of a manifold which is not one. The idea of the Many, because variety is arbitrariness and arbitrariness is repudiation of any Secondness, has for its principal component the conception of First. In psychology Feeling is First, Sense of reaction Second, General conception Third, or mediation. (1992: 296)

The One and the Many are both required for cultural translation. In order to arrive at the Many or Thirdness, the First is to be invested. But how can the First be invested if it does not exist or is not affected by any other First? To invest, to affect the First requires the activation of an indexical causal relation. The concept of the Second hinges on this affection or “sense of reaction.” Ku’s prediction of a semiotic

comparative literature sets a euphoric and utopic goal: comparative literature aims at achieving national, cultural particularities under the generality or universality of literature (186). This is pure illusion because the universal cannot be reached except by two separated Firsts of Secondness. That is, universality can only be a split one without the possibility of one First “reaching into” the other. Only can the Second affect the mind (Peirce 1935: 237). And the Thirdness is the Mind, the “abstract” conception, which can only lead to an intersystemic translation by “remote control,” in the sense of definite separation and structural immanence.

Affection implies re-semanticization because semic categories constitute and change the thymic state, the state of mind (Greimas and Courtés 346). That can be a Greimassian answer for the possibility of reaching and changing the Thirdness, Mind, or interpretant without sacrificing the semantic content. This is a circuitous process: the material affection instigates the mutation on the abstract level which consequently leads to material mutations again: from Secondness, through Firstness, to Thirdness. Affection impacts on the foundation of the deep structure, which is what Greimas has called the phoria, the primordial substance which generates the narrative deep structure (Greimas and Fontanille 4ff.). But the phoria is later modeled by the deep structure and manifests itself in various types of passional models on the discursive level which then aspectualizes, or particularizes, the subject’s view of the world and value systems. Succinctly, that means, cultural or intersystemic translation alters the state of Mind and the general system of representation, which manifest in our understanding of and comportment with reality or existent cultural products. After the condition of comparability has been established by indexical commutation, various levels of the structure, say Chinese cultural system, are reworked. The axiological and aesthetic systems, as well, undergo transmutations because the establishment of both systems depends on the discursive aspectualization under the domination of semantic modalization (Greimas 1989: 544-7). That means, the result that the whole structure changes is the inevitable by-product of translation and comparison. We have to bear in mind Peirce’s

“pragmaticist” declaration that “the object represented in this opinion [the common agreement or opinion of a group] is the real” (1991: 177): the sign, even the idea as pure may-be, constitutes or, in the fashionable term of post-structuralism, constructs reality (261-2). Languages or sign systems are “modeling systems” (Lotman 1977a: 95, 1977b: 9) which model or regulate not only our conception but external reality. In our case, semiotics models and changes Chinese culture which exists only in the Mind, the Thirdness. Theory “makes,” in the sense of affecting, its object “similar,” in the sense of iconic sign relation, to itself. The next section deals with what this similarization corresponds in both Ku’s and Kao’s books.

Comparative Literature as Peircean Poetics

Sebeok has noticed that Peirce’s concept of the icon contains three main divisions into images, diagrams, and metaphors, and that the third lacks deserved elaboration by Peirce himself (117). Metaphor is commonly identified by Saussureans or Jakobsonians as the paradigmatic or selection plane of a sign system, which consists of objects of “similarity” instead of contiguity which is the relation of objects on the syntagmatic or combination plane (Jakobson 1971: 243-4, 258-9). For us, the most important is that “the principle of similarity underlies poetry” (258). Jakobson’s famous definition for the poetic function proceeds as:

The selection is produced on the base of equivalence, similarity and dissimilarity, synonymity and antonymity, while the combination, the build up of the sequence, is based on contiguity. *The poetic function projects the principle of equivalence from the axis of selection into the axis of combination.* . . . Poetry and metalanguage, however, are in diametrical opposition to each other: in metalanguage the sequence is used to build an equation, whereas in poetry the equation is used to build a sequence. (1960: 358, italics original)

To put it in another way, poetic function is to expose the paradigmatic, equivalent items onto the text or the sequence. Peirce has his own association by resemblance and contiguity: though both call up the idea of the set, the former is to associate two things or ideas by the general nature of the mind, whereas the latter by “experience or the course of life” (1958: 251-2). Of course, the association by resemblance is embodied in icons (283). The association by contiguity can exist in both paradigmatic and syntagmatic axis, while the association by resemblance is doubtless on the paradigmatic axis. Thus it should be legitimate to say that Peirce’s concept of the metaphor also pertains to the plane of equivalence. The relevance of this explication will be clarified later.

In comparative literature, in both Ku’s and Kao’s books, the main tendency is to construct equivalent relationships between semiotic concepts and Chinese texts. In Ku’s comparative study, for example, one Chinese narrative poem is dissected, recombined, and interpreted by Barthes’s theory of five codes formulated in his *S/Z*. Yes, every textual analysis by theories is structured by their schemes. But, to describe this poem by Barthes’s definition of the text as a “galaxy of signifiers” (343) means to cut the text away from any inherent links of that cultural system in order to put these signifiers into the “code-web” (343) of theories. In that case, the equivalence is conspicuously imputed between the text and theory. Though Ku has mentioned many Chinese literary conventions to explain the poem, they are also intended to expand the web of codes. It is undeniable that this dissection and equivalentization is inevitable. Let us look at some other examples:

1. iconicity can open the road to the understanding of Chinese poetry (113);
2. the sign in *Yijing* 易經 pertains to the iconic category (354);
3. the disparagement of form or style and the affirmation of sense or content are characteristics of Chinese literature (Kao 46);
4. Tomashevskij’s concept of motivation can be used to explain many

- Chinese novels (47-8);
5. Chinese culture emphasizes the adequation between Name/Form/signifier and the Named/Content/signified (Ku 303; Kao 111, 300-1);
 6. the theory of intertextuality can account for the Chinese literary convention of allusions (218);
 7. Chinese literature tends to be reality-oriented or realistic; while Western literature tends to be autonomous from external reality (219);
 8. Chinese cultural temporality is retrospective; while Western prospective (299).

All this kind of examples pervades in most comparative analyses. That means, comparative literature inclines to construct an overall system of equivalents which are abstracted from a manifold of cultural products. This kind of analytic methodology can be described as typological paradigmization based on contradistinction to the theoretical concepts: some texts or cultural products are interpreted as similar; others as oppositional; either way, they constitute a paradigm of/for/in the theoretical structure. That is, comparative literature as a sequence consisting of equivalents, or projecting "the principle of equivalence from the axis of selection into the axis of combination," performs the poetic function with the difference that, in poetic works, the content and the form are derived from one, to some extent, homologous source. In that sense, another monistic, not intersystemic, structure, is established.

If the construction of equivalent paradigms follows the principle of Secondness, association by both similar and opposing "reactions," this kind of approach evades the task of real Secondness, mutual commutations as the way to changes in Firstness. What this pseudo-metaphoric methodology arrives at amounts to nothing other than tautological repetition of the Thirdness, the metalanguage, with the difference of added materials. That means, the pseudo-metaphoric approach is metalinguistic rather than poetic because "the sequence is used to build an equation," not the other way around, due to the fact that paradigms are constructed or built. To accomplish the task of

mutual correspondence or “a likeness, a metaphor,” (Lotman, quoted in Shukman 202), as Jakobson has said, ambiguity has to be the inherent character of the poetic or metaphoric relation (1960: 370-1). The text has to be regarded as mythological, resisting translation and metalinguistic understanding, according to Lotman and Uspenskij:

[M]ythological consciousness is fundamentally untranslatable on the plane of another description; it is closed upon itself and thus is comprehensible only from within and not from without. This also arises from the type of semiosis that is inherent in mythological consciousness and finds its linguistic parallel in the untranslatability of proper names. (239)

Lotman and Uspenskij’s concept of the mythological proper name can help us formulate the quasi-metaphoric methodology because the isomorphic, self-contained relationships between the name (the word) and the named (the referent) (236) is what we need here. The mythological text has to be taken as a pure alterity subsisting and insisting in itself, it is a Firstness. The unabridged distance between it and metalanguage also exists between one system and the other or the extra-systemic world. Though Lotman and Uspenskij claim that metaphor and poetry are inconceivable or impossible in the mythological text (240, 244), what they have in mind is the concept of metaphor as imputed, arbitrary sign. But Peirce’s concept of metaphor as an icon designates just this kind of immanent quality which subsists between the proper name and the named.

How do the corresponding mutations occur? It happens on the side of metalanguage. The analyst or the dominating metalanguage incorporates the unsurpassable, external distance between itself and its object into itself, and thus institutes an internal negativity where dwells the possibility of extra-systemic existence. That is, the monistic methodology incorporates as its causal counterpart the object of study. The internal negativity duplicates the causal insufficiency on each sides of Secondness, and reminds the system itself of its lack and

loss. Lotman and Uspenskij have well said, “understanding mythology is tantamount to remembering” (240). The system remembers its loss which can be its genesis, phoria, or anything else that suffers owing to the birth of the system. Namely, it is the structural heterogeneity which is remembered but permanently kept apart from the system. In order to make amends for this loss, in our case for the suffering of the object in the process of analysis or translation, the system can only identify with the object, mimes its structure. That semiotic mimesis is what I mean by Peircean metaphoric poetics, Secondness, or mutual correspondence. In this semiotic or structural mimesis, a quality is instituted not arbitrarily but correspondingly and commutatively. In other words, the monistic system rearranges or re-articulates its paradigmatic items according to the rule of resemblance between objects of the object-system or -culture in order to generate a new paradigmatic principle and set. This semiotic and paradigmatic mimesis is the opposite to the pseudo-metaphoric metalinguistic methodology. The crucial point is that the insurmountable distance between two sides of the Secondness makes impossible any direct Thirdness, but guarantees the possibility of articulation. If we recall Benveniste’s formulation for discursive articulation or enunciation as the institution of linguistic intersubjectivity (1971: 228-9), and if, as we have said, discourse or articulation implies the insufficiency of the monistic sign, genuine articulation between two intersubjective systems can only be reached by the negative way.

This Peircean semiotic mimesis also activates the process of temporality because the cause of the system is instituted. Peirce is notable for his displacement of the structural impasse into the temporal plane:

All probable inference, whether induction or hypothesis, is inference from the part to the whole Now we know upon what the validity of this inference depends. It depends on the fact that *in the long run*, any one bean would be taken out as often as any other [T]he validity of induction depends simply on the fact that the parts make up

and constitute the whole. This in its turn depends simply upon there being such a state of things that any general terms are possible . . . [W]e cannot say that the generality of inductions are true, but only that *in the long run* they approximate to the truth. (1991: 111, emphases added)

He displaces the structural or synchronic deadlock in the relationships between the part and the whole into “the long run,” the temporal plane, the future. This is not to be understood as a mere dynamic principle because it cannot promise any final reconciliation or truth. Rather, the “bean” to be taken in the future is now instituted as the cause of the structure, the whole. Once the cause is identified, the whole mimes the cause so that one day the structure will be sutured by that cause. But, for the present, the distance between the part and the whole has to be maintained so that a temporal process is activated towards the future and the past, future because the system is temporalized and past because the cause of the general is remembered.

Remembrance hinges upon the problem of genesis because the mythological proper name causes the birth of the system or text. What is involved in this mimesis amounts to finding the corresponding name for the object-culture or -system. To articulate, to enunciate the name means to generate an iconic sign, a Peircean metaphor, for the object of the sign. This is the way a communicative Thirdness can be articulated or enunciated. Comparative methodology which is destined to be confined to the level of discourse, the place where the former performs its task, cannot successfully articulate a corresponding discourse for both sides unless temporal genesis and structural generative grammar are both integrated:

[T]he instance of enunciation can be considered as a true praxis, a domain of coming and going between the structures called on and those integrated, an instance that dialectically reconciles *generation* (by the convocation of semiotic universe) and *genesis* (by the integration of historical products). Such passional [affective] configura-

tions . . . are situated at the crossroads of all these instances, since for them to occur certain, specific conditions and preconditions of an epistemological nature must be met along with certain operations specific to enunciation. (Greimas and Fontanille xx, italics original)

WORKS CITED

- Barthes, Roland. *Elements of Semiology* (1964). Trans. Annette Lavers and Colin Smith. New York: Hill and Wang, 1973.
- Benveniste, Emile. *Problems in General Linguistics* (1966). Trans. Mary Elizabeth Meek. Coral Gables: U of Miami P, 1971.
- . “The Semiology of Language” (1969). *Semiotica*, Special supplement (1981): 5-23.
- Eco, Umberto. *A Theory of Semiotics*. Bloomington: Indiana UP, 1976.
- Evan-Zohar, Itamar. Polysystem Studies. Special Issue of *Poetics Today* 11.1 (1990): 1-44.
- Greimas, Algirdas Julien. “On Meaning” (1985). Trans. Paul Perron and Frank Collins. *New Literary History* 20.3(1989): 539-50.
- Greimas, Algirdas Julien, and Joseph Courtés. *Semiotics and Language: An Analytical Dictionary* (1979). Trans. Larry Crist, et al. Bloomington: Indiana UP, 1982.
- Greimas, Algirdas Julien, and Jacques Fontanille. *The Semiotics of Passions: From States of Affairs to States of Feeling* (1991). Trans. Paul Perron, et al. Minneapolis: U of Minnesota P, 1993.
- Greimas, Algirdas Julien, and Paul Ricoeur. “On Narrativity” (1984). Trans. Paul Perron and Frank Collins. *New Literary History* 20.3 (1989): 551-562.
- Hjelmslev, Louis. *Essais linguistiques II*. Copenhagen: Nordisk Sprog-og Kulturforlag, 1973.
- Jakobson, Roman. “Closing Statement: Linguistics and Poetics.” *Style in Language*. Ed. Thomas A. Sebeok. Cambridge, MA: MIT, 1960.
- . *Selected Writings 2: Word and Language*. The Hague: Mouton, 1971.

- Kao, Karl H. 高辛勇. *Xingmingxue yu xushi lilun* 形名學與敘事理論 [Semiotics and Narratology]. Taibei: Lianjing 聯經, 1987.
- Ku, Tim-hung 古添洪. *Jihao Shixue* 記號詩學 [Semiotics of Poetry]. Taibei: Dongda 東大, 1984.
- Lotman, IU. M (Jurij M.). *The Structure of the Artistic Text* (1971). Trans. Gail Lenhoff and Ronald Vroon. Ann Arbor: U of Michigan P, 1977.
- . *Universe of the Mind*. Trans. Ann Shukman. Bloomington: Indiana UP, 1990.
- Lotman, IU. M (Juri M.), and B. A. Uspenskij. “Myth-Name-Culture.” *Soviet Semiotics: An Anthology*. Ed. and Trans. Daniel P. Lucid. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins UP, 1977. 233-52.
- Peirce, Charles Sanders. *Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce, Volume I, Principles of Philosophy*. Ed. Charles Hartshorne and Paul Weiss. Cambridge, MA: Belknap P of Harvard UP, 1931.
- . *Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce, Volume VI, Scientific Metaphysics*. Ed. Charles Hartshorne and Paul Weiss. Cambridge, MA: Belknap P of Harvard UP, 1935.
- . *Philosophical Writings of Peirce*. Ed. Justus Buchler. New York: Dover, 1955.
- . *Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce, Volume VII, Science and Philosophy*. Ed. Charles Hartshorne and Paul Weiss. Cambridge, MA: Belknap P of Harvard UP, 1958.
- . *Peirce on Signs: Writings on Semiotic by Charles Sanders Peirce*. Ed. James Hoopes. Chapel Hill: U of North Carolina P, 1991.
- . *The Essential Peirce: Selected Philosophical Writings, Volume 1 (1867-1893)*. Ed. Nathan Houser and Christian Kloesel. Bloomington: Indiana UP, 1992.
- Saussure, Ferdinand de. *Course in General Linguistics*. Ed. Charles Bally and Albert Sechehaye. Trans. Wade Baskin. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1959.
- Sebeok, Thomas A. *The Sign and Its Masters*. Lanham, MD: UP of America, 1989.
- Shukman, Ann. “Lotman: The Dialectic of a Semiotician.” *The Sign: Semiotics around the World*. Ed. R. W. Bailey, L. Matejka, and P. Steiner. Ann Arbor: U of Michigan P, 1980. 194-206.