

■ In Defiance of Biopower: Suicide in Romantic Literature

Kang-Po Chen

National Taipei University of Technology

Faubert, Michelle. *Romanticism and Subversive Suicide: Human Rights, Existential Freedom and Biopower*. Edinburgh UP, 2025, 296 pp., ISBN 9781399527538.

As Alan Richardson rightly observes in a 2004 article, “Romantic scholarship has now, at the beginning of a new century, returned to this earlier emphasis on feeling and sensibility, along with a renewed attention to the insistent presence of the body within Romantic-era texts of many kinds” (3). The more recent scholarship in Romantic studies has shifted its focus from transcendental and idealist construal of the canonized works to in-depth exploration of Romanticism’s more material and somatic aspects. That is, Romantic expression has begun to be understood as pertaining less to the spiritual than to the body. This trend was initiated near the end of the twentieth century, in studies such as Adela Pinch’s 1996 *Strange Fits of Passion* and Thomas Pfau’s 2005 *Romantic Moods: Paranoia, Trauma, and Melancholy, 1790-1840*. Moreover, Romanticism is not only intrinsically connected with the body, but with the violation of the body. Violence and pain are thus the major focuses in twenty-first-century Romantic scholarship, including Ian Haywood’s *Bloody Romanticism: Spectacular Violence and the Politics of Representation, 1776-1832* (2006) and Jeremy Davies’s *Bodily Pain in Romantic Literature* (2014). The former considers the Romantic

Kang-Po Chen is an associate professor in the Department of English at National Taipei University of Technology. His research focuses on British Romanticism, especially the works of William Blake, with particular attention to sexuality, eroticism, violence, and religion. He has published articles in journals such as *Wenshan Review: Literature and Culture*, *Blake/An Illustrated Quarterly*, *Concentric: Literary and Cultural Studies*, and *Review of English and American Literature*. His current research project examines the Romantic reinterpretation of the Cain-Abel narrative in the works of Blake, Byron, and Coleridge.

period an era of “catastrophically violent events” (2) especially public executions, torture, and lynching by the mob during the French Revolution and their “sensational mode of representation” in Romantic poetry. The latter affirms that bodily pain is “an experience that calls attention to our background sense of embodied existence, and hence as a reflexive feeling of our capacity for feeling” (2). Furthermore, bodily pain “transforms our sense of identity” and “illuminates our primordially embodied condition” (18). These studies have deepened our understanding of the Romantic capacity for poetic imagination.

Michelle Faubert’s new monograph *Romanticism and Subversive Suicide* offers a refreshing perspective on this thriving topic of bodily violence in Romantic studies by focusing particularly on suicide. As indicated in the subtitle, Faubert engages with Michel Foucault’s conception of biopower, mainly delineated in *The History of Sexuality*, Volume 1: An Introduction. She considers the political and social institutions in eighteenth and nineteenth-century England an embodiment of Foucauldian biopower, especially in the contexts of slavery, gender, and religion. Based on this understanding, Faubert establishes her central argument that the Romantic representation of suicide forms a subversive force against “the concurrent rise of biopower, to which suicide was the ultimate threat, coupled with recent and developing Enlightenment ideas proclaiming the Western liberal subject as existentially free, which the prohibition against suicide denied” (6). The anti-suicide ideologies in various contemporary discourses sustained and strengthened biopower’s subtle dominion over individuals: plantation slaves, women, and religious outcasts. According to Faubert, their suicides (or wishes for suicide) represent a rebellion against what she calls “enforced life” (7). In the introductory chapter, Faubert points out that the rapidly developed scientific knowledge in the Romantic period corresponds to the transition from sovereign power to biopower identified by Foucault, which in turn influenced “the newly medicalized view of suicide” as “an expression of the broad biological effort to deter, rather than punish, suicide and therefore maintain citizens’ bodies as assets to power” (8). Incorporating Achille Mbembe’s and other thinkers’ ideas, Faubert proposes that slaves and women in the era in question were subject to “the dehumanizing intervention of the state into the continued bodily existence” (10). Her examination of such “enforced life” in Romantic works offers new literary and historical exemplifications of Foucauldian biopower.

In Chapter 1, Faubert presents an extremely informative survey of contemporary views of suicide during the Romantic period. While political rebellions against authoritarian regimes such as the American and French Revolutions generated the notion of suicide as a heroic act of defiance, the later emergence

of new thoughts in fields such as psychology and sociology reaffirmed the general disapproval of taking one's own life as a threat to society's collective welfare. Such reaffirmation is witnessed in the works of Thomas Malthus and Jeremy Bentham. Faubert observes that "these fields aimed not at understanding suicide, but at preventing it through management of live bodies" (26). Anti-suicide sentiments also permeate religious writings. Faubert's survey shows that eighteenth-century religious thinkers believe that individuals do not "own" their bodies, but only their creator, God, does. Thus, suicide violates God's divine decree. And even "the very discussion of suicide as a matter of debate in the period indicated waning belief in God's mastery and an increase in atheism in Britain" (30). In terms of politics, Faubert points out that sympathy for suicide was often associated with sympathy for the French Revolution, so the discussion of suicide was suppressed by authorities in the reactionary social milieu in England. The documents Faubert examines tell us that suicides, much like fictional monsters such as vampires, were denied proper churchyard burials. She insightfully deciphers such a "fantasy of deterrence" as "the culture's anger at and fear of the liberty taken by the suicide—alarm at this claim of autonomy over his own existence and disapprobation of his choice to opt out of the social contract"; that is, "to opt out of the system of biopower" (35-37).

Subsequently, Faubert locates suicide in the literary context of British Romanticism, identifying the archetypal image of "the Bard" in Thomas Gray's ode. The poem is pervaded by a heroic tendency of self-destruction as a form of rebellion against oppressive regimes, dominant social customs, and literary conventions, an image that receives later poetic and artistic representations by Henry Fuseli, William Blake, Benjamin West, and many others. Faubert also discusses how the classical figure of Cato the Younger, who stabs himself to death rather than serve Caesar's dictatorship, is revived by prominent writers before and during the Romantic period such as Joseph Addison and William Godwin. Such a revival underlines the contemporary concerns over "not so much the punishment of death for opposing tyrannical rule but enforced life under oppressive conditions" (60). Faubert convincingly marks in the Romantic representation of suicide by major poets such as Wordsworth, Coleridge, and Keats a strong tendency to reject "the Industrial Revolution's demand that the subject be a productive, useful and, most of all, future-oriented member of society—an asset to biopolitical society" (62). In other words, by versifying suicide, the Romantics advocate the "divorce from futurity" and the "refusal to see human bodies as achieving their highest teleological function in creating children, the symbol of the future" (63). This is an observation that I keenly agree with as my previous studies on Blake also demonstrate that his poetic and

artistic representations of the body epitomize a form of eroticism that subverts practical purposes of reproduction and social control.

Chapter 3 centers on the first of the three major types of suicide in Faubert's study: slave suicide. She first attends to slave memoirs in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. These documents offer more authentic first-hand accounts of slave experience than abolitionist literature by white British writers, in which the unilateral depiction of slave suicide can undermine the very abolitionist message they sought to convey, because such depiction perpetuates the image of black slaves as powerless and deprived of the control of their own bodies. Faubert's examination of slave memoirs shows that suicide had been perceived as heroic, especially on slave ships, where mass suicide of the enslaved often became "full scale rebellion" against the institution of slavery. In this case, slave suicide is perceived as a form of revolutionary insurrection that radically disrupts the biopower that transports, maintains, and manages the enslaved bodies. Faubert defines slavery as an "inverted world" in which "the usual significations, values and meanings of British eighteenth-century society were not just suspended, but perverted and twisted into a horrific other . . . and suicide equalled freedom" (86). And such an inverted world was sustained by Foucauldian biopower, "a machine of enforced life" that renders slaves as "those who are made to live" (89). Faubert investigates this phenomenon in two main aspects that pertain to the body: reproduction and eating. The primary sources she consults include not only English abolitionist documents such as Thomas Clarkson's *An Essay on the Slavery and Commerce of the Human Species* (1788) and Neil Douglas's *The African Slave Trade* (1792), but more valuably, *The Horrors of Slavery* (1824) by Robert Wedderburn, who himself was the offspring of a white plantation owner and one of his female slaves. These documents indicate that slave breeding was a common method taken by slave owners, who either encouraged copulation among slaves or sexually imposed themselves upon the female slaves in their possession, usually against their will, in order to exponentially increase the profit. In this case, giving birth to new lives became a dehumanizing horror, as slaves were treated as livestock, while death by suicide was the only way out of endless suffering. As for the issue of eating, "the refusal to eat was the prime mode of rebellion for those kidnapped from Africa" (Faubert 95). For example, collective hunger strikes often occurred on board slave ships. Faubert refers to Robert Southey's poem which narrates a former sailor's confession about torturing slaves who refused to eat. She acutely notes that white writers like Southey, even though with abolitionist sentiments, usually frame slaves' self-starvation as an expression of their abjectness and woe. However, in the primary account of former black slave Olaudah Equiano, the subversive-

ness of self-starvation is accentuated as an uncooperative act that resists the proslavery notion that plantation owners are benevolent and intended to take good care of their slaves by forcing them to eat, sometimes with horrible instruments such as the *speculum oris*. The life-enhancing process of eating, in the context of slavery, reifies Foucauldian biopower that has to be disrupted by suicidal hunger.

Towards the end of this chapter, Faubert reconsiders the trope of slave suicide in abolitionist literature in the period and argues that such texts, despite the positive intention to evoke the reader's sympathy, still "confirm the status quo of white power versus Black subjugation" (115). For instance, Maria Edgeworth's depiction of the owner-slave relationship in her poem "The Grateful Negro" appeals to "the white British reader's fantasy of power by expressing the colonial dream that white ownership of the enslaved is appreciated and even savoured by the dependent Black person, who cannot live without the paternalistic 'planter's' care" (116). In other words, abolitionist literature usually undermines the rebellious and subversive propensity in slave suicide and "confirms the white colonial desire to control the Black body" (119). The problematic nature of these works highlighted by Faubert is accurate, though not a particularly new observation, as Marcus Wood has elicited similar interpretations in his 2002 examination of John Gabriel Stedman's *The Narrative of a Five Year Expedition against the Revolted Negroes of Surinam* (1796) and its illustrations by William Blake in his *Slavery, Empathy and Pornography*.

In Chapter 4, Faubert turns her attention to female suicide in Romantic-period fiction, namely Mary Wollstonecraft's *Mary: A Fiction and Maria: or, The Wrongs of Woman* and Mary Shelley's *Mathilda*. Before analyzing the texts, she carefully interrogates the historical development of the literary image of female suicide. Faubert identifies an intriguing and lingering complex within the social perception of suicidal women that originates from the classical era and pervades eighteenth- and nineteenth-century English culture. That is, suicide has been first understood as a feminine act, suggesting that women tend to resort to it because they are mentally too weak to face and overcome adversities in life. But they also lack the courage and will to kill themselves. From either angle, women are perceived as insufficient beings, a notion that is reinforced by the literary and cultural association between female suicide and sexuality. For example, the classical icon of Lucretia as an example of honorable suicide after her rape is revived by eighteenth-century writers such as Samuel Richardson, Rousseau, and Gottfried Lessing, conveying the "misogynistic message that a woman's sexualized body is owned by her husband and her father" and "a woman's choice to die is legitimized when viewed as a defence of sexual honour" (144-45). Another

major representation of female suicide in both literature and art centers around the woman who is denied by the man she loves, most powerfully exemplified by Ophelia in *Hamlet*, who “does not die violently or aggressively, but weakly and passively” (146). Ophelia thus offers an ideal image of the suicidal woman, who is often portrayed in highly aestheticized and even erotic manners, rendering female death sexually attractive to patriarchal perception. These two types of female suicide—honorable and amorous—underscore women’s dependence and lack of agency; they end their own lives not as a result of exercising their free will, but because their lives are only meaningful when firmly anchored in their relationship to men, foregrounding “the cultural ideal that women are weak and dependent, unable to choose suicide for their own reasons” (151).

Faubert then connects this conception of female suicide to the culture of sensibility, arguing that the “literary trend was, thus, an affective tool of biopower in encouraging women to embrace their docile bodies willingly . . . The woman of sensibility internalises, even prizes, her passivity as a subject of biopower—sometimes to the point of death, which, ironically, undoes biopower’s aims” (158). She further demonstrates how male Romantic poets such as Wordsworth present the image of suicidal women in alignment with this understanding. In “The Mad Mother” and “The Complaint of a Forsaken Indian Woman,” Wordsworth reiterates the themes of unrequited love and desertion that prompt women’s suicidality. But Wordsworth’s suicidal woman restrains herself ultimately, latently subject to biopower, because her “violent intentions are far outweighed by her devotion to the life of her child” and she is portrayed “as pitiable, rather than rebellious, and, even in a state of insanity, a productive contribution to society” (159). And in the following sections, Faubert demonstrates how Mary Wollstonecraft and Mary Shelley subvert the established notion of female suicide as sexually attractive, passive, and without agency in their novels.

Wollstonecraft’s *Mary* and *The Wrongs of Woman* reflect her concerns about patriarchal dominion over the female body in marriage, as marriage constructs “their debased conditions as mere bodies without intellect or agency” and in this way, she evokes the reader’s “appreciation of the significance of their suicidal wishes” (Faubert 167). Moreover, Wollstonecraft draws an analogy between women’s predicament and plantation slavery to underline this dire condition of “enforced life”. Here Faubert rightly notes Wollstonecraft’s Eurocentric insensitivity to the real condition of African slaves, to which white British women’s suffering was not nearly comparable. Still, her employment of abolition tropes shows that “the earliest feminist struggles were waged under the banner of the human right to bodily freedom and autonomy, as were the earliest abolition-

ist struggles” (165). Faubert’s textual analysis of *Mary* focuses on the eponymous heroine’s death wish. As “the slave of compassion” who represents the eighteenth-century ideal of feminine sensibility, Mary’s final words refer to the verse from the Gospel of Mark about people in heaven who “neither marry, nor are given in marriage . . . as the angels which are in heaven” (Mark 12:25). This biblical reference signals Mary’s suicidal will to be liberated from her body subjugated to patriarchy: “a thinking woman—treated in her society as a mere body, as chattel to be traded in the marriage market—will conclude that her goal to improve her mind may only be fulfilled in the afterlife, where she will be bodiless” (168). But Mary does not commit suicide, but carries on with her life and career of charity, caring for those who are in need. Faubert reads Mary’s decision not to die as Wollstonecraft’s rejection of the pathological and passive image of female suicide that pervades eighteenth-century Britain. This reading, in my view, should be further explicated from the perspective of biopower. Does the fact that Mary turns away from taking her own life to devoting herself to philanthropy somehow embody the operation of biopower, as she makes herself “useful” to society? Or does it not because Mary sustains those who are principally oppressed and stigmatized by biopower? Nevertheless, the chapter offers a valid conclusion that Mary’s wish to die testifies to Wollstonecraft’s acknowledgment of “the multivalent significance of female suicide in her day” and transcends the female image “of sensibility who sinks into a femininely fragile death” (169-70).

On the other hand, Wollstonecraft’s unfinished novella *Maria*: or, *The Wrongs of Woman* situates female suicide in a mental asylum, an apparent Gothic locale that also actualizes the operation of Foucauldian biopower. Maria’s lines connect her subjugation to her husband to slavery, highlighting “Wollstonecraft’s assertion that eighteenth-century British society traps women through marriage as an institution of biopolitical control” (Faubert 170). After a futile escape attempt from this dire marriage because of her pregnancy, Maria is confined in the madhouse as a punishment of her pursuit of independence and freedom. The institute becomes a symbol of patriarchal oppression, “a place for people who have lost their minds” in which “women are only sex machines, lacking intellect and the agency that attends it” (171). Maria’s body is managed and regulated in the madhouse, especially regarding eating and sex. Such biopower control over the female body is construed by the judge presiding over her divorce plea as a necessary measure to secure her wellbeing, as she is mentally insufficient to make good judgment for herself without her husband’s care. After her divorce plea is denied, Maria’s suicidal intention is recorded in Wollstonecraft’s fragmentary notes that indicate Maria’s miscarriage and suicide. In another version of the

ending, Maria restores her will to live after knowing that her child does not die. Faubert convincingly argues that this seemingly “good” ending only suggests that without a living child, her body becomes “merely a grave for her unborn baby . . . the site of her husband’s imprisonment and control” (172) and confirms “the inescapability of women’s enslavement under patriarchal rule, which traps her by means of her body” (172). Maria’s child thwarts her potentially subversive and emancipatory act of suicide and epitomizes “her entrapment in the web of biopower that controls her body as the site of its maximisation of power through births” (172).

Faubert’s subsequent analysis focuses on Mary Shelley’s *Mathilda*, a novel that centers around a father’s incestuous desire for his daughter. The theme of incest and its narrative significance in the contexts of Romanticism and women’s writing have already attracted much critical attention in works by Tilottama Rajan, Melina Moore, Charlene E. Bunnell, Margaret Davenport Garrett, and Christa Schönfelder, to name just a few. Faubert departs from the existing studies by seeing the novella as an embodiment of “the woman-as-text,” a unique literary phenomenon constituted by her mother Wollstonecraft’s own suicidal wish communicated to her via writings and Shelley’s innovation of “the novelistic suicide note in *Mathilda*” (173). Suicide notes, as Faubert contends, “can function as replacement existences for the suicide” (174), further shaping the identity of the one who commits it and the way he/she is perceived by others. This is attested by Wollstonecraft’s accounts regarding her traumatic relationship with Gilbert Imlay and the notes by Mary Shelley’s half-sister Fanny Godwin and Percy Bysshe Shelley’s deserted wife Harriet Westbrook. Mary Shelley’s direct and intimate experience with these confessional writings about female suicide, as Faubert accurately proposes, renders *Mathilda* not only “an epistolary novel—a common form for the novel of sensibility, elements of which pervade the work—but, more specifically, as a letter composed as the last statement of the suicidal protagonist” (179). Like Wollstonecraft, Fanny, and Harriet, *Mathilda* articulates her suicidal voice through her writings, in which the suicidal woman actively establishes her identity—a form of self-fashioning—to counter patriarchal control, in this case *Mathilda*’s father’s incestuous love for her. *Mathilda*’s suicidal wish that permeates the text stands for her resistance to her father’s sexual obsession and belief that he owns her body as a property, a pure object of his sexual desire. Her resistance is intensified by her somatic description of how her body is somehow affected by such desire, conveying the idea of “her suicidality as a direct response to the patriarchal tyranny over her body” (184). Faubert’s interpretations of *Mathilda* are insightful in her centralization of the suicide note as a powerful literary medium to condemn men’s

possessive and perverse control over the female body and a way of “revolutionary self-construction” that restores the suicidal woman’s agency. However, the engagement with biopower is somewhat insufficient and perhaps problematic in this section (only briefly accounted for on page 182). The father’s incestuous desire for his daughter, though undoubtedly patriarchal, can hardly be categorized as a form of biopower. Faubert herself acknowledges that it is rather the social prohibition of incest that stands for biopower, because incestuous sex dismantles familial structure and is commonly believed to result in deformity or even death; the act is life-threatening, not life-enhancing and reproductive. It seems that Faubert’s reading of *Mathilda*, though effective in its own right, does not quite accommodate her central argument that suicide is a rebellion against biopower.

In the final main chapter, Faubert examines Romantic suicide as a religious rebellion against Christianity, mainly in Lord Byron’s closet drama *Manfred*. She first surveys the Christian discourse on suicide in the eighteenth century, pointing out that such an act is considered sinful because it directly violates God’s sovereignty over human beings. As the sole creator of humankind, God is the master of our human lives, not humans themselves. Also, from the viewpoint of biopower, suicide removes humans from their duty to God, as they are not defined as individuals but as part of God’s grand plan, which forms a collective consciousness of Christians. And in a period in which secular regimes are predominately regarded as divinely decreed, “religion’s function as an arm of state power” (197) is duly ascertained, and thus the severe prohibition against suicide. Faubert also identifies a contradictory view of suicide in Christianity; it can be promoted in contexts that represent utter devotion to faith (such as martyrdom) and reflect Jesus Christ’s spirit of self-sacrifice. The literary resonance with such a view can be traced back to John Donne’s works, especially his prose *Biathanatos* (1647). In line with Romanticism’s general rejection of orthodox Christianity, as Faubert maintains, Byron’s *Manfred* provides a powerful example of subversive suicide that rebels against religious authority over human existence.

Faubert first attends to Byron’s references to slavery in *Manfred*’s speeches, arguing that the poet “develops ideas linked to biopower, rather than sovereign power, in that he does not present a character who is threatened with death by the authorities, as would be the case under sovereign power” (219). This is illustrated by the Abbot’s “paternalistic care” of *Manfred* that aims to continue his life, which the hero refutes with constant analogies between existence and slavery. *Manfred*’s urge to be liberated from this enslaved condition is empowered by Byron’s generic choice and poetic designs of silence and lacuna, as a literary countermeasure against conventions and a manifestation of autonomy.

In other words, Byron chooses the form of the closet drama—which is meant to be unstageable—to resist the contemporary restrictions imposed on theater by the Licensing Act regarding subject matter, “by writing in a genre, mental drama, that circumvented the censorship of topics such as suicide and incest” (222). Moreover, with this generic choice, Byron deploys silence as a thematic element that dominates the play, in order to “protest the circumstance that helped to create it (control over the creative individual), and to represent suicide as a removal of the body from power’s sphere of influence (since the form denies the need for actors’ bodies)” (223). Faubert refers to Byron’s deliberate interruptions of speeches to prevent key messages from being uttered. For example, Manuel’s revelation of Manfred’s sibling relation to Astarte is halted by the Abbot’s entrance, and the ensuing silence intensifies the implication of incest that motivates Manfred’s death wish as a rebellion against religious authority, a form of biopower in Faubert’s reading. Another instance of such linguistic gaps is the Abbot’s unfinished phrase “And I do charge ye in the name—” in the final scene; that his declaration of God’s power is disrupted again corresponds to Byron’s poetic strategy of using silence to undermine Christianity’s spiritual control over the hero, whose autonomy and agency are proven by his will to die, to be free from a managed, regulated, and disciplined life. Generally, how Faubert bridges Byron’s generic choice of the closet drama, his employment of silence, and the themes of suicide is brilliant and well-informed by biographical evidence. What I find somewhat thin is again the engagement with Foucauldian biopower. I would expect to see more textual analysis of *Manfred* to demonstrate that Christianity in the poem indeed represents a sort of biopower, which, in Foucault’s terms, aims to put Manfred’s life (or his sexuality as opposed to incest) into public and useful discourse, “rendering it morally acceptable and technically useful” (Foucault 21).

To conclude, Faubert’s reconsideration of suicide in Romantic literature is commendable, as the topic has been generally approached from more philosophical perspectives in existing research. The involvement of Foucault’s conception of biopower undoubtedly provides an innovative and effectual angle to examine the issues of transatlantic slavery, women’s condition, and religious oppression in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Though this theoretical framework does not fully accommodate some of her interpretations (such as Mathilda’s father’s incestuous desire and the Christian authority in *Manfred*, as mentioned above), it nevertheless anchors the study more firmly in its historical and cultural contexts and points to ideological conflicts of race, gender, and religion of our time, as well as how human life should be weighed and valued in these conflicts. In *The Birth of Tragedy*, Friedrich Nietzsche refers to Silenus’s

remark in *Oedipus at Colonus* that the best thing for human beings is not to be born or to die soon, an utterly pessimistic worldview that affirms the inevitable and unbearable suffering of being alive (22). But as Nietzsche seeks to demonstrate in the book, only art and literature, in a profound sense of pessimism of strength, can relieve the suicidality inherent in human experience. By reframing suicide as a subversive act against biopower institutions that have caused a major part of the suffering in this world, Romantic literature, though championing death as Faubert's study has shown, might be able to inspire among the living the will to rise and resist.

Works Cited

- The Bible: Authorized King James Version, with Apocrypha*. Edited by Robert Carroll and Stephen Prickett, Oxford UP, 2008.
- Davies, Jeremy. *Bodily Pain in Romantic Literature*. Routledge, 2014.
- Faubert, Michelle. *Romanticism and Subversive Suicide: Human Rights, Existential Freedom and Biopower*. Edinburgh UP, 2025.
- Foucault, Michel. *The History of Sexuality: An Introduction*. Translated by Robert Hurley, Vintage Books, 1990.
- Haywood, Ian. *Bloody Romanticism*. Palgrave Macmillan, 2006.
- Nietzsche, Friedrich. *The Birth of Tragedy and Other Writings*. Translated by Ronald Speirs, Cambridge UP, 1999.
- Pfau, Thomas. *Romantic Moods: Paranoia, Trauma, and Melancholy, 1790-1840*. Johns Hopkins UP, 2005.
- Pinch, Adela. *Strange Fits of Passion: Epistemologies of Emotion, Hume to Austen*. Stanford UP, 1996.
- Richardson, Alan. "Romanticism and the Body." *Literature Compass*, vol. 1, 2004, pp. 1-14.
- Wood, Marcus. *Slavery, Empathy, and Pornography*. Oxford UP, 2002.