

Victimization and the Writerly Subject: Writers' War Responsibility in Early Postwar Japan

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ABSTRACT

Postwar Japanese responses to and discussions of Japan's responsibility for aggression during the Asia-Pacific War have been influenced by a variety of factors, including the Tokyo war crimes trials and American policy toward the emperor. Japanese writers and critics have also been affected by such factors. However, in the year or two immediately following Japan's surrender, Japanese writers began even before the war crimes trials to assess their own and others' war responsibility. The newly-formed *Shin-Nihon Bungakukai* (New Japan Literary Society) declared that certain writers were particularly guilty, and published their names along with a short essay by critic, Odagiri Hideo. Odagiri's essay, and other statements and essays by leftwing writers in 1946 and 1947, illustrate two tendencies which impeded full acceptance and politicization of the issue of writers' war responsibility: a strong sense on the part of Japanese writers that they themselves were victims of the war (victim complex), and a tendency to attribute war guilt to the lack among writers and other Japanese of a modern personality. Their victim complex prevented them from recognizing their responsibility as victimizers of other Asians during the war; their focus on the need for a modern personality, or ego, turned them inward, toward introspection and solipsism, rather than outward, toward an openly political, socially-constructive process.

KEY WORDS

Asia-Pacific War
victimization
persecution complex
victim complex
subject/subjectivity
war responsibility

proletarian literature
solipsism
modern personality/ego
emperor system
modernization paradigm

The issue of war responsibility has been prominent in the news during the 50th anniversary of the end of World War II, and events in both the U.S. and Japan have demonstrated again not only a serious "memory gap" between Americans and Japanese on the issue of the war but deep divisions within each country.¹ In Japan, on the anniversary of surrender, Prime Minister Murayama Tomoichi declared, in a statement announcing a new government initiative to promote "peace, friendship and exchange" in the Asia-Pacific region, that Japan had brought about great suffering through its "colonial rule and aggression," and offered his "heartfelt apology" (*owabi*).² However, after intense political in-fighting among factions, parties, and extraparliamentary pressure groups, on June 9, 1995 the Japanese National Diet was able to pass only an ambiguous resolution which declared the need to "humbly learn from past mistakes" but avoided any mention of "aggressive war" (*shinryaku sensō*) and offered no clear apology.³ Not merely a left-right issue, war responsibility also divides Japanese conservatives. Soon after becoming prime minister in August 1993, Hosokawa Morihiro, who only recently had left the Liberal-Democratic Party, stated, "For myself, I understand the Asia-Pacific War to have been a war of aggression and a mistake" but he was roundly criticized for his statement by other conservative politicians.⁴ Moreover, repeated scandals have shaken ruling circles in Japan as cabinet ministers have often candidly expressed their contempt for charges of Japanese war responsibility and subsequently been forced to resign by way of apology.⁵ Obviously, a great deal of ambivalence remains among prominent Japanese regarding the extent and nature of their war responsibility.⁶

Postwar Context

Discussion of war responsibility among creative writers, critics and the intelligentsia in general must, of course, be seen against the background of fundamental legal questions related to Japanese war responsibility, including that of the emperor. As early as January 19, 1946, occupation documents

suggested that the emperor would be spared prosecution as a war criminal.⁷ In the meantime, the Japanese government under Prime Minister Shidehara Kijuro issued a cabinet resolution that provided elements of the rationale for imperial innocence that would survive down to the present, that is, that Hirohito had believed Japan had no choice but to go to war as a result of Japan's encirclement by the American and European colonial powers, that he had sincerely worked for a negotiated peace, and in any case was not a policy decision-maker.⁸ All ambiguity as to the fate of the emperor was dispelled once the war crimes trials began on May 3, 1946 and the emperor was not among those charged. Indeed, Hirohito was not only exempted from prosecution but allowed to remain as a constitutional monarch under the U.S.-imposed 1947 Constitution. If the emperor, as head of state and commander in chief, was not responsible for the war, then who was? Everyone else? Only the military and a few civilian politicians? No one? It is not surprising that considerable uncertainty still surrounds the issue of Japan's war responsibility.

Without doubt, not only the selection of defendants but the tribunal's definition of its task, the legal principles that it followed, and the approach that it took to prosecuting and convicting the defendants had lasting effects on postwar Japanese conceptions of war responsibility. Of the eleven justices, only three were from Asian countries; moreover, the U.S. subordinated the trial to American interests, and on the whole conveyed the impression that Japan's major responsibility was owed to the U.S. and its European allies rather than to the Asian countries Japanese forces had victimized.⁹ Yet, Japanese writers' most active discussions of their own culpability preceded or paralleled the trials, and therefore were not directly in response to them. Indeed, for the most part the writers' discussions had waned by the time the trials ended.

Of more importance to writers' discussions than the war crimes trials was a very early move by the Japanese government under Prime Minister Higashikuni to shape Japanese thoughts and emotions related to war responsibility. This was Higashikuni's appeal on August 25, 1945 for "*ichioku sôzange*" (one hundred million should repent in unison). He complained that there had been a "decline in national morality" in the course of the war and demanded, in effect, that all Japanese apologized to the emperor for bringing about Japan's defeat and humiliation. Clearly, Higashikuni sought to take advantage of the mood already created by the August 15 imperial broadcast announcing surrender, which seemed to have both situated the emperor in the role of fatherly peacemaker and helped to catalyze a kind of solidarity among Japanese in the face of disaster. Higashikuni sought to infuse that nascent atmosphere of solidarity and

stoicism with an abject sense of responsibility, among all the people, *for having lost the war*. He also clearly intended to preempt any effort to assign special responsibility to specific groups and thus to politicize the issue of war guilt.¹⁰

Moreover, the principle of *ichioku sôzange* was easily transformed into *ichioku sôhigaisha* (a hundred million, all victims). By this logic, once one had apologized to the emperor and thus admitted one's guilt (if only for not having fought hard enough), it became unnecessary to apologize or feel guilty in relation to anyone else. What remained was only one's own bitter wartime experience, and a sense of having been deceived and victimized by Japan's military leaders.

Naming Names

In the ambiguous atmosphere created by the call for *ichioku sôzange*, it is significant that the first volley of criticism related to writers' war responsibility consisted precisely in an effort to distinguish, among writers as a particular group, who was guilty and who was not. Aiming precisely to politicize war responsibility among writers, it issued from the inaugural meeting on March 29, 1946 of the Tokyo branch of a new, leftwing literary association called the Shin-Nihon Bungakukai (New Japan Literary Society). The resolution adopted at that meeting was published in the June, 1946 issue of the society's journal, *Shin-Nihon bungaku* (Literature of New Japan), under the name of Odagiri Hideo.

Born in 1916, Odagiri was first arrested for a supposed infraction of the Peace Preservation Law while still a high school student in Tokyo. He later attended Hôsei University, and it was as a student in the mid-1930s that he first met several of his future postwar comrades, such as Ara Masato. Odagiri intentionally disqualified himself from the draft by fasting; although he was later mobilized for military service in 1943, this time illness led to his discharge three months later. After evading censorship for a time, while continuing to write critically of the war and other circumstances, he was arrested in 1944; only tuberculosis kept him from being imprisoned. After surrender he was involved in the founding not only of the Shin-Nihon Bungakukai but also of the new journal, *Kindai bungaku* (Modern Literature). He joined the Communist party in 1946.

Odagiri's resolution included a list of twenty-five prominent writers whom the Society judged to be guilty of war responsibility. It included such famous names as Yokomitsu Riichi, Kobayashi Hideo, and Mushakôji

Saneatsu. In an effective counterpoint to this iconoclastic move, a month or so earlier the Society had selected and published in the inaugural issue of *Shin-Nihon bungaku* the names of its own top leaders who, in effect, represented the opposite pole, that is, a group whose reputed wartime record of "non-cooperation and resistance against imperialist war"¹¹ was thought to make them worthy of emulation. This group included such Communist leaders of the prewar proletarian literature movement as Nakano Shigeharu, Kurahara Korehito, Kubokawa Tsurujirō and Tokunaga Sunao. The strategy of naming names was, of course, controversial and led to a variety of debates, in the film world and elsewhere.¹² One objective, of course, was to further elevate the prestige and authority of Communists, especially those such as Tokuda Kyūichi who had stubbornly resisted the war effort, having in some cases to spend as much as eighteen years in prison. But in the mid-1950s a younger generation of writers such as Yoshimoto Takaaki and Takei Akio would point out that some writers whose names were included on the Shin-Nihon Bungakukai honor role had in fact been less than heroic during the war.¹³

In any case, Odagiri's short essay is justifiably treated as a milestone in the ultimately abortive effort of writers to deal openly and politically with the question of war responsibility. And yet, in retrospect, it must be said to contain in nascent form tendencies that eventually impeded that very effort. It begins, hyperbolically, by presenting Japanese writers as victims:

The war has ended, but a new literary creativity has only begun to form and confusion and poverty are the norm. This shows that, as a result of the pressure of never knowing when the gloomy days of war would end, the very subject of our creativity has been grievously wounded. Our spirit and flesh, distorted by that pressure, have not yet recovered to the point where they can support a new creativity. The wounds we have received are substantial—tearing our flesh and polluting our blood—and are of a depth that will interfere with healing.

Only after he has portrayed writers as the passive victims of the war does Odagiri turn to the question of their own wartime activities:

Even though a writer might have been perfectly quiet, we need to ask whether silence is indeed golden; in cases where one intentionally produced an inflated or vague work, we have to ask if such tactics are acceptable on the part of writers. We can only begin when we ourselves exhaustively review all this....¹⁴

Odagiri's prior attention to writers' victimization illustrates a tendency that was typical of the postwar period. The novelist and citizens' movement activist, Oda Makoto (who was too young after the war to participate in the early debates), recalled from the vantage of the mid-1960s:

In the early stages of the war, when it appeared that Japan was indeed winning, our lives were relatively undisrupted and there was less opportunity for our observations to contradict faith in the state. In those times we saw ourselves as loyal participants. Toward the close of the war, however, as the situation worsened, it was difficult not to recognize the inconsistency between our daily experiences and the stated national goals. Our optimism began to falter; confidence wavered. Eventually, we could no longer ignore the gaping chasm that had opened between belief and reality; so when defeat was announced, we had to admit, "We were deceived." Our personal sense of involvement and responsibility then evaporated, leaving a pervasive feeling of betrayal, a sense of having been victimized by the state.¹⁵

Oda goes on to explain how such feelings of victimization gradually developed into a "full-fledged persecution complex" which "precluded a parallel awareness of our own complicity as victimizers." Once something like this had occurred, of course, there was little room in the writers' discursive system for Asian or other victims: the role of war victim was already thoroughly dominated by Japanese. Clearly, writers' self-image as victims impeded the political process of coming to grips with their war responsibility.

Primacy of Politics

War responsibility was also taken up in the early-postwar period by another coterie of leftwing writers, grouped around the new journal *Kindai bungaku*, who felt that the problem was a bit more complicated than members of the more closely party-affiliated New Japan Literary Society liked to think. Members of the *Kindai bungaku* group, who were all in their thirties at the end of the war, had in the early 1930s been devoted to the proletarian literature movement, but some had become disillusioned with tight Communist party control and what they perceived as inhuman tactics. In the words of one of the group's members, Ara Masato, they had lost their "first

youth" not only to war but to the proletarian movement; now, in the postwar, they were determined to have a "second youth" unburdened by the naivete and oppression that had marred the first. In sum, members of the *Kindai bungaku* group expanded the writers' identity as victims to include victimization by the Communist party as well.

Ara's colleague, Hirano Ken, was most explicit in his portrayal of the overlapping effects of writers' prewar subjugation to the state and to the Communist-dominated literary movement. Hirano was born in Kyoto in 1907, attended Eighth Higher School, and then entered Tokyo Imperial University. At university he participated in an illegal, leftwing reading group, became involved in union activities, and joined the proletarian literature movement. After graduation he continued to be active in that movement, but in 1933 he was shocked by the Communist party's "lynch" incident in which a Central Committee member was killed by other party leaders while being interrogated on suspicion of spying for the police.¹⁶ The effect was to estrange him from the party and the literary movement that surrounded it. Upon the outbreak of war with the U.S. in 1941, he entered the government's Intelligence Bureau where he worked until 1943, and became a member of the *Bungaku Hōkokukai* (Society for Patriotism through Literature). In 1944 he joined the Mishima Field Artillery unit, but was ejected ten days later for medical reasons. In the early postwar era Hirano was not only a founding member of *Kindai bungaku* but a member of the Central Committee of the New Japan Literary Society. After teaching here and there, he became professor of literature at Meiji University in 1958, and taught there until his death in 1978.

In Hirano's view, the Communist party shared with the emperor-centered state a compulsion to subordinate literature and those who created it to political control. He suggested that the literature of the Shōwa period (from 1926) had been dominated by the problem of "politics and literature": early in the period, political hegemony in the movement had been exercised by the Left; later, the military, the bureaucrats, and the writers who supported them took control. Hirano admitted that "the content of 'politics' in the early period was the complete opposite of what it became in the later period, but precisely because the two periods comprised positive and negative facets, together they form a whole."¹⁷

Eventually, according to Hirano, the party's domination of the cultural movement led in the early 1930s to pathological spy incidents and lynchings, and also the torture and death at the hands of the police of the literary movement's principal martyr, Kobayashi Takiji.¹⁸ Hirano even suggests that the party's overall responsibility in bringing about these events was comparable to that of the police, who had accelerated their repression under

the impetus of the Manchurian Incident.¹⁹ Hirano's intervention was significant in a number of ways, but in relation to the question of war responsibility it would seem undeniable that his excoriation of the "primacy of politics" had the effect of strengthening Japanese writers' sense of victimization.

Subjectivity

However, more than a persecution complex was responsible for inhibiting efforts to open up and politicize the issue of war responsibility. Odagiri's short essay also inadvertently illustrates a tendency in the early postwar period to emphasize self-rectification and subjectivity. Prominent toward the essay's beginning are calls for what appears to be self-criticism: "[W]e must begin by struggling against ourselves.... [I]n literature, war responsibility is above all our own problem. It begins first of all with our own self-criticism."²⁰

However, in this essay Odagiri did not sustain his reflective, self-critical emphasis but rather soon shifts to the more aggressive strategy of listing the names of those the society had determined to be the foremost war-mongers. Thus, what begins as a call for self-criticism very quickly becomes an attack only on the writers the group identified as war criminals. As Akiyama Kiyoshi was later to note, "We can find clearly expressed here a tendency to take one's own responsibility lightly, while giving great weight to that of others."²¹ The later postwar critic, Yoshimoto Takaaki, also has tended frequently to take early-postwar writers to task for placing themselves on a pedestal and criticizing others rather than thoroughly probing their own involvement.²² And yet, would more introspection and self-criticism have brought more positive results?

Connected closely to the postwar critics' portrayal of Japanese writers as victims was their somewhat solipsistic emphasis on the need to shore up the writerly "ego" and express the authentic self. In an essay that played the role of manifesto for the *Kindai bungaku* group, Honda Shûgo wrote, "For the artist, that is art which most perfectly satisfies 'the promptings of the heart'." Therefore, "Artists must never suppress the self."²³ During the war, writers as well as others had been forced to deny their personal needs and desires in order better to serve the "public" or, in other words, the emperor, the empire, and the war effort. For Honda and others of the *Kindai bungaku* group, it was not "selfless devotion" but precisely the self's full engagement that would produce great art and, ultimately, contribute to democratization.

This preoccupation with writers' self-involvement formed the basis for the *Kindai bungaku* group's understanding of active subjectivity.²⁴

Ara also repeatedly emphasized the need for democratic writers to begin by giving full vent to the ego. Of course, in the early-postwar just as in the prewar era, cultural authorities in the Communist party urged that writers should strive to efface their petty-bourgeois identity and resolutely adopt the stance and outlook of the proletariat. For Ara, however, this had to be resisted: "As petty bourgeois intelligentsia, we [can only] portray ourselves." Indeed, self-reflection had to be "the starting point of literature." Only by first affirming and exploring one's own subjectivity could a writer ultimately make contact with "the people" in a literary sense.²⁵

Kindai bugaku's insistence on the priority of self-expression ramified in a variety of directions. Odagiri, who belonged to both the *Kindai bungaku* and the *Shin-Nihon bungaku* groups, suggested that writers should see the emperor system not as an external structure but as a set of unconscious emotions that predisposed them toward feudal behavior: "Feudalism penetrates even the small corners of our sensibility in daily life. Therefore, we can fight against it only by conquering what is feudalistic within ourselves...." Ara responded: "If, as writers, we are to pursue the emperor's war responsibility in a literary way, we will have to struggle with the semi-feudal sensibilities, emotions and desires that are rooted in our own internal 'emperor systems.'" The solution reached on this and other similar occasions can be stated in a rather simple formula: writers failed to resist the war because they had not yet developed a fully modern personality. As Ara put it, "We were unable to oppose the war... Why...? *Because we did not have within us a modern ego.*"

In a rhetorical mode that might be described as "Occidentalism," the Japanese writers often appealed to stereotypical notions of the "West," or "Europe."²⁶ Europeans had achieved a universalistic, "human" belief system and a sense of equality before God, whereas in Japan people still defined themselves according to hierarchical social roles with no autonomous identity as human beings. According to Haniya Yutaka, "... Europeans were always standing before a kind of court...." They had to deal with the "internal imperative of a 'should' (*sollen*), a notion of how the individual should be as a human being...."

In these writers' minds the contrast between "Europe" and Japan was clear: "We [Japanese]... know how to be Japanese nationals (*kokumin*) but not how to be human beings. Humanism has been nothing but an empty word." Therefore, if there was to be a renaissance in the postwar era, it would be completed only when the Japanese self had been transformed in a modern,

which is to say European, direction. Honda Shûgo summed it up: "the lack of consciousness regarding war responsibility is the result of our failure to establish a modern ego."²⁷

Although they could reach no consensus on a solution, the *Kindai bungaku* writers were more or less united in the belief that tasks such as rooting out the emperor system through democratic revolution and fully airing the problem of war responsibility had, first of all, to be carried out internally, in the minds of individuals. This conviction led them to the ideal of modernity, which was intimately associated with the development of a modern subject, and also with a conception of European culture as the exemplar to that modernity.

As is often pointed out, the modern subject is typically conceived in the form of an individual "self." Agency, subjectivity, morality, etc., are all understood to be properties or effects of the autonomous individual: morality, for example, "is... abstracted from all particularistic contexts, becoming an ontological attribute of the *subject* rather than of his or her discrete *actions*..."²⁸ This kind of modern thought posits the personality as an autonomous source, the origin of productivity, and the foundation on which democratic society must be built.²⁹

It was, for the most part, this type of subject that was envisioned by most of the early-postwar writers and critics who were concerned about war responsibility. The result was that in the early-postwar period, the problem of war responsibility was very quickly included in and dominated by the project of modernizing not only Japanese society but, above all, the Japanese personality. The formulation that emerged implicitly was: democracy can be achieved, war can be resisted, and the issue of war responsibility can be fully dealt with only by modern "individual subjects." It followed that the cultivation of such subjects had to be granted the highest priority in the postwar political agenda.

I have argued that there were at least two major problems in the postwar Japanese writers' approach to war responsibility. First, their approach was impeded by a powerful sense of victimization that tended to preclude major attention to other victims of the war, especially Asians. Without their victim complex, Japanese authors might have been able to write about the Asian victims of the Pacific War and Japanese empire, about the plight of Koreans and Chinese who had been brought forcibly to Japan to labor in coal mines and underground construction sites, or about the "comfort women," and other victims. Perhaps Japanese writers in the wake of war knew little of all this, but a political engagement with war responsibility might be expected to involve the research necessary to unearth the facts. Yet there is no evidence

that the progressive writers of *Kindai bungaku* or *Shin-Nihon bungaku* were at all inclined to address such topics. Their feeling of responsibility for the war does not seem necessarily to have implied responsibility to other Asians, or even to Europeans or Americans, although the latter periodically demanded formalized gestures of regret, especially for Pearl Harbor. To the extent that they resisted the notion of responsibility to the emperor, they seem rather to have felt responsibility to each other, or sometimes to an abstraction like "humanity" or "history."

Second, I have alluded to the tendency among early-postwar intellectuals to approach the issue of war responsibility as one fundamentally of introspection and self-rectification, leading to the assumption that highest priority had to be devoted to the construction within themselves and others of a modern ego, or subject. This notion was equally influential among modernist social scientists like economic historian Otsuka Hisao, who argued that the postwar democratic revolution hinged on the widespread diffusion of a subjective value system he called the "modern human type" (*kindaiteki ningen ruikai*),³⁰ and political scientist Maruyama Masao, who also announced early in the postwar period that priority should be placed on fostering a "modern personality."³¹ This emphasis on the quality of one's own and others' subjectivity may have impeded productive, political confrontation with war responsibility by moving the focal point of the issue "inside," where it became depoliticized and privatized as merely a matter of one's own conscience.

At the level of social practice, the focus on modern subjectivity tended to produce a reformist structure in terms of which a few "enlightened" individuals, who were thought to possess a modern sense of responsibility, would undertake to remold the minds of others in accord with the modern "human type." Thus, the modernization paradigm constructed discursively and made socially available two contrasting but mutually-implicated identities in relation to war responsibility: the modern, responsible individual (exemplified in the heroic Communists who resolutely resisted, the Europeanized intellectuals, etc.) and the ordinary Japanese person who was still "feudal" and "Asiatic" in mentality and therefore failed to recognize and act upon war responsibility. Yet these contrasting identities seem to have functioned paradoxically. Although the superiority of the modern identity was almost universally acknowledged in the early postwar period, the acceptance of such an identity was thought to require a heroic process of overcoming powerful "feudal" propensities that were "typically Japanese" and thus difficult to eradicate. As a result, people tended instead to rest content with the more comfortable identity of "(victimized) ordinary Japanese." It appears,

therefore, that the focus on subjectivity and modernization/enlightenment might have not only delayed confrontation with war responsibility but actually made it less likely as time went on. As Cheshire Calhoun remarked in her analysis of the ethics of responsibility for sexism, "some identities... are best left out of the common market."³²

Of course, once one looks beyond the first year or so after defeat, it becomes necessary to take a variety of other matters into account, including the U.S.'s postwar Asian policy and the American government's own failure to admit responsibility and apologize for the mass destruction that accompanied American aggression in Vietnam.

Notes

¹ Yui Daizaburô, "Between Pearl Harbor and Hiroshima/Nagasaki: A Psychological Vicious Circle," *Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars* 27.2 (April-June 1995): 38-51.

² "Shushôdanwa no zenbun," *Yûkan yomiuri*, August 1, 1995.

³ *Asahi shinbun*, June 9, 1995.

⁴ Yui, Daizaburo, "Between Pearl Harbor and Hiroshima/Nagasaki: A Psychological Vicious Circle," *Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars* 27.2 (April-June 1995): 47.

⁵ In September 1985, Minister of Education Fujio Masayuki remarked that Korea shared responsibility for Japan's annexation of Korea and was dismissed by prime Minister Nakasone; in February 1988, Okuno Seisuke, Director of the National Land Agency, said he hated the term "invasion" (*shinryaku*) and made other such statements, leading to his resignation; in May 1994, Justice Minister Nagano said he thought the "Nanking massacre" was a postwar invention, leading to his resignation; in August 1994, the Director of the Environmental Agency in the first Murayama cabinet said "Japan... liberated Asia", and then resigned; in August 1995, the Minister of Education in the second Murayama cabinet said that "invasion is a normal part of war" and "apologizing for each one is questionable as a response."

⁶ Yet, it would appear that the confusion is mostly among Japan's leaders rather than among its citizens. An *Asahi* opinion poll on November 13, 1993, soon after Prime Minister Hosokawa's remark that, "For myself, I understand the Asia-Pacific War to have been a war of aggression and a mistake," 76 percent of the respondent were in favor of the remark, and only 15% opposed it. See Yui, "Between Pearl Harbor and Hiroshima/Nagasaki," p. 47.

⁷ Arai Shin'ichi, *Sensô sekininron: gendaishi kara no toi* (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1995), 162-63.

⁸ *Ibid.*, 161.

⁹ See Onuma Yasuaki, "Beyond Victors' Justice," *Japan Echo* XI, Special Issue (1984): 63-72.

¹⁰ Arase Yutaka, "Sengo Sengo shisô to sono tenkai," in *Kindai Nihon shisôshi kôza* 1 [Rekishiteki gaikan] (Tokyo: Chikuma Shobô, 1959), 346-48.

¹¹ Yoshimoto Takaaki, "Zensedai no shijintachi" (*Shigaku*, Nov. 1955), reprinted in Usui Yoshimi, *Sengo bungaku ronsô* 1 (Tokyo: Banchô Shobô 1972), 151.

¹² For aspects of the controversy regarding war responsibility in the film world, see Joanne Izbicki, "Scorched Cityscapes and Silver Screens: Negotiating Defeat and Democracy in Occupied Japan," Ph.D. dissertation, Cornell University, 1995), chapter one.

¹³ *Ibid.*, 129-38.

¹⁴ Odagiri Hideo, "Bungaku ni okeru sensô sekinin no tsuikyû" (*Shin-Nihon bungaku*, June 1946), reprinted in Usui Yoshimi, ed., *Sengo bungaku ronsô* 1, 115.

¹⁵ Oda Makoto, "The Ethics of Peace," in J. Victor Koschmann, ed., *Authôrity and the Individual in Japan: Citizen Protest in Historical Perspective* (Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press, 1978), 155.

¹⁶ For a brief account, see Goerge Beckmann and Okubo Genji, *The Japanese Communist Party, 1922-1945* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1969), 242-245.

¹⁷ Hirano, "Seiji to bungaku 1 (Apr.-May 1946)," reprint in Usui, ed., *Sengo bungaku ronsô* 1, 171-172.

¹⁸ On spying and lynching incidents in the JCP, see Elise Tipton, *Japanese Police State: Tokkô in Interwar Japan* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1990), 26-27. Also, Richard H Mitchell, *Janus-Faced Justice: Political Criminals in Imperial Japan* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1992). On Kobayashi's murder, see Tipton, 26.

¹⁹ Hirano Ken, "'Seiji no yûisei' to wa nani ka," *Kindai bungaku* (Sept. 1946): 6. Although one can understand Hirano's demand for a more flexible and tolerant party attitude toward culture, his analogy between state repression of the Left via the Special Higher Police, or Tokkô, and the party's control of proletarian literature must be considered far-fetched. Implicitly legitimated by the peace Preservation Law of 1925, torture and murder by the Tokkô had gone on at least since the round-up of Communists on March 15, 1928, and despite what might well have been the party's application of unreasonable pressure for conformity on loyal writers such as Kobayashi, the

agents of his torture and murder were Tokkô officers, not Communists.

²⁰ Odagiri, op. cit., 115.

²¹ Akiyama Kiyoshi, "Minshushugi bungaku to sensio sekinin" (*Bungaku no jiko hihan*, 1956), reprinted in Usui, ed., 149.

²² Yoshimoto, op. cit., 131.

²³ Honda Shûgo, "Geijutsu, rekishi, ningen," *Kindai bungaku* 1 (February 1946), 2.

²⁴ On the issue of *shutaisei*, or "active subjectivity," in the early postwar period among the writers discussed here and a wide spectrum of others, see J. Victor Koschmann, *Revolution and Subjectivity in Japan, 1945-52* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, forthcoming).

²⁵ Ara Masato et al., "Bungaku to genjitsu: Kurahara Korehito okakonde," *Kindai bungaku* (February 1946): 25-26.

²⁶ For a discussion of Japanese "Occidentalism" in this sense, see James E. Ketelaar, "Strategic Occidentalism: Meiji Buddhists at the World's Parliament of Religions," *Buddhist-Christian Studies* 11 (1991).

²⁷ Ara Masato et al., "Zadankai: bungakusha no sekimu," reprint in Usui Yoshimi, ed., *Sengo bungaku ronsô* 1 (Tokyo: Banchô Shobô, 1972), 65-67.

²⁸ Derek Sayer, *Capitalism and Modernity: An Excursus on Marx and Weber* (London and New York: Routledge, 1991), 121.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, 121, 128.

³⁰ Otsuka Hisao, "Makusu uêbâ ni okeru shihonshugi no 'seishin'," *Otsuka Hisao chosakushû* 8 [Kindaika no ningenteki kiso] (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1969), 98-100.

³¹ Maruyama Masao, "Kindaiteki shi'i" (1945), in *Senchû to sengo no aida*, 1936-1957 (Tokyo: Misuzu Shobô, 1976), 191.

³² Cheshire Calhoun, "Responsibility and Reproach," in Cass R. Sunstein, ed., *Feminism and Political Theory* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990), 258.

