

Ethetics of Mystical Understanding:  
Joyce, Hopkins, and Tsung-ping

By

Chi Ch'iu-lang

ABSTRACT

Placing the theories of Joyce's epiphany, Hopkins' inscape and instress, and Tsung-ping's (375-443) *ying-mu hui-hsin* together, we can see that art essentially drives from apprehension of an object or scene for esthetic contemplation, goes through appreciation of the harmonious relation of each part with the others and these parts with the whole, and finally reaches a quasi-mystic understanding of some poetic truth. The media of these artists' artistic expressions--fiction, poetry, and painting--are different, but they share the common concern for presenting "authentic" something that transcends what Heidegger calls the "thingly element."

Joyce's epiphany is often taken light of or grossly misunderstood, and Hopkins' inscape and instress is frequently confused with his strong sense of Jesuit duty. A reexamination of Stephen's esthetic theory in Joyce's *Stephen Hero* and *Portrait of the Artist* and Hopkins' prose writings and "Windhover" serves to illuminate their theories. Moreover, what Tsung-ping, a Chinese *shan-shui* (or mountainscape) painter, says on the same subject not only provides a further illumination but also points to the unified, spiritual nature of Chinese artistic endeavors.

KEY WORDS

Joyce  
inscape  
Stephen Hero

Hopkins  
instress  
"Windhover"

Tsung-ping  
*ying-mu*

epiphany  
*hui-hsin*

It is interesting to see that up to the nineteenth century most of the fundamental pronouncements about literary theory have been made by creative writers themselves. In their writings, they often insist that the heart or imagination, rather than reason or the analytical faculty, is the shaping power of their poetry. Sidney, for instance, says that the Muse told him to "look in thy heart, and write" (*Astrophel and Stella*, No. 1). Shelley asserts that "Reason is to Imagination as the instrument to the agent, as the body to the spirit, as the shadow to the substance" (p. 499). Coleridge claims that by virtue of imagination the creative mind wedds Nature and builds a new world, a "new Earth and new Heaven," that presumably lies beyond mere discursive reasoning ("Dejection: An Ode").

Tracing history backward, we note that James Joyce (1882-1941) sought to create in his fiction "epiphanies" out of mundane scenes of life, Hopkins (1844-89) believed that genuine poetry ought to be language of inspired moments, and Tsung-ping 宗炳 (175-443), a Chinese landscape painter of the fifth century, emphasized how an intuitive communion will be reached between an accomplished work of art, the appreciative eye, and the *shen* 神 (spirit) in the landscape.

In the following we will examine the concepts of Joyce's epiphany, Hopkins' inscape and instress, and Tsung-ping's *ying-mu hui-hsin* 應目會心 ("the mind responding to what the eye apprehends") to see how their common concern lies beyond what Heidegger calls "the thingly element" (p. 19). The media of their creative activity (fiction, poetry, and painting) are different, but they share the purpose of reaching an intuitive, mystic understanding.

### I. Joyce and Epiphany

Stephen Daedalus, the young protagonist in Joyce's early works discusses how, when confronted with raw materials for his writing, the literary mind goes through the stages of *integritas* (integrity), *consonantia* (harmony), and *claritas* (radiance). Obviously, the final stage of *claritas* is closely related to his concept of epiphany. Joyce at first toyed with the idea of turning his concept of epiphany into a literary technique, then he seemed to have discarded the term, but subtly incorporated the concept into his method of using juxtaposed fragmentary details and mythic parallels to suggest a meaningful larger whole.

In its narrow sense, "Epiphany" is a day (January 6) for celebrating the revelation of God in Jesus as a child to

the three Magi. Since Harry Levin's discovery of Joyce's use of this term in 1941 in the extant manuscripts of *Stephen Hero*, many critics have been induced to use it in commenting on Joyce's works and other modern works of literature. A majority of critics agree that the term is important in Joyce's esthetic theory and crucial to the understanding of Joyce's method and works. The term is applied to passages in Joyce's works, stories in *Dubliners*, chapters of the *A Portrait of the Artist As a Young Man*, *Ulysses*, and *Finnegans Wake*, or even the whole of all of these books (For example, see Hendry 449-67; Van Ghent 268; Spencer 16-17; Tindall 11; Levin 37).

A few critics are skeptical: they regard the theory implied in the term as an immature attempt of a youthful esthete, never to be taken seriously. Robert Scholes gives perhaps the most shocking challenge to the prevalent use of the term (pp. 65-77). Accusing Joyce's critics of taking liberty with the 'sketchiness' of Stephen's esthetic theory, Scholes considers epiphany to be artless recording of actuality. He holds that it should be distinguished from "an incident" or "a piece of prose" which an epiphany becomes when put in a context. To him "epiphany-hunting" is an "intellectual recreation," a mere "harmless pastime" like symbol-hunting, archetype-hunting, and Scrabble. He suggests that we limit the application of the term to Joyce's own collection of "Epiphanies" and calls for an end of its use in Joycean criticism.

Scholes seems to be doing a disservice to Joyce's criticism by discrediting a popular term. Nevertheless, the question he poses is important and demands our close attention. He says:

If the separation of the observer and the world is clear in the theory of the epiphany, other aspects of the theory are far from clear. The achievement of epiphany seems to depend on the eye of the observer, but the *object* achieves its epiphany. One aspect Stephen does not consider is the reaction of the observer to an epiphany. Does it work any change in him? Is he wiser because of it? We do not know. Nor do we know the relationship of the epiphany to art, and this is a great question. Any object--a person, a clock, a mind--can achieve epiphany. The phenomenon is in no way related to the creative process. Even the recording of the phenomenon can be done by a "man of letters." No artist is required. (p. 71; see also Scholes and Kain 3-4)

These remarks by a respected critic indicate that there may be a discrepancy between the "epiphany" in early Joycean writings and the same term after it becomes codified as a literary term. In any case they serve as a warning against its indiscriminate use. At the same time they call for an over-all reexamination of Joyce's theory of epiphany in the light of Joyce's practice and other similar esthetic theories.

The causes of such diametrically opposed views of the epiphany theory appear to be twofold. First, the term is not properly defined in *Stephen Hero*. The questions that can be raised from the definition can be properly answered only by Joyce himself, which of course Joyce never did. Attempts will be made in this paper to point out the problems as precisely as possible and to formulate some answers which I believe still can be found within the texts of *Stephen Hero* and *Portrait*.

On the other hand, despite its being an improperly defined term, critics are tempted to use it liberally because certain characteristics in Joyce's art seem to stem from the embryonic concept behind the term. Put briefly, this consists in the fact that Joyce often arranges personal experiences and naturalistic details in a significant context so that they suggest, reveal, or rather, directly point to the essence of reality which can be apprehended by intuition but cannot be communicated in ordinary language. His methods is marked by an extreme objectivity in its consistent absence of commentary. It may be said that, beyond selecting and arranging these details into a meaningful pattern, Joyce would be making a futile attempt to comment on them. Irene Hendry asserts quite convincingly that many writers have used "revelation" as a technical device but that Joyce "used it more consciously and with greater variation than anyone with whom he can be compared" (p. 451).

Some critics, such as William T. Noon and S. L. Goldberg, have pointed out that Joyce's concept of *claritas* (clarity), *quidditas* (whatness) and its consequent epiphany is akin to Gerald Manley Hopkins' "inscape" theory rather than to Aquinas' comparable theory of knowledge (Noon 49-51, 72; Goldberg 52, 318); Burgess 20-21; Atherton 31). In addition to Hopkins, we shall see that Joyce's concept of epiphany also bears close affinity to that of Zen illumination (*tun-wu* 頓悟 in Chinese and *satori* 悟 in Japanese), which is also a sudden intuitive apprehension of the essential nature of things. We shall look into this affinity in a comparative discussion with Tsung-ping's esthetic ideas in section III.

The term "epiphany" is explained in *Stephen Hero* but is

withdrawn from the published version of *Portrait* (*SH* 210-13; *PA* 212-13). Contrary to Kenner's and Goldberg's assertion that the withdrawal is meant to expose Stephen as a "sham artist" or a "shallow human being" (Kenner ch. 9; Goldberg chs. 2 & 3), we have reasons to believe that the concept of epiphany still exists in *Portrait* although the term is not there. Whatever caused Joyce to discard the term, it is continued by the terms "*claritas*" or "*quidditas*," and "the mysterious instant," which clearly refers to the "epiphany" mentioned in *Stephen Hero*. It will be shown, moreover, that we can get a much clearer notion of what Joyce meant by "epiphany" by a careful scrutiny of the related passages in the two books. These passages are numbered for easy reference.

1. By an epiphany he meant a sudden spiritual manifestation, whether in the vulgarity of speech or of gesture or in a memorable phase of the mind itself. He believed that it was for the man of letters to record these epiphanies with extreme care, seeing that they themselves are the most delicate and evanescent of moments. He told Cranly that the clock of Ballast Office was capable of an epiphany.

From this first passage we see that what is manifested is the "spiritual" content of things; that speech, gesture, mind--things not usually called "objects" as well as a clock can be epiphanized; that the verb "record" implies that the writing of the epiphany may not involve creative process; and finally, that an epiphany signifies both the act of manifestation and the moment in which this manifestation is made.

2. Imagine my glimpses at that clock as the gropings of a spiritual eye which seeks to adjust its vision to an exact focus. The moment the focus is reached the object is epiphanised. It is just in this epiphany that I find the third, the supreme quality of beauty.

The second passage takes the observer into consideration. It defines the epiphany, or the epiphanic moment, in terms of the reaching-forth, for that is what "seeks" signifies, of a sensitive observer's vision. The passive voice, "the object is epiphanised" implies that the observer, or "the spiritual eye" "epiphanises" the object rather than that the object shows forth of itself. This

contradicts the first passage and the question remains. Perhaps Stephen means that the critical moment is when the two acts, the act of showing forth from the "object" and the act of a groping vision, meet at a focal point, but we cannot be sure.

3. Consider the performance of your own mind when confronted with any object, hypothetically beautiful. Your mind to apprehend that object divides the entire universe into two parts, the object, and the void which is not the object. To apprehend it you must lift it away from everything else: and then you perceive that is one integral thing, that is a thing. You recognise its integrity.

The third passage is the first step of esthetic apprehension. It involves a separation by the mind of the object from the rest of the universe.

4. Analysis then. The mind considers the object in whole and in part, in relation to itself and to other objects, examines the balance of its parts, contemplates the form of the object, traverses every cranny of the structure. So the mind receives the impression of the symmetry of the object. The mind recognises that the object is in the strict sense of the word, a *thing*, a definitely constituted entity.

The fourth passage is the second step in which the mind not only analyzes the object but also considers its relation to other objects. Goldberg finds fault with the lack of reference to this relation in its corresponding passage in *Portrait*, but I think the problem lies in the connotation of "objects." Obviously Stephen is considering the usual objects (e.g., a basket) here, but as mentioned in my discussion of the first passage above, it seems that the term "object" is meant to be expanded to include invisible things (e.g., speech or mind) as well. An important question now is: Can a combination of objects or things, when they form a coherent entity, be the "object" of esthetic apprehension? We cannot be certain. Stephen and Joyce himself seem to conceive an epiphany in a much smaller scale than his commentators would take it to mean. But if a

speech can be epiphanised, there is no reason why a scene, and by extension, a combination of scenes, cannot. Joyce apparently thought that this is possible, and at least one (No. 235) of his "Epiphanies," which depends for its effect on the contrast of two scenes, illustrates this point (Scholes and Kain 35). In short, we may infer that anything or any group of things is capable of being the source of an epiphany so long as it or they form an entity to an apprehending consciousness.

5. Now for the third quality. For a long time I couldn't make out what Aquinas meant . . . but I have solved it. *Claritas* is *quidditas*. After the analysis which discovers the second quality the mind makes the only logically possible synthesis and discovers the third quality. This is the moment which I call epiphany. First we recognise that the object is *one* integral thing, then we recognise that it is an organised composite structure, a *thing* in fact: finally, when the relation of the parts is exquisite, when the parts are adjusted to the special point, we recognise that it is *that* thing which it is. Its soul, its whatness, leaps to us from the vestment of its appearance. The soul of the commonest object, the structure of which is so adjusted, seems to us radiant. The object achieves its epiphany.

In the fifth passage an epiphany is again "the moment." The expression "the parts are adjusted to the special point" is ambiguous. When read in connection with the second and third passages, it seems to refer to the adjustment of the observer's vision rather than the object adjusting its parts. Stephen may simply mean the arrangement of its parts in such a way that an epiphany is possible: it is difficult to see why an object can adjust its parts of itself. Yet, he more probably means that the observer's vision is driven by its inherent power to make such arrangement. Like Hopkins' expression about an inscape "exploding into meaning," the statement that "Its soul, its whatness, leaps to us . . ." is figuratively true only when the observer's psyche is well prepared to respond to the encounter.

6. The connotation of the word, Stephen said, is rather vague. Aquinas uses a term which seems to be inexact. It baffled me for a long time. It would lead you to believe that he

had in mind symbolism or idealism, the supreme quality of beauty being a light from some other world, the idea of which the matter is but the shadow, the reality of which it is but the symbol. I thought he might mean that *claritas* is the artistic discovery and representation of the divine purpose in anything or a force of generalisation which would make the esthetic image a universal one, make it outshine its proper conditions. But that is literary talk.

The sixth passage and the seventh below, from *Portrait*, again equates Thomist *claritas* with Scotist *quidditas*, and the term epiphany is implied in "that mysterious instant." The sixth passage is Stephen's speculation on what Aquinas meant by *claritas*. The ending sentence, "But that is literary talk," is usually taken to mean a dismissal of the preceding statement. But how much of it is really dismissed from Stephen's or the young Joyce's mind? This is an important question, and yet it defies any easy solution. Joyce himself might not subscribe to the Platonic idealism in the first part, but the second part, instead of being Stephen's past speculation of Aquinas' meaning, could be what the young Joyce had in mind. Stanislaus Joyce reports that his brother once said to him: "Don't you think there is a certain resemblance between the mystery of the Mass and what I am trying to do? I mean that I am trying in my poems to give people some kind of intellectual pleasure or spiritual enjoyment by converting the bread of everyday life into something that has a permanent artistic life of its own (4; see also Ellman 169). If Stanislaus' report is correct, this passage given by Stephen could be an indication that Joyce was well aware how an epiphany could function as literary technique. Goldberg contends that *claritas* in *Portrait* does not have "any reference to the spiritual insight, the imaginative-moral activity, of the beholder" (p. 53). We have seen that the relation of the beholder and the object is considered in *Stephen Hero*. In the *Portrait* we see the effect of the esthetic experience on the beholder described. That Goldberg's contention is untenable is clear from the passage below.

7. The radiance of which he speaks is the scholastic *quidditas*, the *whatness* of a thing. The supreme quality is felt by the artist when the esthetic image is first conceived in his imagination. The mind in that mysterious instant Shelley likened beautifully to a fading coal. The instant wherein that supreme quality of beauty, the clear radiance of the

esthetic image, is apprehended luminously by the mind which has been arrested by its wholeness and fascinated by its harmony is the luminous silent stasis of esthetic pleasure, a spiritual state very like to that cardiac condition which the Italian physiologist Luigi Galvani, using a phrase almost as beautiful as Shelley's called the enchantment of the heart.

Obviously, if the observer is brought to a spiritual state of "the enchantment of the heart," or "the luminous silent stasis of esthetic pleasure," we cannot say as Goldberg does that *claritas* in *Portrait* does not refer to "the spiritual insight" of the beholder, or agree with Scholes when he says that Stephen does not consider the reaction of the observer to an epiphany. In this connection, Tindall's succinct comment seems to come nearest to what Stephen and Joyce want to say: "Involving the potency of a natural object and the sensibility of a subject, epiphany is a transaction between object and subject that owes no less to the former than to the latter" (10).

An important point that Stephen does not say but can be inferred from his definition is that a thing--any natural object, a gesture, a scene--is an epiphany to a certain observer in a particular condition and circumstance at a particular moment, but it may not be an epiphany to the same observer at a different time, condition, or circumstance. For, this is what Stephen means when he says in the first passage that epiphanies are "the most delicate and evanescent of moments." Moreover, what is an epiphany to an observer may not be one to another observer even if the time and conditions do not change. This should be true because, as is seen in the second passage, an epiphany involves the adjustment of the observer's vision "to an exact focus," which clearly implies that, if the observer does not or cannot make the required adjustment, an epiphany will not take place.

Thus we can say quite legitimately that Joyce's own "Epiphanies" are epiphanies to him, but at least some of them are not epiphanies to many other people. In the situation of Epiphany no. 39, for instance, Joyce tells us that the "comeliness" of the girl reminds him of (probably a work of) Raffaello, an Italian artist, but the Epiphany as a whole is an ordinary sketch of a person that we can find in the writings of Pre-Raphaelite writers. Nothing worthy of the name of epiphany seems to register in the reader's mind (Scholes and Kain 49).

This brings up the question of the relation of epiphanies to art. Since an epiphany is a sudden manifestation of something indescribable and a consequent illumination of the beholder's mind, it is a phenomenon or an experience. As such it cannot be properly called a work of art so long as it does not involve "human disposition," in Stephen's definition of art, or treatment with a technique "for an esthetic end" (PA 207; Schorer 190 *et passim*). In other words, an epiphany is just a subjective record of experience without being objectified by techniques. An epiphany is not in itself a technique, but it can be employed as a technique in a work of larger design, and this is precisely what Joyce does in almost all of his works of art. In *Portrait*, Stephen Daedalus' watching of the birds on the steps of the library or the girl wading in midstream, for instance, is an epiphany to Stephen (pp. 224-25, 171). They can also work on us as epiphanies which are similar to those experienced by Stephen because his experience have been "humanly disposed for an esthetic end."

After all this, most of the confusion about the significance of the epiphany should disappear. And yet, ironically we are still somewhat left in wonder as to how to define the term exactly. Does it refer to the act of showing forth the "whatness" of a thing, or to the mysterious moment when such an act occurs? We return to the definition in the first passage which tells us that it refers to the act of manifestation.

To avoid such a vicious circle, a redefinition in the light of the scattered passages seems in order. An epiphany is a sudden manifestation of the whatness or pure suchness of a thing, or a group of things that form a coherent entity, to a prepared consciousness and its consequent apprehension by it in a critical, mysterious moment. A record of such a manifestation can also be called an epiphany. This definition is a considerable departure from the meaning, "to show forth" in its original Greek *epiphainein*. But even in its ecclesiastical denotation, the Epiphany has to be achieved through the Magi, the Three Wise Men from the East. The radiance of a thing "shows forth," but only when it is apprehended by a sensitive observer can we say that the epiphany is achieved. Seen in this way, we may ask of Scholes and other skeptics that if the participant (the artist or his audience) of an achieved epiphany does not become wiser, what does?

## II. Hopkins' Inscap and Instress

As a nature and religious poet, Hopkins was interested in observing aspects of a thing which make it distinctively

individual. His mind was alert to respond to "the dearest freshness deep down things" through distinctive patterns of nature such as the "bright wings" "at the brown brink eastward" ("God's Grandeur"). In or shortly before the year 1868, Hopkins conceived the ideas of *inscape* and *instress*, what Heuser calls "two words of being" (Heuser 27, 23-28). This amounted to the construction of a theory to hinge on his poetic endeavors, but it is difficult to ascertain whether Hopkins gleaned these concepts from the Greek philosopher Parmenides, as Heuser and Robinson maintain (Heuser 24; Robinson 33), or from his contact with other sources such as J. C. Shairp's discussion of Wordsworth's "Spots of Time," which Zaniello claims that Hopkins had read in 1865 (Zaniello 73). In any case, these two terms show up abundantly in his journals, letters and other writings after 1886. A journal entry on May 18, 1870, for instance, reads: "I do not think I have ever seen anything more beautiful than the bluebell I have been looking at. I know the beauty of our Lord by it. It[s] *inscape* is [mixed of] strength and grace, like an ash [tree]" [Hopkins' own brackets] (Pick 95; Gardner 120). Although Hopkins applies these two terms primarily to visible objects in nature, such as birds, clouds, flowers, and trees, he also speaks of "inscape of composition" in art works, and of *inscape* of sounds and speech (Robinson 34; Pick 140).

In his lecture notes on "Poetry and Verse" (1873-74), Hopkins presents his conviction (though parenthetically) about poetry and *inscape*:

Poetry is speech framed for contemplation of the mind by the way of hearing or speech framed to be heard *for its own sake and interest* even over and above its interest of meaning. Some matter and meaning is essential to it but only as an element necessary to support and employ the shape which is contemplated *for its own sake*. (Poetry is in fact speech only employed to carry the *inscape* of speech *for the inscape's sake*--and therefore the *inscape* must be dwelt on. . . .) (Pick 140; italics mine)

A statement in his "All Words Mean Either Things or Relations of Things" (Feb. 9, 1868) is also pertinent to this crucial point:

The further in anything, as a work of art, the organization is carried out, the deeper the form penetrates, the prepossession flushes the matter, the more effort will be required in

apprehension, the more power of comparison, the more capacity for receiving that synthesis of (either successive or spatially distinct) impressions which gives us the unity with the prepossession conveyed by it. (Pick 139-40)

In such theoretic formulations Hopkins strongly backs up the position that poetry has its *raison d'être* beyond trite moralizing or simplistic deduction to paraphrasable content. Such a statement makes Hopkins theory comparable with the doctrine of "art for art's sake" or the theory of pure poetry derived from Edgar Allan Poe. It will be erroneous, however, to place Hopkins in line with the aesthetes or formalists simply because of this insistence for poetry for its own sake, and for "shape" over and above "matter and meaning." In essence, the passages above indicate that genuine poetry requires of the reader exercise of their creative power in the reading process. They also explain why his poetry sometimes appears 'odd' or difficult as a consequence of dwelling on 'inscape' as 'the very soul of art' (Robinson 35). In a letter to Robert Bridges in 1879, Hopkins himself gives the reason why his poetry has the necessary vice of being odd and obscure:

No doubt my poetry errs on the side of oddness.... But as air, melody, is what strikes me most of all in music and design in painting, so design, pattern or what I am in the habit of calling *inscape* is what I above all aim at in poetry. Now it is the virtue of design, pattern, or *inscape* to be distinctive and it is the vice of distinctiveness to become queer. This vice I cannot have escaped." (Gardner xxii; see also Bridges 72).

According to Gardner, Hopkins was exposed to the writings of Duns Scotus in 1872 and found support from the medieval philosopher, especially from his "principle of Individuation" and "theory of knowledge" (Gardner xxiii-xxiv). Contrary to St. Thomas Aquinas who considered the "individual" unknowable (only the "universal" being known), Scotus corroborated Hopkins' thinking that understanding of the particular leads to that of the universal. Hopkins's *inscape* theory coincides with Thomist philosophy in this fundamental aspect.

With a minute care for the unique quality of things, Hopkins seeks to make his poetry "explode" into meaning. As in Stephen-Joyce's esthetic theory, the

creative imagination grasps the Thisness (*haecceitas*) of things and reaches some mystical understanding of the universal. Presumably, with the combined operation of the intellect and the senses, the creative mind abstracts, compares, and synthesizes his experiences into a unified whole.

In connection with our topic on hand, Hopkins' "Windhover" (1877) is particularly noteworthy because it dramatizes very succinctly the mystical experience of coming to grips with the inner reality of things. In no other poems does Hopkins leave so much to the latter part of the poem to give a sudden impact on the reader. By his mid-career Hopkins considered it to be "the best thing" he ever wrote, (McKenzie 79; Pick, *Windhover* 1; Gardner 227). No matter whether this remains true in the entire corpus of his poetry, it is probably the most written about short poem in the English language.

Aside from Peter Milward, however, who briefly noted that Hopkins' inscape and instress theory "has its supreme illustration" in the poem (p. 47), very few critics have taken cognizance of its esthetic implications. In spite of its title, for example, Guadini's "Aesthetic-Theological Thoughts on 'The Windhover'" makes little mention of Hopkins' esthetics.

The dedication "To Christ Our Lord" points to the religiosity of the poem, but the tone is more showing than preaching, and the theme as much esthetic as it is religious. McKenzie and others have remarked that, instead of a mere dedication, Hopkins engages Christ in the dramatic scene. We may call in question, however, whether the poem has to be read in the light of Jesuit tradition, with "My heart in hiding," for example, being taken to mean the poet trying to shun his priestly duties.

In fact the whole poem is devoted to showing forth the beauty revealed in the moment of the poet's viewing and the impact he receives from the telling inscape ("a billion / Times told lovelier") of the windhover unfolding its nature ("in his riding / Of the rolling level underneath him steady air"). Can the concluding sestet not be simply taken to mean that constant application amplifies and strengthens the vitality, and when the occasions arise, the act will emit "fire" and radiate "shining" beauty?

A comparison with Stephen-Joyce's esthetic theory will show that Hopkins' mystical understanding also goes through three stages. The moment when the poet "caught the morning's minion" is *integritus*, or when

his roving eye is focused on the scene of kestrel hovering in the wind. Then follows *consonantia*, a description of the harmony ("brute beauty") exhibited by the bird riding and mastering the strong wind. The final moment of *claritas* is signaled by the word "Buckle," and how the poet reaches the depth of inner reality is shown in the sestet. The "fire," the shining plough, and the "gold-vermilion" revealed by the fallen embers --all this tells about what Shelley calls "the enchantment of the heart."

Some words in this sonnet serve as exponents of its dramatic structure unfolding transcendental qualities. The word "caught" means "caught sight of" in this context, but it also connotes an urge ("Stirred") to embrace, to possess, or to identify with, the admirable qualities radiating from the bird. Ironically, moreover, as the pursuer may sometimes find himself the pursued, we may say that the windhover caught the poet "in hiding" rather than that the poet caught the windhover. The word "brute" may have the neutral sense of "being animal-like"; yet, it also connotes its being "primeval," or specifically, "untarnished by reasoning, premeditation, or any practical considerations," and hence having the "fearful symmetry" (Blake's phrase) of a primitive being. Such qualities as "beauty and valour and act," therefore, are godly qualities that compel awe and admiration.

"Buckle," the word beginning the sestet, literally means that the essential qualities (animal beauty and courage) "gloriously combine" with the time and changing elements (air, etc.) to bring about a dazzling revelation. McKenzie suggests rather ingenuously that "buckle" also means the coupling of electric circuit (82). On the esthetic plane, however, the word also implies the union of substance with the accidents: those commonplace objects accidentally and dynamically join together to show forth the potential qualities of the bird. The details of the scene thus achieve inscape and instress. Put differently, the poetic spirit is joined to the formal elements in servitude to the poetic purpose. Just as Stephen in his "epiphanic" moment sees the wading girl at the end of *Portrait* as an emissary from the fair court of life, the poet here envisions "fire" breaking from the windhover, who may then embody the love of God, if the dedication is to be taken into an organic account.

The windhover, metaphorically with its "plume" of "daylight's dauphin," has its brute beauty, but it is also drawn out by beauty ("dapple-dawn-drawn"). The poet's vision "caught" sight of the bird, and his heart

"stirred" for it. All such words manifest the instress--the irresistible spiritual force in action. The word "dangerous" (l. 12) calls to the reader's mind Simon's coming into contact with Jesus: the love of God can indeed be critical and self-consuming, demanding selfless love. The meaning of the word "dangerous" reverberates to the final lines which strongly suggest the Incarnation and sacrificial sufferings of Christ. The poet continues the motif of the "fire" into the latter half of the sestet to show the radiant beauty which may result from the act of love.

With such words as "plough down sillion," "blue-bleak embers," "Fall, gall," and "gash," the religious overtone is unmistakable. Nevertheless, the plough that shines through, and the "gold-vermillion" that gashes forth--these flash to the reader as the innate beauty of the windhover. Such is the epiphany, a revelation of the "whatness" of the "windhover." Seen in this light, the "fall" of the "blue-bleak embers" and the "gashing" of "gold-vermillion" are not only the revealment of the inscape. Its instress also propels an "explosion out of darkness."

We have seen how Hopkins' instress complements inscape. The concept of instress explains why an object or scene perceived as an inscape will necessarily have esthetic impact on the viewer. W. H. Gardner explains the relation of the two in this way:

But *instress* is not only the unifying force in the object; it connotes also that impulse from the 'inscape' which acts on the senses and, through them, actualizes the inscape in the mind of the beholder .... Instress, then, is often the *sensation* of inscape--a quasi-mystical illumination, a sudden perception of that deeper pattern, order, and unity which gives meaning to external forms. (p. xxi)

It is no exaggeration, therefore, to say that as a poet Hopkins devoted himself to the discovery of the inscape of things, and to the communication of the sensation of inscape (which is "instress") to his readers.

Hopkins' concern with "inspiration" in the creative mind and inscape in the art of poetry gives him the position to label as "Parnassian" the predictable kind of poetry which has been written when the poet is "not inspired and in his flights." Shakespeare, according to Hopkins, is the greatest of poets because he "uses so little Panassian" (Gardner 156).

For the opposite reason, Wordsworth and even Tennyson, are castigated.

In his letter, September 10, 1864, to A. W. M. Baillie we find a lengthy discourse on three kinds of the language of verse. Hopkins places as the first and highest "poetry proper, the language of inspiration." By inspiration he meant "a mood of great, abnormal in fact, mental acuteness, either energetic or receptive, according as the thoughts which arise in it seem generated by a stress and action of the brain, or to strike into it unasked" (Pick 129). "In a fine piece of inspiration," he says, "every beauty takes you as it were by surprise" (Gardner 155). What Hopkins considers crucial is for the poet "to sing in flights" when "the inspiration, which is the gift of genius, raises him above himself" (Gardner 155, 154). The next kind of poetry has formal beauties, for "it can only be spoken by poets," but, not being imbued with inspiration, it is not "in the highest sense poetry" (Pick 129). Hopkins thus goes on to state that poetry of this "Parnassian" kind runs "in an intelligibly laid down path": it merely "palls on us" (Gardner, ed. 154-56).

Hopkins' "Windhover" is indeed an inspired and inspiring work. The hawk itself can be viewed as a symbol of poetic spirit in flights. With its brute beauty the kestrel may not be as delightful as Shelley's skylark (another symbol of the poetic spirit), but it effectively dramatizes the mystical experience when the inner vision joins or captures a significant view. The veil of familiarity shrouding the mystery of the world is then suddenly drawn aside, and the fragmentary details "buckle" to reveal the true nature of things. For poetry to be poetry, what inspired the poet must also inspire the reader.

### III. Tsung-ping's *ying-mu hui-hsin*

In this age of rapid scientific expansion, bare-bone materialists and formalists would have us believe that this world consists only of thingly elements and factual knowledge. Yet, if Heidegger is to be believed, what he has to say on this subject is quite instructive:

[T]he art work is something else over and above the thingly element. This something

else in the work constitutes its artistic nature. The art work is, to be sure, a thing that is made, but it says something other than the mere thing itself is, *allo agoreuei*. The work makes public something other than itself; it manifests something other; it is an allegory. In the work of art something other is brought together with the thing that is made. To bring together is, in Greek, *sumballein*. The work is a symbol.... It seems almost as though the thingly element in the art work is like substructure into and upon which the other, authentic element is built. (pp. 19-20)

In the holy rite of Catholic Communion, our daily bread and wine (Heidegger's "thingly element") go through transubstantiation to become the flesh and blood of Jesus Christ ("the authentic element"). By the same token, the formal elements cohere as an entity to evoke esthetic sympathies or inspire imagination in the reader whose mind is attuned to receive impact from them. Without such interaction, what are called "formal beauties" will simply be lumps of inert matter devoid of any human significance.

Joyce thought about epiphany because, in Harry Levin's words, "he wanted to create a literary substitute for the revelations of religion" (Levin 38). Hopkins aims at inscape in poetry also to effect revelation of this "authentic element." A host of other similar concepts may be brought together for mutual illumination, but we may sum up this discussion by mentioning Tsung-ping's *Hua san-shui hsü* 畫山水序 (Preface to Landscape Painting).

Joyce, Hopkins, and Tsung-ping maintain, tacitly or implicitly, that art works are essentially the product of inspired moments. It follows then that the reader is also expected to reach those inspired moments by participating in the poetic process. At such moments the literary mind of both poet and reader stretches itself, loses its identity, and becomes one with the myriad aspects of nature. What Tsung-ping wrote in this regard runs as follows:

The saint, embodying the Tao, casts light on things. The sage, with purified mind, savors the shapes of things. Mountains and waters, though physical, also have their spiritual aspect. . . . The saint follows the Tao with his wisdom, and the sage makes it prevail. Mountains and waters symbolize the Tao with their shapes, and the kind hearted delight in them. In this way they come near the Tao. . .

. Those who reach the Tao by meeting things with the eye and responding with the mind will also respond in the same manner to pictures patterned after nature. When the communion is established and the spirit inspired, the spirit soars high above and the Tao is apprehended. . . . Thus the saint imparts his visionary gleams to posterity. Myriad shapes of things melt into a greater whole in his spiritual thought. What do I have to do except to stretch my spiritual being? And, when the spirit loams in a world unfettered and free, what can there be that may surpass it? (Tsung-ping 584; cf. Fukunaga 147-64; translation mine. See also Lin Yutang's trans. 31-33)

聖人含道映物，賢者澄懷味像。至於山水質有而趣靈  
 . . . . . 夫聖人以神法道，而賢者通山水，  
 以形媚道。而仁者樂，不亦幾乎 . . . . .  
 夫以應目會心為理者，類之成巧，則目亦同應，  
 心亦俱會；應會感神，神超理得 . . . . .  
 聖賢映於絕代，萬趣融其神思，余復何為哉？  
 暢神而已。神之所暢，孰有先焉。

After our examination of Joyce's and Hopkins' concepts, Tsung-ping's idea looks very familiar, except perhaps the name, Tao. What "Heart heard of, ghost guessed" (Hopkins, "Spring and Fall") may not have a name, so we may echo Hopkins by saying, "Now no matter, child, the name." Suffice it to note here that in Tsung-ping's process of esthetic perception also, the tripartite division of Stephen-Joyce's theory is discernible. "Meeting things with the eye" is *integritas*, "responding with the mind" is *consonantia*, and the inspired moment when the "spirit soars above" is *claritas*.

The Chinese have long entertained a unified view of poetry, music, calligraphy, and painting. By the time of Kuo Hsi 郭熙 (fl. c. 1070, painter) and Su Tung-p'o 蘇東坡 (1036-1101, poet) in the Northern Sung, the saying that "poetry is shapeless painting, and painting is poetry with shapes" 詩是無形畫，畫事有形詩 had already become current (Kuo in his "Hua i" 畫意 [The Import of Painting] quoting Su's poem "On Han Kan's Horse" 韓幹馬) (Fukunaga 319-20). Such a unified view of the arts further developed into a spiritual art theory when Su Tung-p'o and Huang San-ku 黃山谷 (1045-1105) introduced the philosophy of Lao Tzu and Chuang Tzu and Buddhist philosophy, especially Zenism, into the arts.

In Zenism the psychic state of mystical understanding

is called *satori* in Japanese and *ch'an-wu* 禪悟 in Chinese, all implying an intuitive leap over consecutive reasoning (Watts 103 *et passim*). The literary critic Yen Yü 嚴羽 (fl. 1180-1235), maintains that the highest order of poetry is *ju-shen* 入神 (entering the domain of the mystical) or achieving a state of *miao-wu* 妙悟 (pp. 6, 10). In his "Hua yü-lu" 畫語錄 (Remarks on the Art of Painting), Shih T'ao 石濤 (17th century) says, "Is painting not the import of poetry, and is poetry not Zen thought in painting?" 即詩中意，詩非畫裏禪乎 (Fukunaga 497).

We may infer then that both epiphany and inscape aim at a manifestation of this "authentic" something which transcends the "thingly element." This authentic something, for lack of a suitable name, may be called the Tao, or *ch'an* 禪, or epiphany, or instress. In any case, the authentic element has to have the thingly element as its body, and the thingly element without the authentic part gives no understanding beyond what is intelligible and calculable. In other words, when the thingly element "epiphanizes," or "inscapes," or *ying-mu hui-hsin*, the thingly element embodies the authentic element to make poetry a worthwhile humane enterprise.

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