

■ For the Impossibility of Saying “You”: Indeterminate Subjectivity in the Intersubjective Writing of Elizabeth Bishop’s “One Art”

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Abstract

This article explores the difficulty of saying “you” in Elizabeth Bishop’s poem “One Art” to demonstrate how Bishop creates a poetic subjectivity that allows another subject to exist in her narrative. This creative subjectivity distinguishes Bishop’s poems from her poetic contexts: her narrative is more capable of intersubjective love than the confessional poetics, and her narrator turns the poetic description into an affectionate opening to others. To explicate the significance of Bishop’s poetics, this article engages with Jacques Lacan’s theory of female subjectivity and Gilles Deleuze’s thoughts on signs in relation to the formation of an individual. This article proposes that Bishop’s poem creates a subjectivity that can include a heterogeneous other through three aspects: firstly, the urgent need for writing and the impossibility of encompassing the lost other in her own narrative; secondly,

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the contingency of traits of the other that constantly restructures the subject; and lastly, the necessity of writing recreated as a practice of losing. The subjectivity Bishop creates in this poem is a subject who practices losing in order to fundamentally open herself to the other.

Keywords: Elizabeth Bishop, Lacan, Deleuze, subjectivity, the other, impossibility, contingency

"You" is the most difficult word to utter in Elizabeth Bishop's love poem "One Art." Love challenges the subject's capacity to address another subject without shrinking it into an object fulfilling the loving subject's narrative. This implies a series of questions: Is it possible for a subject to relate to the radical differences of someone else without subsuming them into her own system? Can her subjectivity be structurally constituted by the non-homogenizing containment of what is other than herself?¹ If so, the question turns into this: How can her subjective structure include the signs of otherness? In other words, in what language can she write "you" without composing a monologue—a language in which "I" and "you" can affectionately relate to each other?

In Bishop's poems, it is the subject who has practiced losing that is capable of loving another. In this article, I explore the tension between the oneness of a subjective narrative and the heterogeneity intersubjective relation in Bishop's poem "One Art." How does the subject experience love in language, not as fulfillment of the homogeneous narrative that the poetic subject narcissistically imagines but as an encounter with what she cannot fully comprehend? This article analyzes the structural impossibility of saying "you" and the fundamental role of loss in the structure of a subject capable of loving through speaking to two perspectives of literary criticism—modernist/postmodernist's questioning of the coherence of subjectivity and description poetics' value of things—from two theories about the subjective formation that opens to love: what Jacques Lacan thinks about love in relation to unitary traits and feminine subjectivity and what Gilles Deleuze thinks about love in relation to learning from signs. As an expert in the relation between subjectivity and loss, Lacan faces the question: If there is intersubjective love other than the fantasy of oneness, how is the subject of this love structured? What is her relation to what one subject cannot encompass in her language?

From the angle of Deleuze, the problem is: How can a subject be created in an encounter with something other than her? What is the relation to signs that structure this particular subject of Bishop's poem? Deleuze proposes that relating to what is different from her coexists with fundamentally transforming herself. Deleuze suggests that to learn is to become an apprentice to signs (*Proust and Signs* 4). The subject of learning is constituted for encountering differences. I analyze how Bishop's poetic subject in "One Art" is composed of relating to an other through losing.

¹ In this paper, the poetic subjectivity in Bishop's poem "One Art" is considered feminine, not only because it is in line with the gender of the poet but also because the subjectivity that is capable of intersubjective love is feminine in the Lacanian theory, as this paper will later discuss.

1. The Impossibility of Relating to the Other

Writing “you” is an impossible task Bishop undertakes in her poem “One Art”: The second person is almost impossible to speak of in the first-person narrative. Bishop’s persevering insistence in writing “you” epitomizes the crisis of subjectivity that Bishop’s poetics faces in the context of modernism and post-modernism. Some scholars suggest that her poetics agrees with the modernist quest to undermine the Enlightenment ideals of the mastery of coherent reason and the questioning of the Romantic lyrical poet. For example, in Lynn Keller’s observation, Bishop shares modernist qualities with Marianne Moore: “Dissatisfied with concepts and terms that could be detached from sensory reality, the modernists tried to attach their poetry to particular objects and instants” (86). Bishop values sensual experiences over fixed concepts. The multiplicity of things takes over the coherence based on a single perspective.

Some critics analyze Bishop’s poetic composition as leading to multiplicity and the de-centering of subjectivity that characterizes postmodernist views. While Zachariah Pickard downrightly argues that “Bishop’s poetics is inherently postmodern in its decentered subjectivity” (6), Jan Gordon reads in Bishop’s poems “the loss of *privilege*” of a conventional position that usually implies some kind of assumed subjectivity including “the narrator’s sense of an advantage to perspective,” “an access to secrets unknown to other protagonists in her poems,” or even an “aesthetic advantage by granting the reader the right to acknowledge a false subjectivity” (300). In this view, Bishop not only puts the lyrical self of the poems’ narrators in danger but also refuses to let the poem be held together by a privileged point of view.

However, it is not useful to conclude that Bishop’s poems head towards a complete disillusion of subjectivity, not only because Bishop renovates the existence of a subject instead of destroying it but also because subjectivity is significant in an ethical sense of being with other existences. The more recent studies on Bishop have returned to the problem of subjectivity in the context of race (her identity as a white woman in relation to the Black other) or queer studies (her lesbian sexuality) (Zhou; Abraham). In order to investigate the relation with others and the capacity to love, the questions behind Bishop’s creation of poetic subjectivity according to the concerns of modernism and postmodernism are thus: What is a subject like if she opens up to things and instances instead of isolating herself into the rational coherence of a consciousness? How can a subject exist when she is not privileged to be the central perspective? What kind of structure would enable a subject to both maintain herself and allow others to exist as their own perspectives in her narrative? I argue that Bishop’s poetic

subject goes further than the postmodern subjectivity as she not only questions the dominance of a subjective coherence but also enables intersubjectivity to be sustained in her poems. This intersubjectivity makes love possible in a narrative that is written by only one person. Thus, I introduce Lacan's and Deleuze's theories to help elaborate on this accomplishment of hers.

In this context, writing "you" in a poem is a breakthrough. The writing of "you" challenges the subjective narrative to allow two subjective perspectives to coexist. Bishop's interest in intersubjective narratives is related to her devotion to "the correspondent form" (344), as analyzed by Siobhan Phillips. Phillips suggests:

Writers of Bishop's time, who came to maturity in the shadow of an institutionalized modernism, would have been especially conscious of the lyric speaker as a central category and the lyric's sociality as a central question. Letters allow them to unsettle the terms in which this question was commonly posed. (346)

In line with the questioning of the centrality of a lyric speaker, Bishop chooses an ethical path in which the problem is not the existence of subjectivity but the priority of one subjectivity without space for others. Instead of devoting poems to "the confessional 'voice' of exposed interiority, letters suggest a correspondent text of interrelated subjectivity" (Phillips 347). The correspondent form shifts the paradigm into intersubjectivity. The devotion to ethical relationships replaces the elevated lyrical self. As Phillips suggests, "[l]etters are ethical ... insofar as the term can indicate a principled attention to intersubjective exchange" (344). In addition to the significant amount of Bishop's correspondence with her writer friends, including Robert Lowell, Marianne Moore, and May Swenson, the correspondent form is also a significant underlying pattern in her poems. Her attempt to write "you" as a perspective that her narrative cannot encompass is one of the examples. This writing of "you" is by no means easy. In the poem "One Art," writing "you" is an impossibility that propels writing while almost upsetting it.

As the subject of "One Art" turns this encounter into a devoted, consistent practice, she, again and again, contains and fails to contain the uncontainable other. What writing "you" bluntly puts forward to the face of the subject is the limit of the narrative of one subject. Two questions are the sides of one problem: How can she have a heterogeneous relation with someone different from her? How can she relate to her impossibility? In other words, how does the space for the other within her confront her as impossible but compel her to write?

In Bishop's poems, "you" seems to be the most difficult thing to say. Particularly in the poem "One Art," the narrating subject is almost choked by

the difficulty of uttering “you.” Towards the end of the poem, the word “you” is finally forced out when the narrator can barely catch her breath. It seems that the breath through which this word “you” is uttered is the stuttering of impossibility. Before this impossible utterance of the lost beloved, this poem detours into concrete examples of other things the subject has lost. The seemingly casual but tenuous composition of the poem with numerous details of what has been lost embodies the subject’s struggle to practice the art of losing. The whole poem is quoted here:

The art of losing isn’t hard to master;
so many things seem filled with the intent
to be lost that their loss is no disaster.

Lose something every day. Accept the fluster
of lost door keys, the hour badly spent.
The art of losing isn’t hard to master.

Then practice losing farther, losing faster:
places, and names, and where it was you meant
to travel. None of these will bring disaster.

I lost my mother’s watch. And look! My last, or
next-to-last, of three loved houses went.
The art of losing isn’t hard to master.

I lose two cities, lovely ones. And, vaster,
some realms I owned, two rivers, a continent.
I miss them, but it wasn’t a disaster.

—Even losing you (the joking voice, a gesture
I love) I shan’t have lied. It’s evident
the art of losing’s not too hard to master
though it may look like (*Write it!*) like disaster. (198)

The poem is seemingly composed to be a guideline for learning the art of losing. The lines mainly consist of two kinds of expressions: Firstly, imperatives instruct what to do and break down the learning of this art into practical steps: “Lose something every day”; “Accept the fluster of lost door keys, the hour badly spent”; “Then practice losing farther, losing faster”; and, “*Write it*” (198). Secondly, self-persuasions about how losing is doable and acceptable: The sentence “The art of losing isn’t hard to master” is repeated almost four times, and the negation of disasters almost four times too—the fourth time is less a repetition than a breakdown of the repetition, as the narrating subject can no

longer persuade herself so thoroughly.

As the poem is a guideline that more and more undermines its claims of the easiness of loss, the writing of this poem itself is less a piece of propaganda than a practice of losing. The struggle with the impossibility of speaking "you" has forced the poetic subject to detour into less significant losses and transforms the poem into a practice. The intentional practice of turning a loss into an art that the subject can master is shown in the art of the rhymes in the poem. There is a parallel between the mastery over the loss and the mastery of the poetic form. In Joanne Feit Diehl's words, "the mastery sought over loss in love is intimately related to the control she maintains in her poetry" (178). The attempt at psychological mastery is executed through the form of poetry. The poem attempts to contain the uncontrollable losses in a very well-controlled form. The form the poem adopts, villanelle, consists of intertwining rules of rhymes that line up in this order: $A^1 b A^2 / a b A^1 / a b A^2 / a b A^1 / a b A^2 / a b A^1 A^2$. The rhymes repeat in a controlled way. The words Bishop chooses to be the most repeated rhymes (A^1 and A^2) are: "master" and "disaster"; they contradict each other and create the tension that this poem persists on. While the poem starts with "master," it ends with "disaster." The revelation of the corresponding rhyme—to master is nothing but a disaster—accompanies the difficulty of directly admitting the loss to be a disaster. The rhyming words almost embody the struggle between the attempt to contain and the surge of expression from the unconscious.

Trying to come to terms with the disaster, Bishop even maintains an oddly casual tone as if the poetic mastery is not difficult at all, just as she repeatedly comments: "The art of losing isn't hard to master." The more this seemingly spontaneous articulation pretends to be easy, the more intense its underlying struggle between restraint and breaking down is. The more difficult the loss is, the more intricate and repetitive the form of language needs to be in order to have the power to contain the loss. The insistence on the strict form of the poem is pushed through to the end of the poem, even when the narrator can barely speak out. As the form continues to the end despite the difficulties in uttering, the poem ends with what David Kalstone calls "the resolve which just barely masters emptiness and succeeds in filling out, tight-lipped, the form" (73). As Bishop forces her process of feeling and thinking into the tight-lipped form, she, on the one hand, shows the wish to persist in writing despite the uncontainable forces and, on the other hand, reveals how the internal emotional struggles clash against the containment of the form. In the end, what fulfills the containing form is the uncontainable word: disaster.

The paradox between the "mastery" through the intricate form and its ful-

fillment by the word “disaster” corresponds to a paradox innate to the Bishopian subject who wants to master loss. Paradoxically, in the apprenticeship of this art, this active subject can do nothing but passively lose. This paradoxical fusion of involuntary suffering and voluntary practice resembles Freud’s observation of a child’s attempt to master the mother’s absence through actively playing the *fort-da* game to make losing and regaining something seemingly controllable by himself (McCabe 27). However, the subject in Bishop’s poem practices only losing. She makes the uncontrollable a practice without turning it into something controllable. The illusion of regaining does not eliminate the pain of losing, and she does not become an active subject by recreating the process of losing as in the *fort-da* game of Freud. The art of losing is a bizarre practice as it does not contain activities the subject can do. What the subject does as a practice is not throwing away keys—in that case, the sense of “losing” does not exist—but accepting “the fluster.” The practice is an intention to allow intentions other than the subject’s. This poem is torn between different intentions. The intention to master the art of losing is just one of them, and the things and the person’s intentions to be lost seem to be even more important. One of the lines of persuasion is the recognition that “so many things seem filled with the intent / to be lost,” an intention that the narrating subject cannot control.

The only possible practice for the subject in relation to losing is to actively become passive in relation to uncontrollable others outside herself. The fluster of lost things seems to go by in a flux beyond her control. Susan McCabe argues that what the poem “One Art” accomplishes is “testing the limits of rational control” and thus “revealing the subject unsettled within flux” (33). While the strict poetic form presents rational control in this poem, the flux consists of the lost things and traits of the person that are beyond the mastery of the subject. Within this strict form and with the strong attempt to master losing as an art, the narrator reveals herself to be “unsettled within flux,” or, more precisely, to gain an inconsistent but continual subjectivity in being part of the constantly unsettling flux. The possible mastery does not lead to stable control; rather, it leads to a becoming flux, becoming unsettled. The mastery of the art of losing shows more the power of the lost things than the control of the subject.

In this poem, more powerful than the intent to master the art of losing is the intent of the lost things: “so many things seem filled with the intent / to be lost that their loss is no disaster.” The narrator consoles herself in the face of the losses that violate her wishes by recognizing intents other than her own. The struggle between her wish and the existence of the uncontrollable makes it impossible to speak of a single consistent intention of the poem. At the end of the poem, we realize that what is full of the intent to lose is nothing more than

the other subject, "you." The things' intentions to be lost foreshadow the uncontrollable intention of this other subject "you"; the poetic subject "I"'s numerous attempts to respect the intentions of the things are revealed at the end of the poem to be the preparation for speaking of this other.

The significance of Bishop's creation of a subject that is capable of a relationship with another subject that she cannot own can be further explicated by the two different subjective structures Lacan proposes: the subject defined by the phallic function and the subject who cannot be fully determined within language, corresponding to men and women. The first kind of subject is closer to the lyrical self of (male) Romantic poets whose poems center around themselves. They form a self-sufficient understanding of the world. Lacan reveals this kind of subject to be based on the representation of a lack: "throughout this moment of castration is the mode of representation of a lack from which the subject finds himself suspended" ("Phallic" 113). While the subject may consider representational completeness to be possible in their poems, the representation is actually based on a lack of their connection with the reality of what the representation refers to. The subject is castrated by his failure to relate to others in a way that affirms their existence beyond his system.

Lacan uses the concept "impossibility" to describe the impossibility for a relationship to exist for such a subject established in his own language. For Lacan, impossibility is the affirmation of relation with an other outside the fantasy; he defines "the sexual relationship as that which 'doesn't stop not being written'" ("Phallic" 144). Whatever the lyrical male subject writes about, the intersubjective relationship is never written; writing "you" as an other he cannot comprehend is always impossible. The relationship with an other can only be presented to a subject as an impossibility, an existence outside his system. Only when he opens himself up from where his limit—impossibility—is can what is other to the subject happen to him. An encounter occurs when the subject's system breaks in the confrontation with the heterogeneity beyond his homogenous system.

Through considering the structure of the subjectivity of women, Lacan tries to imagine the possibility of intersubjectivity. Instead of establishing a self-sufficient subject on the lack in the symbolic, Lacan explores love's relation to this suspension: Lacan proposes that "the suspension to which all love is attached" lies in "the encounter in the partner of symptoms and affects, of everything that marks in each of us the trace of his exile—not as subject but as speaking—his exile from the sexual relationship" (*On Feminine Sexuality* 145). "Affects" in this quote and "representation" in the quote about male subjectivity denote two different aspects in the functioning of a subjective language.

Affects are the quantitative energy that may or may not be attached to the representations. Representation gives affect names and makes them thinkable, but not all affects can be adequately represented. Thus, the completeness that the representational system attempts at may be a false fantasy and end up repressing unrepresented affects. In Lacan's formulation of the relationship through affects in his theory about female sexuality, his refocus on affects draws attention to the limit of the representational system of one single subject. Recognizing the impossibility of encompassing another subject is a chance for the subject to open her system to the contingency that the other seems to belong to. The determination by a systematic language needs to be suspended in order to become the space for the contingency in which the encounter of love can happen. In the difficulty that exiles a subject from the relationship she imagines, the encounter with the impossible other redefines subjects not through speaking but through affects and symptoms. Instead of losing the ability to speak, the subjects relate affectively through concrete things and affectionate memories. In short, for Lacan, the subject's capability to love lies in letting affects emerge to replace the determination of purely symbolic language in the homogeneous system of one subject.

Bishop takes on the impossible task of relating to a lost other in her poem without denying the difficulties. She lets her poem face the excruciating impossibility and recollects a series of affective things and memories until she can utter the lost subject. The loss of "you" is almost impossible to name. Paradoxically, the poem is excruciatingly and powerfully written because it is impossible to write this loss. What is impossible to be written is "you"—the poem is an unbearable mourning about losing you. The difficulty of coming to terms with the loss corresponds to the difficulty of naming "you." The struggle to master losing in "One Art" accelerates to the last paragraph where the final goal of this learning is revealed to be "losing you":

—Even losing you (the joking voice, a gesture
I love) I shan't have lied. It's evident
the art of losing's not too hard to master
though it may look like (*Write it!*) like disaster. (198)

Parallel with the starting sentences of the previous three stanzas, the first sentence of this stanza starts much quieter. It begins with a dash—as if the words spoken here are hesitated, delayed, and then finally whispered. "You" is uttered after the prolonged pause of the dash at the beginning of the first line of the last stanza (—Even losing you). During the period of time that the dash occupies, the narrating subject extends her temporality a little beyond the mas-

terfully controlled time of losing she is gaining into the times of the lost objects. The time length of the dash breathes by being out of breath. The final stanza of this poem is written as the impossibility of writing on the outside of the conclusion reached in the third stanza. In the trembles of fitting the "losing you" into the all of "None of these will bring disaster," the final writing is forced out by the italicized "*Write it!*". In McCabe's words, "[t]he self-prompt '(*Write it!*)' conveys the immense energy needed to utter the last word of 'disaster'" (27). The utterance of losing you as a disaster is broken by pauses, stuttering, and imperatives. In this instance, the impossibility of writing you and the necessity of writing you concur. It is indeed a disaster to lose "you." To say otherwise is lying, or, to say the least, an awkward practice of speaking of something that cannot be spoken of otherwise. The final revelation of this core is not simple at all. The forced imperative speaks of an intensity of effort and pain that the poem's casual tone and strict form cannot hide.

Bishop relates to the other subject in two of the aspects Lacan highlights in his analysis of the subjectivity of women: facing the impossibility of encompassing the other in one's own system and relating through affective details. As the addressee of the poem, "you" is the most unsettling element of the poem instead of the one that fulfills the narration of the writing subject. Paradoxically, the difficulties of reconciling the loss of "you," however, constitute the possible space for love in the poem. The impossibility and necessity of losing "you" open up a series of things she loses without ever having owned them. In Lacanian terms, the recognition of the impossibility coexists with experiencing (the loss of) the other through things she has felt and related to. The recounting of the series of lost things, from keys to gestures, becomes a love letter speaking of the existence of beloved things and "you."

What Bishop creates more than Lacan's theory is her composition of subjectivity based on the practice of losing, an active passivity. While Lacan's lack is a given, dead fact, Bishop's losing is an ongoing practice in writing. Impossibility becomes a starting point for Bishop's subject to become. The relations with the people and the things that have composed parts of her subjectivity are lost and then continue to exist as an impossibility that she cannot fully comprehend. The losses can stop being a disaster only when the subject becomes someone who always loses what she has never owned—only when she allows the loss to compose a part of her subjectivity in the place. Writing is no longer an act of encompassing things and others in the lyrical self's representational system but a practice of losing. While the Lacanian phallic subject attempts at a self-sufficient system of language, the Bishopian subject not only faces the impossibility as in the Lacanian subjective formation of women but also actively

practices restructuring herself through the impossibility of being fully formed.

In this practice, the subject contains what is not hers by letting her own logical structure be broken and thus formed: broken in the sense of never achieving completeness in itself and full in the sense of being constantly filled by the things that pass through her. As this subject is always between different broken formations, the form of this subjectivity remains indeterminate. Indeterminacy becomes the passive power that resists homogenous determinations of a system and the flexible state for the subject to encounter the uncontrollable other. Learning to lose enables the subject to relate to an other that is different from herself while putting herself into the turmoil of letting herself be constantly destroyed and constructed. The subject in Bishop's poems' ability to relate to what is impossible to language lies in her capacity of heterogeneity—she can encounter what is heterogeneous to her because she is heterogeneously constituted, impossibly heterogeneous.

2. The Contingency of the Beloved Traits

Facing the impossibility of uttering the lost “you,” the narrating subject in Bishop's “One Art” writes of a series of lost things before admitting the loss of the beloved person. What takes up most of the lines of this poem is curiously the counting of things the narrating subject has lost and the traits of the lost loved one. This section of the paper attempts to elaborate on how the recounting of these scattered details is significant to the establishment of the loving subject. The recounting of details is a particular feature of Bishop's poetics in a context wider than this one poem. The attention to things is a particular characteristic of Bishop's poetics that critics have observed. The relation to an other that is not fully known by the subject underlies this feature of Bishop's poems. It strikes scholars that Bishop's poems seem to extend according to endless descriptions of things instead of following the thought process of a lyrical subject. The way Bishop explores the world with description implies her attitude towards what is outside herself: she affirms the unknowability of the world without preexisting forms. In *Elizabeth Bishop's Poetics of Description*, Pickard finds the adequate way to read her poetics is as the “art of description” (5). In Pickard's words, “to begin with a perfectly useless concentration and end by sliding off into the unknown is the fundamental pattern that underlies Bishop's art of description” (5). Bishop's attention to details of things and her focus on precise description are without the intention to generalize what is described.

Description is how she approaches the unknown without fixing them

into systematic subjective narratives. In an ecocritical reading of Bishop, Scott Knickerbocker suggests that "the world's unknowability . . . necessitates . . . her close observation of its details" (59). The devotion to the description of things is a respect for the unknowability of the world. In Colm Tóibín's words, this kind of "clarity" and "precise description" creates a "tone [that] implied an acceptance of what was known" (2). Description is a discipline of acceptance in which the subject tries not to assume or presume forms but just to see the forms the things present. I want to explicate Bishop's poetics a bit further than Tóibín's statement: by not deducting forms from them and imposing forms onto things, the subject accepts what was known without claiming for a system of knowledge that would turn all the unknown into what will be one day subsumed into the system without surprises. In other words, the acknowledgment of the otherness of even what is known through detailed description structures the subject as someone who opens up to the unknown as it is.

She relates to things through language without claiming them. This results in a particular role of the subject that Nancy McNally proposes in "Elizabeth Bishop: The Discipline of Description": "What sets her work apart from practically every variety of contemporary poetry is that she rejects the exhibition of her own personality in her poems in favor of the role of an impersonal but highly perceptive observer" (190). Description is the way Bishop takes up the role of an observer instead of a master of knowledge. This choice of being "an impersonal but highly perceptive observer" contributes to Bishop's practice of passivity in the art of losing a loved one. The choice to not override the particularity of things by her subjective narrative corresponds to her recounting of particular lost things in the struggle to speak of the lost love in "One Art."

In "One Art," Bishop describes the actual traits of the loved one whom she has lost. While the description of the things may serve to subsume the loved one in the self-sufficient narrative of the lyric poet, Bishop's description functions differently. Instead of claiming to possess the eternal memory of the details of the object of love in the poem dedicated to this loss as many classic poems do, Bishop adopts "losing" as her relation with these details. The significance of the difference between possessing the lost things and traits of the person and acceptingly losing the lost can be shown in the comparison between a classic sonnet of William Shakespeare, "Shall I Compare Thee to a Summer's Day." This sonnet starts with the narrator's consideration of comparing the loved one to nature and ends with the affirmation of the value of a poem's eternity. Considering putting the object of his love in the same category of a summer's day—nature—Shakespeare recounts how the attractive traits of the object are doomed in the face of the impending destruction by the force of time: "every fair from

fair sometimes declines / By chance, or nature's changing course, untrimmed" (Shakespeare 18). In this poem, "nature's changing course" is another name for chance; in other words, the unpredictable nature that his loved one may belong to is the contingency he is helpless with. With a firm tone of necessity, Shakespeare finds his own poem to be the salvation of losing all fairness of the loved one: "When in eternal lines to time thou grow'st: / So long as men can breathe or eyes can see, / So long lives this, and this gives life to thee" (18). His poem subsumes the life of the loved one into its territory. As the loved one "needs" his poem to gain eternity, the poem seems to conclude that the necessity of his writing replaces the contingency of the loved one that is subject to the changing time. This replacement affirms his work and claims to have beaten time, negating contingency and denying loss.

Differently, far from denying her losses, Bishop relates to her loss by the insistent practice of losing. In "One Art," losses firstly emerge as accidents in the past—the accidents of losing "mother's watch," "the door keys," and "the hour badly spent." The ineffaceable loss of "you" is also recounted through the losses of small things: "the place you meant to travel," "the joking voice," and "a gesture" she loves. Counting one lost thing after another constructs the poem as a narrative of experiencing losses. These unexpected events of losing are not just an attempt at reconciliation with the past but an everyday practice that creates the future of the subject through continual learning and a gradual mastering of this art. The art can never be completed but requires constant practice, as the last stanza shows how the seemingly casual tone of the poem is undermined by the subject's hesitation to admit the disaster of losing someone. This practice enables her to embrace contingency while maintaining the capability to write. Instead of framing and defining the lost things to be eternal, as in Shakespeare's attempt, Bishop's writing subjects itself to the necessity of contingency. Instead of claiming her writing to be a necessary salvation, she writes as a necessary practice of losing.

Even though the loss of "you" is the main topic of the poem, this poem writes extensively about other lost objects that have or have not belonged to the narrator to the extent that the writing of the poem seems to be a disassembling of the subjective narrative of the poem into little things. The lost loved one, "you," seems to have become a constellation of little traits, a constellation that is viewed in the context of a larger constellation that includes other lost things. On the one hand, this transformation of "you" into a constellation within a larger constellation seems to be an attempt to decrease the emotional intensity of facing the loss; on the other hand, the practice of losing is a profound and honest insight into how the love for the other subject has been associated with

the smallest traits in the first place. This affirmation of little traits particular to the subject is an affirmation of the uniqueness of another subject.

The irreplaceable traits of the other are theorized differently in psychoanalysis and Deleuze's systems. In Freudian and Lacanian psychoanalysis, these traits are called "unitary traits" and play a fundamental role in identification in subject formation.² Different from the psychoanalytical focus on the single subjective structure as the measurement of what happens, Deleuze views the traits that shock the subject to recognize the existence of the other as "signs" that occur between subjects. A comparative analysis of these two views would help explicate the relation between Bishop's subject and particular traits of the lost other in "One Art."

For Lacan, the irreplaceable traits of the other are fundamental to the initiation of the writing of a subject. Lacan proposes that unitary traits particular to a person are what become a signifier that is the determining element of a system (*Seminar XVII* 1544).³ Before becoming an abstract mark, a trait is what speaks of something particular about a subject to another subject; the relation of a trait representing one subject to another is the determining function that makes an abstract representational system of language possible. In this view, Lacan connects the abstract system of a language based on a homogenous point of view of one subject with the concrete traits of an other that the subject encounters as different. In other words, the intersubjective relation is the basis of a language that a subject can deploy to form a narrative seemingly complete in itself. In this framework between the oneness of the signifying system and the irreplaceable heterogeneity of the unitary traits, Shakespeare's poem as discussed above and Bishop's "One Art" are located in two different positions. While Shakespeare is comforted by the oneness of time in eternity of the poem that does not decay, Bishop's "One Art" affirms the heterogeneity of unitary traits without resorting to the exclusive oneness that the mastery of the poem may claim to affirm. Her quest for mastery is itself paradoxical: How can "losing," which is by definition out of one's control like accidents, be an art to be mastered? The mastery she looks for and the contingency innate to the practice itself paradoxically become one. This art does not tame contingencies into expectable regularities but creates a practice in which contingency and mastery coexist. In other words, Bishop refuses to submit to the unidirectional evolution of the unitary traits into the necessity of the phallic signifier, as Lacan describes, by submitting the necessity she practices in her writing to the traits that may be or have been lost. Instead

² The detailed discussion of identification and subject formation can be found in Tsai's article.

³ For a detailed discussion about the relation of unitary traits and signifiers, please see Tsai.

of affirming the absolute oneness possibly created by a poem, she retains the relation with a heterogeneous other, a relation Lacan sees before the signifiers are formed.

Deleuze's theory of signs locates the traits of a radical other in the inter-subjective relation. Instead of creating a narrative according to the subject's own system, the subject is transformed by the "signs" of the other in their encounter. Just as Lacan observes that love is associated with unitary traits, in *Proust and Signs*, Deleuze also observes that love is caused by small, sensuous details that do not last; the ephemerality forces the artist to resort to art as the necessary reconciliation with, or, rather, the denial of the decaying materiality. Deleuze explicates the sensuous signs as the little things, including "the weight of a face, from the texture of a skin, from the width and color of a cheek," along with "odors and tastes." While the material decays, art seems to be where the precious sensuous signs continue to exist in an immaterial way (*Proust and Signs* 85).

However, the subject's encounter with the signs of the other constantly restructures the subject. In *Proust and Signs*, Deleuze interprets the *Bildungsroman* of "a man of letters" (3) in Proust's *In Search of Lost Time* as the narrator's process of becoming an apprentice to different kinds of signs emitted by others that are radically heterogeneous to the subject. For Deleuze, the subjects come into form through learning from the signs outside the subject. The capacity to recognize the signs of others breaks the ground of the enclosed, narcissistic territory of the subject. Deleuze suggests that "[t]o learn is first of all to consider a substance, an object, a being as if it emitted signs to be deciphered, interpreted" (*Proust and Signs* 4). In other words, it is to acknowledge that the other is a unique existence distinct from the subject; the other speaks without being just the mouth of the subject.

Learning creates encounters and forms a relation between the subject that learns and the other that emits the signs: "Learning takes place not in the relation between a representation and an action (reproduction of the Same) but in the relation between a sign and a response (encounter with the Other)" (*Difference and Repetition* 22). Learning occurs in a relation defined by an encounter between heterogeneous participants instead of projecting the idea of the subject onto the object. To learn is to treat the other as something different but possibly decipherable. This learning is necessary for opening up to love. Deleuze describes how the moments of real love come as violence to the subject when an other shocks the subject out of his preconditions. The real truth of the other happens in the real encounters with an other in love and is described like this: "truth is never the product of a prior disposition but the result of a violence in thought" (*Proust and Signs* 16). There is no prior disposition that guarantees a

comfortable understanding. The subject cannot find a place to posit himself. It is in learning that the subject restructures himself in relation to others, other subjects, or the environment, through signs. In Deleuze's words: "Learning to swim or learning a foreign language means composing the singular points of one's own body or one's own language with those of another shape or element, which tears us apart but also propels us into a hitherto unknown and unheard-of world of problems" (*Difference and Repetition* 192). Learning is to let the unknown and the foreign modify and constitute the subject. The subject is thus broken down as a changeable constellation formed by singular points that are not just his but also the other's. The subject relates to what is other than himself through molecular singularities instead of molar universality. In Anna Cutler and Iain MacKenzie's explanation, "a person's body and a body of water, according to Deleuze, are composed of both universal and singular aspects. Each body has a universal aspect to the extent that it is constituted by a system of differential relations—relations of height, depth, limits and turbulences, for example" (53). The fact that the human body and the body of water can relate to each other assumes they are both thought of as relations. None of them are constant forms but forms of relations in themselves.

In this view, Bishop's poem recounting the details of what she has encountered and lost is thus not only a reconciliation with the loss of the other but also a process of reforming her subjectivity. Her composition of a subject through details of objects and an other subject does not eliminate the coherent, rational, dominant subjectivity that modernists put into question. She creates a subjectivity that is broken among and composed of different perspectives. Critics like Bonnie Costello have seen how, in Bishop's poems, "unusual perspectives ... amount to a critique of the single vantage point of integrated, timeless subjectivity" (9). Thus, she suggests that Bishop's "use of multiple, angled, liminal, and inverted perspectives is reminiscent of symbolism and surrealist techniques but sometimes has a different outcome, leading away from abstraction rather than toward it" (9). However, even though Bishop's poems have qualities that may be associated with Imagism, Symbolism, Surrealism, Cubism, and other modernist and postmodernist poetics, her poetics still does not quite fit into any of these categories because "[t]he particular way in which she injects herself between things and ideas—her particular form of poetic subjectivity—plays into the question of whether or not she can properly be considered a postmodern poet" (Pickard 6). In fact, Bishop's poetics of recounting tangible things constitutes her subjectivity in a way Deleuze would describe as constantly learning to encounter the signs of others by losing, a subject of relations with what she has encountered and cannot own. No matter how much her poetics of description

is like a patchwork of flat objective images, the words and things in her work remain in constant interaction. Instead of hiding behind a picture of what she has lost, Bishop's subject painfully relates to the details she loses time and again.

3. The Necessity of Losing and Writing

The Deleuzian subject is formed by learning from the signs of the other in their encounter. If Bishop's subject in "One Art" is thought of in this view, the problem becomes: How does a subject learn from the other when their relation is composed through losing? While the subject of Proust refuses to lose by claiming that time can be regained in art, the subject in Bishop embraces losing. Loss has been central to Bishop's writing. Diehl describes the celebration of loss as crucial to Bishop's poetics: "Even when she is most carefully describing the world before her, Bishop meticulously celebrates departure, loss becoming a precondition for poetic entitlement" (187). As losing underlies Bishop's meticulous description of things, the subject paradoxically relates to them by losing them. What does "losing" mean, losing that serves as a relation to signs?

The Bishopian subject's relation to signs is different from Deleuze's formation of the Proustian subject. In Deleuze's analysis of Proust, various kinds of signs correspond to the stages of the Proustian subject's encounter with the world. These signs include worldly signs, signs of love, sensuous signs, and signs of art. In Deleuze's description, Proust's illuminating process of gradual, multi-layered opening up of the subject to otherness, firstly socially and then affectionately and sensuously, somehow ends up being enclosed within the signs of art. Since signs of love are found to be too disappointing, material, and ephemeral to be the truth for Proust, the subject overcomes the destined loss with the signs of art as an affirmation of immaterial essences. The signs of love between two subjects are subsumed by the primacy of the art of one subject. Deleuze argues that in Proust's pursuit, "all apprenticeships," no matter in relation to worldly, material, or sensual signs, "by the most diverse paths, are already unconscious apprenticeships to art itself" (*Proust* 14). It is as if art is the ultimate goal of all other signs because it not only redeems all that has been lost in the temporality of eternity but also makes sense of the inexplicable otherness.

Insisting in thinking of the signs of art as essentially separated from materiality and the signs of love as failures in being elevated from materiality may lead to difficulties in being susceptible to others; in the art of one subject, determined by the law of one signifier, in Lacan's words, others may easily become nothing more than imaginary objects. Art would become a defense mechanism

for a subject like Proust to hold himself together. In this view, the inseparability of love from the actual ephemeral features would thus be deemed as weakness—something indescribable, frustrating, troubling, confusing, and thus causing more pains than pleasures because it brings unnamable pleasures that seem to be fickle.

Deleuze's analysis of Proust seems to align with the argument of Shakespeare's sonnet. In the cases of both Shakespeare's sonnet and Deleuze's description of Proust, what underlies the struggle between eternity and ephemerality is the tension between the oneness of a piece of writing by one subject and the multiplicity of uncontrollable others. The question behind this reconciliation of the ephemeral and art—though quickly curbed by the reconciliation as the answer—is: How does one relate to contingency? How can a subject be consistent or subsistent in relation to the constantly changing? While Deleuze's description of Proust ceases the questioning by resorting to the almighty, eternal art, Bishop's art keeps questioning. For Bishop, the apprenticeship is not completed by overcoming the signs of love with the signs of art. The signs of art stay as ephemeral as the signs of love. To put it more explicitly, love is a repetitive practice of losing, and poetry, for Bishop, is a form that enables this practice. McCabe describes the role of the poetic form in Bishop's practice of losing:

the process of losing, for Elizabeth Bishop, is not an art like any other; it requires that we let go to gain mastery, that we neither monumentalize our experience nor fix what is always in the process of dissolution, that we recognize how inseparable our living is from our art. Poetic form and the lyric have been historically assigned the role of masking or denying the power of loss, instability, and time. In Bishop, however, writing is a way, not to overcome, but to come to terms with loss. (1)

For Bishop, the art of losing does not repress loss. Her mastery is a mastery of "coming to terms with loss"—creating terms that enable her to relate to loss. Instead of replacing the loss with the insistent existence of art, Bishop writes from the perspective of a loser. She has lost and will lose more. Every sentence is a re-encounter with something that has already been lost, and every sentence is a declaration of love as the acknowledgment of a loved one that is radically outside the control of the subject. In other words, the signs of art become as ephemeral and changing as the signs of love. Bishop's poem "One Art" posits the feminine subject of art differently than the Proustian subject, as she has never overcome love with art. The art is penetrated and transformed by being undermined by ephemeral love; the art makes itself incomplete, defenseless, and insufficient in order to be the language of love. This art achieves nothing but the failure to close itself up in an eternal circle. Art is the subject's repetitive practice of losing.

Different from Deleuze's analysis of Proust, in Bishop's poetry, art and love relate to each other differently. Bishop does not replace the fickle with the eternal; she does not replace pains with the presence of art. She does not look for the oneness in writing to replace the contingency of love. She continues to lose instead of regaining the lost: while Proust searches for the lost time, Bishop loses again the lost time. She continues to encounter parts of her life as the uncontrollable others. As the poem goes on with recounting the losses, the art of the poem becomes a process in relation to things; the poem is an immaterial form of loss and contains the passing of the material. The material things are recalled, but their ephemerality is not given up in their being recalled in language. Instead of transforming into eternity, they remain ephemeral in their state of being lost. Bishop's subject is more of a subject who loses than a subject who remembers. Losing any subjective consistencies other than the contingency of the object's traits, the subject is composed of its heterogeneous relations with things.

The subject of "One Art" based on this particular relation with loss brings a new light to the entanglement of necessity, impossibility, and contingency in Lacan's discussion (*On Feminine Sexuality*). As each line of the poem embraces the contingency of an encounter with the other, the encounter transforms the impossibility of owning the other in one's language into the necessity of writing. This impossibility has become the honest place from where writing happens again. The necessary force of writing lies precisely in the will to lose again the other that has already been lost and has never submitted to being possessed. While Shakespeare seems to so easily maintain that "you" will always live in his poems, Bishop can barely speak of "you" beyond speaking of the unitary traits of "you." Impossibility opens up to creativity; impossibility plays the crucial role of revealing that the completeness of the subject is just a fantasy. The impossibility for a subject opens her to a contingency that is beyond the known possibilities for her. This impossibility is not negativity but indeterminacy, or, what has not yet been determined as possible by the existing system. Brian Massumi elaborates on the pursuit of contingency and the significance of impossibility in philosophy:

What philosophy tries to articulate are *contingencies*: potential relational modulations of contexts that are not yet contained in their ordering as possibilities that have been recognized and can be practically regulated. Philosophy's back-flow is to a point of pre-possibility. It is a form of *contingent reason* whose nonobject is the practically *impossible*. The impossible is not the opposite or simple negative of the possible. It is the indeterminate but positive potential for possibilities to be added to particular contexts. (240-41)

Contingency cannot happen in the realm of the possible that has been known. Contingency happens as what is always before the formulation and regulation of the possible. What sustains in this state of "pre-possibility" is the indeterminate that the system has no better name other than "the impossible." In this analysis, Massumi is highly aware of the fact that thinking is not only about creating but also about facing already existing—and probably fixed—systems of thinking. Thus, to create is to reconnect with the impossible that still has the potential to be indeterminate, to create, and therefore to allow contingency to happen as new possibilities. The creative indeterminacy in this process lies in the constantly renewed connection between impossibility and contingency. The indeterminacy lies not only in the virtual but also the actualization of the virtual when contingency enables impossibility to become an actualized possibility again while being more indeterminate than any possibilities.

In line with the creative process that combines impossibility and contingency, Bryant argues for the actualizing power of contingency, or, in his words, how chance necessitates answers: "Chance becomes necessity both in the sense that there necessarily is chance and in the sense that chance generates necessity in the form of questions and problems which *demand* answers" (208). Contingency asks the questions that demand reality to embody their answers. Even though the virtual is the creative potentiality, the creative process necessarily involves the contingency becoming necessity again.

The question is: How can the indeterminate retain its power in the actualized? In other words, how does contingency happen in the space of necessity? Both Lacan's and Deleuze's answers are: encounter. Encounter is the opposite of anything happening under the realm of one system. It opens up the possibility of love between two subjects. Contingency is very closely related to encounter. As Lacan puts it, "the regime of the encounter is tantamount to contingency." Encounters are the effects of contingency. In Lacan's words:

I incarnated contingency in the expression "stops not being written." For here there is nothing but encounter, the encounter in the partner of symptoms and affects, of everything that marks in each of us the trace of his exile—not as subject but as speaking.... Isn't that tantamount to saying that it is owing only to the affect that results from this gap that something is encountered? (*On Feminine Sexuality* 145)

Contingency is when those that have not been written can start to be written. The marks of these things belong to the lack in the symbolic under each subject formation; they speak not of the subject—more feminine than masculine as Lacan clarifies this structure mostly in his discussion of a feminine subjectivity—as a position in the system but as in her exile. What remains to be written outside the systematic symbolic are "symptoms and affects." Symptoms

and affects are what emerge in encounters and what the subject identifies with and transforms herself in accordance with. Only affects can traverse this impossibility and it is in this traversal that the subjects encounter each other.

The subject of Bishop's "One Art" establishes herself on the contingent. Contingency is exemplified in losing since the connection between the subject and her objects is contingent. Bishop's preoccupation with loss, as Thomas Travisano points out, includes multiple dimensions: "unresolved or repressed feelings of loss, grief, abandonment, and personal or cultural dislocation" (93). Travisano suggests that this engagement with loss is deeply related to the forming of her subjectivity, not as "a process of revealing the self," but as

a process of exploring the self, of reaching back through a consideration of recurrences, symptomatic behaviours, and verbal slippages—that is, through tangible cultural markers and through the intangible and unreliable but powerful messages of the unconscious—toward the elusive junctures of the traumatic past. (93)

It is not a formed subject that loses something and becomes incomplete. The subject of loss is fundamentally unknown and unformed. Learning to lose is the subject's exploration of what is in her but other than her, the "elusive junctures" that create her but she may not have recognized. Every lost thing and every moment of losing might be an elusive juncture. Losing is the embrace of contingencies. This embrace fundamentally changes the structure of her subject. The subject is not well-formed. She does not become more well-formed after learning. She contradicts herself. She makes sense in not making sense: she caresses objects by losing them. She caresses the object as if it has already been lost, even in the caress. Losing becomes the way objects encounter her and traverse her.

The attitude Bishop actively takes is to lose, in both the sense of involuntarily not owning something and the sense of being defeated by someone winning. This is a very strange and fundamental aspect of the subject in Bishop's poem "One Art." The subject seems to set herself to fail. J. D. McClatchy has an informative analysis of the word "lose" in its sense of failing and not having:

The peculiar resonance of the phrase "the art of losing" is that the word has two meanings, transitive and intransitive. It can mean to mislay or to fail. We hear the second meaning of the poem's first line, and the ghost of it throughout. "Lose" has other overtones: to elude, to stray, to remove, to be deprived. (154)

To lose refers to both the relation with an object that the subject no longer has a relation to and the subjective state of failing. Taken together, these two senses constitute the subject as disconnected from the objects and failing to be a subject who can own things. As McCabe explains, there is a "perverse rejection

of the desire to win" (27). If claiming the objects in order to become a complete and independent subject is a way of winning, it is clearly not what Bishop ultimately strives for. The desire to cut and separate from the objects does exist, but it comes as a way of failing.

Bishop's resolution to not win is an intriguing decision. McCabe interprets that the rationale behind this decision is that "Bishop recommends that we recognize our powerlessness and play with the conditions of loss" (27). The acceptance of the powerlessness is the mastery Bishop learns to have. Recognizing the powerlessness, the subject exists at the blurry edge between existing and non-existing, being there and not being there. The learning of signs of loss creates a subject who fails. Every encounter pushes her to fail and accept failure as the constitution of her subjectivity. Whether losing is a disaster or not is not an either-or question but a painstaking struggle that turns the subject into a subject of love. The subject of love is accomplished by her failure to fully represent either herself as a fixed subject or the objects of love as something graspable as much as by her persistence to write.

Conclusion

Bishop's poems can be read as a radical continuation of this questioning of the subject and her relation to what is other than herself: If the subject is formed and reformed in her learning from the signs, what kind of a subject is an apprentice of losing? How does losing define the subject through her relation with the signs from other subjects? The Lacanian subject of affects, particularly in relation to the structure of the feminine, expresses a form of indeterminacy that cannot be determined fully by a representational system. The Deleuzian subject of learning situates herself in the indeterminacy between two determined forms. The questions I want to ask in relation to Bishop's "One Art" are: How can the subject not be determined by the oneness of self? How can indeterminacy be a form of subject instead of what the subject excludes or what stays destructively formless? What is the form of indeterminacy that enables the subject to open up to otherness?

The subject's capacity to love lies in the heterogeneity that she is capable of containing in her writing of herself. It is impossibly paradoxical to be *one* subject writing of what is fundamentally *heterogeneous*. The subject is structured as the encounter between oneness and heterogeneity so that she can contain the encounter between the heterogeneous. The oneness of a subject is turned into an impossibility that opens up to multiple signs, and heterogeneity composes

the writing of the subject itself to be the constant embodiment of contingency in necessity, one necessity at a time, one after another. This continuous process turns into a state in which love can exist without the relation being determined and fixed. Indeterminacy becomes the other name for love when the subject opens up by being constituted by losing.

Like the unresolved paradox of water, indeterminacy is the form in which oneness and heterogeneity reconcile in the Bishopian subject. In dialogue with Lacan's theory, this paper explores aspects of indeterminacy through impossibility, contingency, and necessity: the impending impossibility of saying "you" forces the limit of her writing to be present in every sentence. This impossibility becomes dangerous indeterminacy as "you" threatens to unsettle her mastery of the art of writing and losing. The impossibility of saying "you" refuses her attempt to turn losing into a comforting art. Since this indeterminacy of the "you" that cannot be said corresponds to the ongoing state of losing, the indeterminacy of this impossibility also enables her not to be determined as lacking. By existing as someone who is constantly losing, she finds in indeterminacy the form of art. She becomes indeterminate in relation to both the oneness that circumscribes a subject and the loss that determines the lack of the subject. She continues to relate to her losing.

This indeterminacy in relation to the oneness of a subject and the lost ones is embraced as a contingency. It is as a contingency that the signs of the other describe the accidents and encounters. In this way, indeterminacy becomes a factor of determination. It is encounter that gives rise to the forms of the subject; it is the signs between the heterogeneous that create the ephemeral ones that the subject becomes again and again. Coming from the outside of the subject, indeterminacy is the way contingency subsists in the forms of subjects; it is the heterogeneity that dwells within the broken oneness.

The consistency of writing lies in its heterogeneity. Indeterminacy is the coincidence of oneness and heterogeneity in an ongoing process. This coincidence recreates endless and ephemeral necessities at every instance of writing. The indeterminacy as necessity becomes the structure of the subject by being what is at the same time, too big and too broken for the subject. By contradicting any consistent formation of the subject, this indeterminacy endlessly recreates the subject as inconsistent but temporarily formed writings.

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說出「你」之不可能：伊莉莎白·碧許 〈一門藝術〉中相互主體寫作的不確定 主體

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摘要

本文探討伊莉莎白·碧許在詩作〈一門藝術〉中對「你」的難以言說，來展現碧許如何創造一個容許他者主體存在的詩學主體。這個創造性主體讓碧許的詩與她所在的詩學脈絡相異：她的敘述比起自白詩學更有相互主體的愛的能力，而她的敘述者把描述的詩學轉換成對他者敞開的情感開口。為了展開碧許詩學的重要意義，本文參照拉岡的女性主體理論以及德勒茲與個體形成相關的符號思考。本文從三個面向論述這首碧許的詩創造一個可以包含差異他者的主體性：其一、對寫作的急迫需要以及敘述如何不可能包含失落的他者。其二，他者各種特徵的偶然性如何不斷重新構成主體。其三，寫作的必要性如何被重新創造練習「失落」的方式。碧許在這首詩中創作的主體練習失落，以便根本性的把自己向他者打開。

關鍵字：伊莉莎白·碧許、拉岡、德勒茲、主體、他者、不可能性、偶然性

