Theories of “Innocent Reading” East and West: Xujing in the Wenxin diaolong and Western Hermeneutics of Innocence
Author : Chi Ch’iu-lang
Keywords : innocent reading, interpretation, xujing, xushi, Liu Xie, Zhu Xi, Shattuck, Roger, Vendler, Helen, Gadamer, Hans-Georg
DOI :
Whether literary interpretation is defensible becomes a
question since Western literary theories appear to have reached a point of saturation. To make Comparative Literature a truly
global and cross-cultural discipline, Chinese scholars seem too preoccupied with absorbing Western theories or suffer from
their supposed “aphasia” in literary theory. We may examine
xujing (虛靜, emptiness and tranquility)—a traditional Chinese
concept—in conjunction with some recent pleas for “innocent
reading” in the West.
Obviously, neither xujing nor “innocent reading” can be
taken to mean absence of consciousness or of knowledge, for
without consciousness or knowledge, no mind can function at all.
Instead, both concepts refer to a heightened consciousness in which the thinking mind (or “imagination”) overlooks the pseudoscientific division between subject and object. Liu Xie (劉勰) refers to the thinking mind as roaming with objects (shen yu wu
you 神與物游), implying a unison between subject and object.
Roger Shattuck and Helen Vendler make much of reading with
“a kind of induced innocence,” presumably to achieve Susan Sontag’s “erotics” (in place of “a hermeneutics”) of art.
Proposed as an essential mode of the imaginative mind in
Liu Xie’s Wenxin diaolong (文心雕龍) (ch. 26), the concept of
xujing originated in the philosophical thoughts of Confucianism, Taoism, Buddhism, and the metaphysics of the Six Dynasties. It
is probably not until Zhu Xi (朱熹) of the Sung Dynasty, however,
who discussed xujing as a corollary to the concept of xushi (虛實, vacuity and tranquility vs. solidity and action, etc.). He pointed out that in putting xujing to practice, one should always bear in mind its opposite mode.
In the West, as literary interpretation received a great
boom after New Criticism, the concept of “innocent reading” was
conceived as an antidote for the rampant, chaotic usurpation of
the text which, ironically, the New Critics themselves had tried to
rescue by upholding the ontology of the text.
Granted that it is only human nature to have personal biases and ideological preconceptions, it does not follow that in
literature we can afford to do away with “intrinsic controls.”
Without joining in the stampede for correctness or scientific truth,
literary interpretation will have its own validity once we recognize
these controls to be part of the game. Moreover, unlike an imposed external force, these controls should well up within the
reader’s mind, acting much like the centripetal force that forms a
tension with the centrifugal force in Coleridge’s concept of
imagination, or like the yin (陰) and xu which accompany yang (陽) and shi in traditional Chinese thoughts. Before this becomes a general picture in literary interpretation, or any communication for that matter, we have to eradicate the
superstition that the “death of the author’ or the alleged
“instability of meaning” justifies the birth of any kind of reading
and any kind of readers.