The Ezra Pound Case: Freedom of Speech v. The Treason Clause
Author : Hsiu-ling Lin
Keywords : modernist poetics, right-wing politics of modernism, treason, freedom of speech, war-time broadcasting, the overt act, the intent, The First Amendment, The U.S. Constitution, World War II, Fascism, insanity, national citizenship, intellectual allegiance, constructive treason
DOI :
The first part of this essay lays out the literary debates on Ezra
Pound’s politics. Literary critics regard Pound’s fascism as the
signatory act of collusion between modernist poetics and right-wing
politics. Charles Bernstein, for instance, typifies the harsh criticism
that justifying Pound’s fascism is justifying fascism. I argue for
historicizing Pound’s ideas of fascism, a mixture of guild socialism and
social credit theory, which does not fall into easy categories of either
left or right. Furthermore, in the true libertarian spirit, defending
Pound’s right of anti-Semitic speech does not necessarily mean that
one has to agree with his politics. This stance can be substantiated
with the Skokie case (1977), which rules that even anti-Semitic
statements are protected by the First Amendment. We should
exclude the issue of anti-Semitism from Pound’s treason case. It is
time to render to the law the things that are the law’s, and to literature
the things that are literature’s.
Examining the legal aspect of the treason charge against Pound
in light of the United States Constitution and relevant precedents
reveals that because the treason charge requires both an overt act of
either “levying war’ against the government or “adhering” and “giving
aid and comfort” to the enemies, and the intent of betraying one’s
country, Pound’s radio speeches do not show sufficient evidence that
Pound intended to betray his country. From the perspective of the
common law and the precedents, the treason charge against Pound
was insufficiently founded. A genealogical study of the evolution of
treason clause demonstrates that the U.S. treason clause was
intended to be restrictive and narrow, a departure from the broader
constructive treason in British common law. U.S. court opinions have
interpreted the treason clause narrowly. Based on both the intent of
the Constitution’s framers and the judicial precedents, Pound should
have been acquitted of treason.
Perhaps the best way to examine the Pound case as it relates to
law and literature is to separate the moral verdict on Pound’s politics in
today’s literary discussion from the legal discussion, and, at the same
time, to bring light into literary discussion from legal discipline. This
will help us also contemplate further whether law and literature, as
quite distinct disciplines, can enrich each other, or, as Judge Richard
Posners claims, that they cannot be applied to each other.